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General Introduclion
CHAPTER I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, Economic Theory did not take into account the technological 
innovation issue. The reason it would seem is that, until recently, the so-called “Solow 
residual” was thought to be exogenous and, as such, it was not deemed worthy of deeper 
study. As a result, the research conducted in the microeconomics field was essentially 
directed towards problems related to the efficient allocation of resources.
Nowadays, however, it is generally accepted that technological progress is an 
essential factor for both economic growth, caused through improvements in productivity 
as a consequence of the utilisation of resource saving productive processes, as well as 
for the increment in welfare, caused through the introduction of new or better quality 
producís into the market. This makes the study of the mechanisms that encourage and 
condition this process of great interest and importance.
The last two decades have witnessed a growing interest by economists in the 
study of the determinants that influence a company’s spending on research and 
development of new processes and producís (R&D), that leads to the achievement of an 
innovation. This is not strange given the impressive technological revolution that has 
taken place in the second half of the century and which economics could not ignore.
The theoretical complexity that the inclusión of this new variable raises in the 
models has caused progress in this field to be slow. Nevertheless, the last few years 
have seen a certain acceleration in the achievement of relevant results at the same time
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as the amount of research in this topic has increased. In any case, it would be fair to say 
that the research is just beginning and the theoretical path that remains is long and 
problematic due to the special features of the variable under analysis.
For empirical studies the problems are in the collection of data and its 
interpretaron. There are serious problems, for instance, when looking for a reliable 
indicator of the technological activity of a fírm or industry (the number of innovations, 
patents or the expenses on R&D) because all of them present some kind of bias. A large 
part of the innovations achieved by firms are not patented because other better 
procedures sometimes exist to protect them (for instance, secrecy). Similarly, the 
innovative activity of a fírm cannot be measured statistically if it does not have a 
specific department devoted to this, that is, if it operates this task in an “informal” 
manner. In this case, the expenses on R&D do not reflect with accuracy the firm’s 
innovation performance. Moreover, the indicator of the number of innovations does not 
provide us with information about its real relevance.
The above comments are a consequence of the peculiarities that the 
technological innovation process presents and which makes analysis and applied 
implementation very difficult.
Thus, when a fírm decides to invest a given amount of resources in R&D it faces 
an uncertain environment because the results that it will obtain and the time spent on 
reaching them are unknown. Moreover, it is generally accepted that innovation contains 
the public good characteristic in a high number of cases which reduces the amount of
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profits obtained and encourages protection through, for instance, patents. This, on the 
other hand, can present positive effects if, as established by Jaffe (1986), the cost of 
innovating is reduced by the extemality that is generated by the R&D done by the firms 
located in a cióse “technological area”. We then face the so-called “appropriability 
problem”.
In a similar manner, innovating firms are located in non-competitive markets. 
This is because the effect of an innovation is to increase product differentiation or to 
reduce the cost of production. As is generally agreed, both have positive effects not only 
on profits but also on market share. In this respect, Schumpeter (1950), as the main 
reference author in this topic, established “market power” as one of the relevant 
incentives of the innovative activity for financial and appropriability reasons. This 
proposal, as we will see, has been empirically tested in a lot of studies. However, it 
seems that the relationship that exists between innovation and concentration acts in both 
directions making them, therefore, endogenously determined.
Although all the considerations made have always to be taken into account in the 
innovation process, the research in this field has actually been focused in determining 
the main incentives that a fírm has to conduct R&D. Starting with the Schumpeter 
writers, an important part of the literature has directed its attention to the problem of the 
effects of the aforementioned “market power” on the variable of interest, as well as to 
“fírm size”, as an element in connection with the former, whose foreseeable effect is 
based on the supposed existence of scale economies in R&D and on its fixed cost nature 
for the fírm. This is one of the main worries that remains today (e.g. Cohén and
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Klepper, 1996a,b). The true incidence of the mentioned determinants is not solved and it 
seems that innovation is influenced by other variables with a more clear economic 
justification.
So, there are two factors which are believed to have a major impact on the 
decisión to allocate resources to innovation: the market demand conditions the fírm 
faces and the technological environment in which it develops its task. The first factor is 
called “the pulí of demand” and the second “the push of technology”. Both provide a 
more satisfactory explanation of the incentives that lead the fírm in its technological 
evolution.
The basis of these determinants are the following. On the one hand, as 
Schmookler (1966) points out, the profits the fírm obtains ffom its spending on R&D 
are directly related to the number of product units that encompass the new technology. 
The higher the potential market the fírm faces the higher will be the incentive to conduct 
R&D, assuming that scientific knowledge is propagated enough so as all the industries 
are able to have access to it at the same cost. Similarly, the spending on R&D by firms 
has a fixed cost feature. Therefore, the higher the amount of sales in the respective line 
of business the lower the cost of the innovation per unit produced, which in tum will 
encourage the allocation of resources to research. On the other hand, more productive 
technological environments imply that the difficulty of obtaining an innovation is lower 
and, therefore, higher the effort directed by a fírm to spending in this area (Rosenberg, 
1974). In the literature, it is quite often considered that “technological opportunities” are 
typical of the industry where the fírm is located.
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Naturally, there are defenders of both hypothesis but, because an important 
number of empirical studies have revealed the significance of both factors, the debate 
has been focused only in its relative importance, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 
II.
Until now, expenses on R&D have been defmed in a generic manner. However, 
when a firm innovates it can do this in two different ways, although, as we will see, 
these are not al ways clearly differentiated. The first one has the objective of reducing 
the unitary cost of production through the improvement of the productive process, this is 
called “process innovation”. The second one tries to improve the quality of the existing 
products or to introduce a new product into the market, this is called “product 
innovation”. In any case, this last type of innovation normally has the effect of obtaining 
a greater product differentiation in the market, and therefore it shifts the downward 
sloping demand curve the firm faces rightward (recall that we are in a non-competitive 
market), allowing the firm to obtain a higher price-cost margin.
The theoretical models have analysed only one of the two types of innovations or 
have treated the expenses on R&D as a whole unit, independently of the different effects 
that each one has on the profits of the firms. Given the fact that firms obtain patents in 
both types of innovations1 (or, in any case, devote resources to both) it seems that taking 
into account only one aspect sheds light on part of the problem. Moreover, it is often the 
case that a product innovation requires a process innovation (Levin and Reiss, 1988),
1 The distinction between product and process innovation is relative. It is common to observe that the 
product innovation for an industry becomes, in fact, a process innovation for the industry that acquires 
these goods and uses them as inputs in its productive process. Some authors argüe that increments in 
productivity are in an important part due to the innovation acquired or used in a given sector (see
10
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making the analysis much more complex. This is the reason why, recently, some simple 
theoretical models have started to appear in the literature trying to provide some 
explanation of the existing relationship between the expenses on R&D destined to 
product innovations and those devoted to process innovations within the fírm (see, for 
instance, Bonanno and Haworth, 1998 or Yin and Zuscovitch, 1998). At the same time, 
in the empirical field there exits some research about the determinants that influence 
each type of innovation (Lunn, 1986, Levin and Reiss, 1988, Berstcheck, 1995, Cohén 
and Klepper, 1996a or Klepper, 1996).
We must take into account that, in the final analysis, the objective of an 
innovation (product or process) is to obtain a better position of the firm in the face of 
real or potential rivals and this should be the origin of the economic justification of the 
technological activity. For this reason, it is essential to consider the differential effect 
that these two distinct types of innovation have over the strategic features of the 
respective product (quality and cost), because it is quite obvious that these will be the 
main factors on which to base the competition position.
In this regard, it is logical to think that the variables “firm size” and “market 
power” are essentially the result of the relative position that a firm has in its price- 
quality relationship with respect to its competitors, taking as given consumer tastes. If 
we consider that both variables are affected in a great manner by the resources the firm 
devotes to innovation, then the endogeneity connection that the literature establishes 
between concentration and R&D should not be surprising ñor the confusión existing in
Sterlacchini, 1989 orGeroski, 1991).
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the role firm size has to play in its technological activity.
This, therefore, is going to be our point of departure. We will consider that the 
market share of the firm is essentially determined by the price-quality relationship that 
its product has compared to that of the rival firms and that these variables are basically 
affected by the expenses on R&D. So, in Chapter III, starting with the demand structure 
that comes from the product innovation model of Ulph (1991)2, we will analyse the 
decisión about the spending on cost-reducing R&D with the objective of investigating 
the influence of the different parameters of the model (quality gaps of the analysed and 
the rival innovative firm in relation to non-innovative ones, market dimensión and 
technological opportunities) on this variable. In this analysis, we are mainly interested 
in the effect that own vertical product differentiation has on the incentive the firm has in 
reducing its unitary cost of production (productivity) as well as the impact of the rest of 
the parameters on this relationship.
Due to the fact that we consider Bertrand competition in the product market (the 
price of the product depends directly on the unitary cost of production as well as on 
quality gap) and given the existing strategic interdependence among firms already 
mentioned, we have had to resort to numerical simulations in order to check the relative 
importance of the incentives that vertical differentiation provides to the R&D spending 
on process innovation. We have detected a quadratic relationship between these two 
variables. However, the effect of own quality gap on process R&D intensity (the cost-
2 This model was originally designed to study the existing relationship between the industrial structure of 
an economy and its growth rate. Once extended, it is used to study some aspects of the behaviour of 
innovative firms (product innovation) that present strategic interdependence in their decisions (Ulph and 
Owen, 1994).
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reducing R&D in relation to total sales) will be positive or negative depending on the 
assumption that the quality of the product enters or not the cost function.
The motivation for this research is derived from the following argument. Until 
now, the research conducted in the technological innovation field has taken the “size” 
and “market power” variables as determinants of the technological activity of the firm. 
In our case, the variable “vertical product differentiation” (in relation to price) 
substitutes these. It is therefore interesting to check under what circumstances this 
substitution is correct. If the assumption is true, the debate about the convenience of a 
given market structure as a factor that impels the innovative activity would have less 
sense, making the product features and the possibilities that the product gives to the 
strategic competition among firms more relevant factors3. Moreover, our main aim is to 
check that what has been predicted by the theoretical model developed in this research 
is, in fact, accomplished with the data available. That is, our intention is to investígate 
the influence that own vertical product differentiation has on productivity gains of a 
firm and if there is a point at which there exists a trade-off between quality and 
productivity, giving up the improvements in cost reduction in favour of welfare 
increments. In the final analysis, the problem in hand is to investígate if the achievement 
of a great product differentiation implies lower economic growth.
The empirical section is presented in Chapter IV using as a data source the 
“Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales” (Survey of Firm Strategies) conducted by the
3 In general terms, the literature has not taken into account the effect that product differentiation has on 
technological innovation. Some approach in this topic, especially in relation to the influence that 
differentiation has on the relationship concentration-spending on R&D can be found in Comanor (1967) 
and Shrieves (1978).
13
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Fundación Empresa Pública and which encapsulates for each fírm in the survey 
information about a wide range of variables that are very useful for this study. In the 
empirical specifícation of the model we have had to resort to some simplifications to do 
the estimation, trying always to keep as cióse as we can to the essence of the theoretical 
model. By means of the utilisation of a panel data in which the dependent variable is 
discrete (the number of process innovations) and the independent ones are considered as 
weakly exogenous, we are able to observe how the estimations confirm the main 
proposition of the theoretical model, that is, the existence of a point beyond which we 
find a trade-off between the vertical product differentiation of a fírm and its process 
innovation performance. In addition, the propositions derived about other variables 
(rivalry, market dimensión,...) are also, although only partially, confirmed.
Thus, when the sample is restricted exclusively to those firms revealing a certain 
degree of product differentiation, the “firm size” variable has a positive and significant 
effect that is able to severely reduce the impact of “rivalry” and “the pulí of demand”. 
This result contradicts, to a certain extent, the theoretical model (although own quality 
gap always behaves as predicted). The explanation we have given for this is that once 
some kind of “brand loyalty” is acquired, the negative impact that “rivalry” exercises in 
the attraction of new consumers as a consequence of the corresponding price reduction 
is significantly reduced and the argument of cost-spreading4 of Cohén and Klepper 
(1996a,b) becomes of greater importance.
When we refer to process R&D intensity (R&D expenses in relation to total
4 That is, at the same time the firm grows in size the cost of the innovation per unit produced decreases.
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sales) the estimation, apart from revealing important sectorial differences, suggests that 
the quality of the product does not enters, at least in a relevant manner, the cost function 
that, to our understanding, implies that the product innovations reported by the firm are 
essentially of an incremental nature. In any case, the small sample at our disposal in this 
specific study (only 134 firms for 1990) means that we should accept the 
aforementioned results with caution.
The research would not be complete if we did not proceed to confirm one of our 
main premises which consists in assuming that the variable we have taken as a 
dependent one, that is, our measure of the process innovation performance of a firm, has 
a relevant impact on the firm’s productivity evolution. This is done in Chapter V. 
Starting from the classical Cobb-Douglas production function extended with the 
inclusión of a measure of the knowledge capital, we test our hypothesis by establishing 
two assumptions not usually considered in this type of study. First, process innovation 
only is the technological variable responsible for the advances in productivity, leaving 
apart product innovation whose role is exclusive to the improvement of product quality. 
Second, in spite of considering the amount spent by a firm on R&D as the main 
component of its knowledge capital we assume that the process of leaming is by doing 
successfully and, therefore, we focus on effective innovations. Our estimations reveal 
that the technological variable chosen has a significant impact on the productivity 
evolution of a firm and this result is robust under altemative specifications.
The present work has tried to shed some light on the study of innovation 
differentiating clearly the distinct impact that the increment in product quality and the
15
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reduction in production cost have on firm profits, as well as the existent interrelation 
between both types of improvements. I hope this to be an additional “research” capital 
in this field.
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CHAPTER II: THE TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE INNOVATIVE
ACTIVITY
II. 1.- Introduction.
The purpose of this second chapter is to establish the point in which economic 
Science is situated about the determinants of innovation. Since Schmookler (1962) 
suggested that innovation could be explained following economic criteria, forgetting the 
past held beliefs of taking technological advances as given, the amount of studies in this 
fíeld has increased continuously.
These studies have been first focused in testing the known Schumpeterian 
hypothesis about the advantages that the “monopolistic firm” would have when it comes 
to obtain innovations, leading implicitly to the emergence of serious doubts about the 
theoretical proposition of the perversity of non-competitive markets. In fact, the 
important thing is to test if the variables “market power” and “fírm size” have the 
positive effects on innovation postulated by Schumpeter. Despite the effort devoted to 
this research, the results obtained are far from conclusive, although in the academic 
spheres the opinión is that the particular characteristics of the industry, the market and 
the firms that go to make it up are the real determinants of the existing relationship 
between size and innovation and that, in any case, concentration and innovation are both 
endogenously determined.
18
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It seems that both the expected growth in demand and the technological 
opportunities of the industry are the variables with a higher relevance for generating 
incentives for firms with the intention of directing resources to technological advance. 
In any case, there is a wide consensus about the validity of these two factors guaranteed 
by empirical studies, although the debate is focused in the relative importance of each 
one.
Finally, the public good feature that usually is given to technology has been also 
a theme of discussion because although, on the one hand, it is true that sometimes it acts 
as a negative incentive, on the other hand, it can induce firms to invest in R&D in order 
to profit ffom the available knowledge (Cohén and Levinthal, 1989) or, additionally, to 
increase the productivity of R&D when the technological environment is improved 
(Jaffe, 1986). The diverse studies do not provide clear results because to empirically 
measure these effects is extremely difficult.
Our aim in this chapter is not to make an exhaustive analysis of what the 
different authors have considered to be the relevant variables that influence firm 
behaviour in order to direct resources to innovation1 because we consider that this 
purpose has not sense. Our intention is to concéntrate on the basis that supports each 
factor and the difficulties that its measure and interpretation presents. This will serve us 
as the starting point for the theoretical and empirical models .
'A detailed analysis about this topic can be found in Cohén (1995).
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II.2.- Firm  size and innovation
Since Schumpeter established the generic idea that firm size (or line of business 
size) as well as its market power could influence in an important manner in its 
innovation focus2, establishing a dichotomy between static and dynamic efficiency, a 
high number of theoretical and applied studies have tried to test this hypothesis. In fact, 
investigating the level of certainty of this proposition has occupied the major part of the 
economic literature on R&D. The reasons for that lies, on the one hand, in the different 
interpretation that the distinct authors have given to the vague thoughts of Schumpeter3 
and, on the other hand, in the difficulties that present to empirically demónstrate its 
propositions as, for instance, those related with the measurement of the level of 
innovation.
The firm of a bigger size, that is, with a higher sales volume, can have some 
advantages when investing on innovation. For instance, the profitability obtained from 
cost-reducing R&D is directly related to the amount of product affected by the 
innovation, because the fixed cost that the innovation process implies is shared among a 
higher number of units (cost-spreading argument). Moreover, it is well known that in 
order to obtain an innovation it is necessary to put into effect projects with a high degree 
of uncertainty. For this reason, in a context of an imperfect capital market, the 
availability of liquidity by the firm and the stability of these fimds may be of great 
relevance in its decisión to direct resources to R&D. Therefore, it is assumed that a big
2 The hypothesis of Schumpeter (1950) and Galbraith (1956) is that the bigger firms generate a 
disproportionate amount of the technological advances of the economy.
3 The term “monopolistic firm” makes reference to both “size” and “market power” aspects.
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firm has more possibilities to generate the necessary volume of resources (cash-flow), 
avoiding the problems related to liquidity constraints. Moreover, there are also 
arguments in favour of the existence of scale economies in the technology of R&D4 and 
in the financial market (because of a great negotiation power) and that are more directly 
related with Schumpeter’s reasoning. Finally, it is assumed that the expenses on R&D 
are more productive for big firms than for small ones because of the scope economies 
obtained as a consequence of the existence of complementary projects and the co- 
operation between the R&D department and others (e.g. marketing).
In an attempt to test the Schumpeterian hypothesis, in a classical study, Comanor 
(1967) works out for 21 industrial sectors the elasticity of the level of research 
(measured by the average of the professional employees between 1955 and 1960) in 
relation to firm size (measured by the average of the total number of employees in these 
years). The result obtained by Comanor is that in only 6 of the 21 sectors there seems to 
exist scale economies in R&D, finding in these an estimated elasticity with a valué 
higher than 1. This leads to conclude that, in a great part of the industrial sector, the 
smaller firms conduct a greater proportion of research levels than the bigger ones, 
contradicting the thoughts of Schumpeter.
This approach, that is, to investígate the existing relationship between the scale 
of production and the inputs used for R&D, is widely criticised by Fisher and Temin 
(1973). These authors consider inappropriate the Comanor methodology in order to test
4 There are two reasons. First, because of a greater división o f labour, the higher is the number of people 
devoted to R&D the higher will be their effíciency, and second, given an amount of human resources 
devoted to this task, their productivity will be higher in a big firm due to the larger diversification of 
activities generated within it.
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the existence of increasing retums (scale economies) in R&D at the line of business and 
firm level. They demónstrate that the elasticity of the R&D output (increment in profít 
that occurs because the firm dedicates to R&D activities) with respect to firm size (total 
employment) is equal to the elasticity of the input of R&D in relation to size plus the 
elasticity of the average labour productivity of R&D (additional production per worker 
obtained as a consequence of the task done by the employees dedicated to R&D) also in 
relation to size. Moreover, these authors note that the argument of scale economies does 
not necessarily imply that the elasticity of the R&D input in relation to size is higher 
than one which, at the same time, does not imply the accomplishment of the hypothesis 
attributed to Schumpeter.
Thus, Fisher and Temin argüe that the existence of technological and financial 
scale economies cannot be tested directly disaffirming the studies that try to test a 
supposed consequence of it, that is, the more than proportional increment of the inputs 
o f the R&D activities with firm size.
The reply comes from Kohn and Scott (1982). In their article, these authors 
adduce a logical mistake in the argument of Fisher and Temin because the latter do not 
consider the optimisation restrictions of the firm. In this sense, Kohn and Scott 
demónstrate that the elasticity of the R&D input and output with respect to size are in 
direct connection with another three elasticities. These are the following: that which 
reflects the potential retums of the industry in relation to R&D, that which defines the 
degree in which an industry is Schumpeterian in the “cost sense” (an industry will be 
more Schumpeterian from this point of view the greater the elasticity of the marginal
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cost of R&D in relation to the output of R&D) and that which encompasses the degree 
in which an industry is Schumpeterian in the productivity sense (an industry is more 
Schumpeterian from this perspective the greater the elasticity of the marginal valué 
added of the R&D output in relation to the scale of production).
These authors demónstrate that if the elasticity of the R&D input in relation to 
firm size is higher than 1 or, altematively, if the elasticity of the marginal valué added 
of R&D in relation to firm size is higher than 1, it is possible to affirm that bigger firms 
obtain a proportionally greater R&D output. This is accomplished provided the 
existence of increasing retums in the R&D production as well as that the valué added of 
the output of R&D (given the number of workers not dedicated to R&D) is increasing 
with the mentioned variable but at a decreasing rate. Therefore, the authors establish the 
possibility to relate firm size with employment, output and the valué added of R&D. 
Moreover, they note that if an industry is excessively Schumpeterian, that is, if it is 
always profitable to invest an additional amount in R&D, a stable joint distribution 
between firm size and R&D activity will not exist in the market which probably would 
lead to an increasingly concentrated industry.
Once established the theoretical aspects of this topic, apart from the Comanor 
(1967) research, there are other relevant empirical studies that have tried to test the 
aforementioned hypothesis. Cumberston (1985) note that, within an industry, there 
exists a direct relationship between three variables given that all of them are related by 
an identity: firm size, market size and the relative position of the firm in the market. In 
this respect, although the tendency is to make a distinction between the absolute size of
23
The traditional determinants o f the innovative activity
the firm and its relative size (concentration) a wider and more consistent focus of the 
problem is to consider the connection between both through a third variable, that is, 
market dimensión. So, this author factorizes the changes on the expected R&D of the 
industry in the face of a transformation in its market structure in three effects, with the 
aim to expose with clarity the existent interactions among the different variables:
1 The “number effect”. This is the reduction in the number of firms due to an 
increment in its size and “market power”. This effect implies that even accomplishing 
the Schumpeterian-Galbraith hypothesis, R&D could be reduced with market 
concentration, making the impact of this effect stronger the greater the technological 
opportunities of the industry.
2.- The effect of “firm size”. This effect establishes that the relationship between 
firm size and R&D is positive and strictly convex (hypothesis of Schumpeter- 
Galbraith). Thus, the increment in the size of the bigger firms at the expense of the 
smaller ones will lead to an increment in the expected R&D of the industry.
3.- Market power effect. This does not have a clear direction even assuming that 
the Schumpeter-Galbraith hypothesis is accomplished as a result of the existence of 
complex interrelations between the variables reflecting market power (e.g. market share 
and concentration ratio).
After their econometric analysis the conclusión of Culbertson is that the 
expected R&D of the industry may fall with greater market power and firm size. This 
could be accomplished even if the expected R&D of the firm is increasing with market 
power and at a higher proportion with firm size.
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Cohén, Levin and Mowery (1987) note that it is necessary to consider an 
adequate unit of analysis in order to appropriately fix the effect of size on innovation. 
Then, the “cost-spreading” argument is better delimited when we consider the different 
lines of business within the firm (size of the line of business), firm size as a whole being 
more appropriate in order to measure the effects of imperfections in capital markets. In 
relation to those explanations based in the scale and scope economies, the most 
appropriate unit of analysis is a fimction of its nature. Moreover, these authors introduce 
in its regressions variables that try to reflect the different technological opportunities 
and market determinants (appropriability, market structure and demand conditions, 
market growth, price elasticity and income elasticity) that the distinct industries may 
present because taking them into consideration is important in order to extract valid 
conclusions for the relationship to be analysed. The data reveal that, once the fixed 
effects of the industry are taken into account, R&D intensity (not innovation intensity) 
at the level of line of business is not significantly affected by firm size. The size of the 
line of business has no effect on R&D intensity at this level although positively affects 
the probability to conduct R&D.
However, the authors find that firm size is significant (though with a very small 
impact) in industries with low technological opportunities. This seems to indicate that 
inter-industry differences in this variable (and probably also in appropriability 
conditions) influence the degree in which size gives advantages.
In the same line of research Pavitt, Robson and Townsend (1987) study the inter- 
industry distribution of the size of the innovating firms in the UK for the period 1945-
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83. As before, these authors establish the same two determinant factors of the inter­
sectorial variation of the innovating firms distribution: technological opportunities and 
appropriability conditions. They find how the relationship between firm size and 
innovative activity could be statistically described as U shaped5.
Recently, the “cost-spreading” argument has served Cohén and Klepper (1996b) 
as a basis for explaining the empirical regularities that are observed in the literature in 
the existent relationship between firm size and R&D6. From the authors’ point of view, 
there are two necessary conditions in order for the firm “ex-ante” output to influence in 
an important manner the expenses it conducts to R&D. On the one hand, the firm has to 
obtain the profits of the innovation essentially through its own output, that implies the 
assumption of the difficulty of licensing. On the other hand, the expected growth 
consequence of innovation must be low, being the main source of profits the growth in 
the price-cost margin of the firm and not the greater volume of sales. The main 
conclusión of these authors is that, contrary to previous arguments, firm size is quite 
determinant when spending on R&D at the intra-industrial level, and this is specially 
true in cost-reducing innovation.
5 These authors stress the fact that the innovations distribution by firm size differs substantially from that
based on R&D expenses. In particular, the number of innovations by employee is above the average in 
firms with less than 100 employees and in those with more than 1000 employees.
6 These regularities are:
1) The probability to conduct R&D increases with size.
2) Within the industry, R&D expenses and firm size are positively and directly related.
3) In a great part of industries, R&D expenses growth proportionally with firm size.
4) The productivity of R&D decreases with firm size because it undertakes, at the margin, less 
profítable projects.
26
The traditional determinants o f the innovative activity
The study of the role that scope economies have in the relationship between firm 
size and innovation has been scarce. The only research with a certain interest is that of 
Henderson and Cockbum (1996), in which it is analysed the relationship existing 
between firm size and research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry.
As already mentioned, the expenses on R&D can be more productive in bigger 
firms not only for reasons of scale economies but also for the existence of scope 
economies. These are derived from a larger diversification of projects that occurs in 
firms with a higher dimensión which allows extemalities within and outside the firm to 
be captured. There are two ways in which to obtain increasing retums from the 
technological effort of the firm. On the one hand, the accumulated knowledge of a given 
project can be used, at low cost or without cost, as productive input in other related 
projects. That is to say, the different activities can share inputs without additional cost. 
On the other hand, extemalities of knowledge among programmes can exist that 
increase the productivity of each one, making the research output affected irrespective 
of the expense incurred. It seems that both effects are presented in the pharmaceutical 
industry because the authors find a certain advantage on innovation for bigger firms and 
these also have more efficient research programmes.
As we have seen, we cannot establish a clear conclusión about the effect firm 
size has in its innovation effort. In any case, it seems that if we take into account 
technological opportunities and appropriability conditions of the industry as well as the 
particular features of the market (size, price elasticity, etc) the impact of firm size is, in 
general, very small making the aforementioned characteristics of greater relevance.
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Although it seems that at the intra-industrial level there are some authors for whom this 
is an essential variable.
The relevance of the innovations obtained by firms with different sizes is a point 
which has not been empirically solved. Rosen (1991) presents a theoretical model in 
which the author demonstrates that in order for the Schumpeterian hypothesis of action- 
reaction to be accomplished, the bigger firms have to invest more in R&D but in safer 
projects than the smaller ones, which implies that the latter obtain a greater percentage 
of the relevant innovations. The reason for the aforementioned empirical shortcoming is 
the non-availability of adequate data about the importance of the innovations and the 
level of risk which a firm incurs when it spends resources on R&D.
H.3.- Industry concentration and innovation
The influence that the degree of industry concentration has on innovation 
activity is another of the hypothesis established by Schumpeter that has had the 
attention of researchers as much as that of firm size. In any case, as we have seen, both 
determinants are closely connected (Culbertson, 1985).
Diverse are the reasonings that have tried to explain the fact frequently observed 
in the data that innovative activity grows with the degree of concentration until a given 
point beyond which it decreases.
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The argument of Schumpeter lies in the consideration that greater industry 
concentration implies, through higher market power of the firms that go to make it up, a 
reduction in market uncertainty and provides, therefore, the intemal funds necessary to 
undertake a costly and risky activity to an effícient scale as is the investment in R&D7. 
Other arguments make reference to the more favourable conditions of appropriability of 
the profits derived from innovation that the firms that opérate in more concentrated 
markets have.
In this sense, Scherer (1983) in an study in which connects the degree of industry 
concentration with the amount and the type of expenses on R&D the firm incurs 
(process or product) and, from here, with productivity growth, finds that probably the 
appropriability conditions and, to a lesser extend, the technological opportunities of the 
industry are the most important factors to explain the positive relationship that the 
estimations reflect between concentration and R&D intensity8. The intuition of Scherer 
is the following: the higher the industry concentration the higher will be the market 
share of its main firms and also the portion of cost-saving the firm can appropriate 
through its process innovation (assuming high transaction cost for licensing). In this 
respect, the firm will have higher incentive to invest in R&D, and as a consequence, it 
will have larger productivity growth.
7 Comanor (1967) highlights the fact that the Schumpeterian hypothesis could be considered as 
concentration having two sepárate effects on the research level. On the one hand, an effect of firm size 
as a function of the relative size of the main firms in the industry. On the other hand, we have the 
aforementioned market power effect. Moreover, this author puts the connection between the possibility 
o f differentiate the product in the market and the impact that concentration may have on R&D 
expenses. The greater the possibility of differentiate the product (barriers to entry) the lower this 
impact because the competition in R&D is important.
8 When we speak about R&D intensity we refer to the current spending on R&D as a ratio to total sales.
29
The traditional determinants o f the innovative activity
As Geroski (1990) noted, for an adequate testing of the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis it is necessary to distinguish between the expected market power that is 
presumably obtained as a result of an innovation and the market power the firm has 
now.
The expected monopoly power is directly connected with the innovator ability to 
appropriate for all the profits of the innovation avoiding being imitated. If, from this 
point of view, it is considered that the Schumpeterian hypothesis implies that innovation 
takes place only when it is expected to reach a degree of market power that allows the 
firm to cover at least its cost, it seems that the consensus is easy to obtain.
By contrast, if this hypothesis is formulated in terms of the actual market power, 
serious doubts emerge about its validity because there exist forces that act in inverse 
senses. A indirect positive effect of having at present a certain degree of monopoly 
power is derived, for instance, from the capacity the firm has to raise barriers to entry in 
the future because it benefits from them today. This affects the size of post-innovation 
reward. The direct effects are defined for a given level of post-innovation reward. In the 
positive side, a firm with certain monopoly power can have more qualified employees 
and an important amount of cash-flow that leads to a better adaptation to any event, not 
having to resort to costly extemal funds. Moreover, it is usually affirmed that resorting 
to extemal financial funds is not adequate for this type of spending in order to avoid that 
valuable information reaches rival firms. In the negative side, we also find distinct 
arguments. Firstly, the absence of competitive forces can reduce the ability of a firm to 
adapt to extemal shocks. Secondly, it is well known that the higher the number of firms
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the higher is the probability of innovating in any given moment of time. Finally, the 
leader firm in a given period has reached this position because of past innovations, 
having lower net profits from innovation than potential entrants because part of the 
innovations obtained are displaced.
Taking into account the above considerations, the estimations of Geroski (1990) 
suggest that the existence of higher degree of rivalry among firms in the market does not 
lead to a reduction in the innovation rate. Moreover, the data indicates that a positive 
effect of the actual degree of monopoly on innovation does not exist but on the 
monopoly which is expected in the future. In any case, this author highlights the fact 
that the factor that has the greatest importance on innovation is that which reflects the 
technological opportunities of the industry. If we do not take them into account the 
results are biased as they overestimate the concentration effect.
In this line of research we also find the work of Levin, Cohén and Mowery 
(1985) with a very similar approach to that analysed in the previous epigraph. These 
authors use likewise the line of business as a unit of analysis and include the systematic 
inter-industrial differences existing as a result of distinct points of departure in that 
referred to technological and appropriability conditions. They conclude that the degree 
of concentration of the industry has a very small impact on innovation effort and, in 
some cases, it is non-significant depending on the estimation procedure. Scott (1984) 
argües that the explanation of this fact may be that the degree of concentration of the 
industry is the reflection of a collection of specificities that it presents and that can be 
encompassed by the State of technology and the imitation possibilities. Following the
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guidelines established by the rest of the studies mentioned, the author observes how the 
particular effects of the firm and the industry explain a high percentage of the spending 
on R&D per unit of product.
In any case, we have to always take into account that the relationship between 
concentration and innovation is in both ways and that both variables are endogenously 
determined (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). Thus, the achievement of an innovation by a 
firm gives it a transitory monopoly power that can be gradually reduced when the rival 
firms obtain innovations or imitate the existing ones. Foliowing this reasoning, Levin 
and Reiss (1984) starting from a theoretical model in which innovation and 
concentration are simultaneously and endogenously determined, show that R&D 
intensity has a strongly positive effect on industry concentration. In contrast, the degree 
of concentration influences negatively this variable except for those industries with a 
greater orientation to product innovation.9 For these authors, the simultaneous 
determination of R&D and industry concentration is a function of three main factors: the 
demand structure, the richness of the technological opportunities and the technological 
and institutional conditions that establish the degree of appropriability.
Angelmar (1985) carries out an interesting research that, in some sense, qualifies 
the above affirmation. The study of Angelmar is focused on industries with very rich 
technological environments in which it is assumed, a priori, that greater industry 
concentration will have a negligible effect (or even negative) on R&D expenses 
because of the lesser importance that in this case the introduction of better products into
9 However, Lunn (1986) fmds a positive relationship between concentration and the patents that reflect 
process innovation but not with those reflecting product innovation.
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the market would have. This author notes that at least two additional factors must be 
taken into account: the cost and uncertainty of R&D (different among industries because 
of minimum budget needs or the time necessary to introduce the innovation into the 
market) and the imitation capacity of the rival firms. The estimations of Angelmar lead 
to the conclusión that when the cost and uncertainty of R&D as well as the imitation 
speed by rival firms are high10, concentration has positive effects on R&D. In contrast, if 
the cost and the uncertainty of R&D are low and there exists important imitation 
barriers the net effect is negative.
A recent study related to this point is that of Blundell et al. (1993). This work is 
based on the same sample used by Pavitt et al. (1987). The results of this research 
highlight the fact that, being true that firms with greater market shares have higher 
probability of innovating because of their higher incentives11, more competitive 
industries tend to induce higher levels of innovation. This reasoning is in line with the 
work of Geroski (1990). Therefore, it is necessary to add information at the firm and 
industry level to establish rigorously the impact of market structure on innovation.
As we have seen the number of studies is very high and, therefore, the results 
obtained allows for the possibility of diverse interpretations. The clearest conclusión we 
can extract from this overview is that both the degree of industry concentration and the 
expenses on R&D are endogenously determined and that the technological environment
10 Following Levin et al (1987) the speed of imitation by rival firms is negatively related to the capacity 
of patenting, secrecy and the possibility to induce brand loyalty and positively related to the ffequency 
with which consumers buy the product.
11 Following the model of Gilbert and Newbey (1982), the monopolist has greater incentives to the 
achievement of a process innovation than the entrants because the profits of the industry decrease when 
the market is shared with a higher number of firms. This effect is taken into account by the monopolist 
but not by the entrants. This is the reason why the former innovates more.
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in which the industry is located and the demand structure as well as the existing barriers 
to imitation condition in a great manner the relationship between both variables. These, 
therefore, are ultimately the factors that determine innovative activity.
II.4.- The pulí of demand
The idea that market dimensión or, more generally, the demand conditions of an 
industry is the factor with higher relevance in the direction and magnitude of the 
innovation effort was fírst established by Schmookler (1966)12. This author observed a 
linear relationship and high correlation between the innovations (patents) achieved in 
the industries producing capital goods and the demand directed to these firms (measured 
by capital investment)13.
The argument of Schmookler (1966) relies mainly in considering that the prívate 
profit from research varíes in direct proportion to the amount of product that 
encapsulates the new knowledge. An additional explanation of this positive incentive 
also being the aforementioned argument of “cost-spreading”. In order to sustain this 
affirmation, this author assumes, on the one hand, that the ability for invention responds 
very rapidly to profit opportunities and, on the other hand, that the greater the dimensión 
of the actual and potential market the higher the innovative activity directed to it, 
because profits increase with market dimensión. Additionally, the greater the productive 
activity directed to satisfy a given demand the higher the possibilities of finding a
12 This author was also the fírst one in postulating that innovative activity could be explained through 
economic incentives.
13 This result depends critically on the fact that capital goods innovations were classified by the industry 
of use and not by the industry of origin.
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solution to the set out problem (Scherer, 1982). All of this implies that scientific 
knowledge is sufficiently developed and disseminated as the supply of new knowledge 
is very elastic, at the same cost level, for all industries and firms. That is to say, the cost 
of the invention is the same for all the industries.
However, Schmookler (1966) itself qualifies this restrictive assumption, 
recognising that firms in industries with more richer technological environments have 
certain advantages in the achievement of innovations. At the same time, the author 
argües that the application of technology is very adaptable and it will be directed 
towards one sector or another depending on the potential profit to be obtained and that, 
in the final analysis, it would be determined by its demand.
The arguments of Schmookler have not been void of critics. Rosenberg (1974) 
presents, with an abundance of examples, the evidence that the cost of invention differs 
among industries, a fact that is demonstrated by the diverse evolution in the progress of 
the distinct branches of Science. Moreover, it is argued that it is not completely true that 
the progress of the invention or innovation is the reflection of a given existing demand 
because an important part of individual needs or wishes have remained unsatisfied or 
badly supplied during prolonged periods of time despite the existence of a solid 
demand. A clear example is that of medicine, where accelerated progress has not been 
possible until the existence of scientific knowledge that could allow it (i.e. the 
development of bacteriology). Through successive historical examples, Rosenberg 
demonstrates how the supply side, that is, the increasing stock of knowledge, has been 
determinant in explaining the progressive satisfaction of human needs through
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innovation. So, the State of the different sources of scientific knowledge have lead to 
some innovations being less costly than others. As a conclusión, this author highlights 
the fact that the allocation of resources of the innovative activity in an economy is not 
only the result of forces operating on the demand side (that determine the profitability of 
the innovation) but also the result of the advance occurring in the supply side 
(knowledge) which determines the probability of success of the innovation and is also 
an indicator of the cost of obtaining it.
A more rigorous attempt to test the Schmookler hypothesis is done by Scherer 
(1982). This author uses a wider survey than Schmookler14 and less biased towards 
traditional sectors. In this case, the patents sample is classified in a manner that does not 
imply any difference in doing this by industries of origin and industries of use as was 
the case of Schmookler15.
In his estimations, Scherer finds that the relationship between the demand index 
and patents flow is positive and significant although, and this is one of the important 
differences, the relationship is not linear revealing the existence of decreasing retums. 
Moreover, in the sample a distinction is made between capital goods and industrial 
materials innovations considering that the relationship with the respective demand 
measures is stronger for the first case, arguing that Schmookler started from the most
14 The Schmookler analysis included only between 6% and 8% of the total number of patents registered in 
the USA between the end of the forties and the beginning of the fífties.
15 Schmookler estimated also classifying patents according to the industry of origin. The relationship 
found was also linear but with much lower correlation, a fact that the author explains for the existence 
o f differences in technological opportunities among industries (a greater number of innovations per 
unit of product for the industries with richer opportunities). When the differences in technological 
opportunities are aggregated, classifying the innovations by industries of use the high correlations 
indícate, following the author's point of view, the greater relevance of the demand forces.
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favourable case in order to demónstrate his own proposition. But perhaps, the most 
important contribution of Scherer is to consider the technological opportunities of the 
industries (classifíed according to the richness of its knowledge basis) through the use of 
dummy variables in his regressions in order to investígate the role of this variable on 
innovation. The results obtained show that factors on the supply side explain a very high 
fraction of the variance of the innovative activity (around 60%) and at all times a higher 
that those obtained in the Schmookler estimations.
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) carry out a similar study but in this case the 
measure of the innovative activity is R&D intensity. In this case, the Schmookler 
hypothesis has to be modified because it is based on levels of innovative activity and 
absolute market size. Given that there is a normalisation by the current level of output, 
the differences that might be produced in the expected market size will be determined 
by the expected demand growth rate.
These authors argüe that the optimal level of R&D activity depends, in a wide 
sense, on two main factors: the supply of new scientific and technological knowledge 
and the existence of effective demand for this knowledge that depends on the ability to 
extract profits of a given unit of the produced knowledge (appropriability) and on the 
output level and expected demand growth of the good that encapsulates the new 
knowledge. The estimations carried out by the authors differ when considering the intra- 
industry and inter-industry context.
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At the intra-industry level, the mechanism of demand induction has a very small 
effect making the “appropriability” factor and the intra-industrial differences in 
technological opportunities more importance. These results do not necessarily contradict 
the Schmookler hypothesis because, as already mentioned, they refer to innovation 
level.
At the inter-industrial level the growth rate of demand explains a high 
percentage of the variance (65%) that, at first sight, is surprising and contradicts the 
intra-industrial results. The explanation may be that growth rates of the different 
industries are highly correlated with those factors at the intra-industry level that 
encourage the research activity of firms.
Finally, Jaffe (1988) carries out, basing his study on a cross-section of data, a 
very rigorous analysis in which, apart from introducing variables on the demand side, 
considers the incidence of the different technological opportunities of the industries as 
well as the possible extemalities of innovation that could exist. In this study, the author 
analyses for the USA manufacturing industries the effect that both demand and supply 
factors could have over R&D intensity and productivity growth.
The results of Jaffe indicate that both types of determinants are relevant. In 
particular, this author finds that the explained variance by factors representing the 
market conditions is a little higher than that explained by technological opportunities.
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All in all, as we have explained the forces that act on the demand side and that 
mainly affect the profits that can be achieved from innovation or, at least, can serve as 
an indicator of it, must be taken into account. Perhaps, Schmookler was not accurate in 
highlighting that the factors that, in one sense or another, condition the market size o f 
the product that encapsulates the new knowledge have a higher relevance, trying to 
reduce the importance of the restrictions that could come from the State of scientific and 
technological knowledge and the speed of its progress. To see in more detail if this 
omission is relevant, in the next section we will analyse the contribution in the literature 
to the analysis of the effect of these technological factors, although we have already 
given an idea of their significance.
II.5.- Technological opportunities
In previous sections, in which we described the effects of firm size, 
concentraron and market dimensión on innovative activity, we have occásionally 
outlined the relevance of considering a variable, specifíc to each industry, that 
apparently condition the relationship to be investigated16. This variable is called 
“technological opportunities”. The concept that is encapsulated in the expression 
“technological opportunities” is too wide, diffuse and, on some occasions too 
ambiguous in providing a precise description.
16 As Dosi (1988) points out, the scientific knowledge plays a crucial role in the emergence of new 
possibilities to greater technological progress. In any case, this author highlights the fact that, even 
taking into account technological opportunities, market dimensión and its growth rate have some 
influence in the propensity to innóvate.
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As mentioned above, Rosenberg (1974), in his critique of Schmookler, outlines 
the importance that scientific progress has for achieving an innovation. Through the 
verification of some historical events, he describes how the different development in the 
distinct fields of Science at each moment in time have implied that the emergence of 
inventions is not equally possible for all industries17. From this point of view, 
technological opportunities would be the expression of the cost of invention that differs 
among industries.
In a similar line of research, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) define the 
technological opportunities of an industry as the reflection of the diffículty with which 
scientific knowledge allows firms to transform the inputs used in research on 
innovations. Although this focus seems appropriate, it is defined in excessively general 
terms to be satisfactory.
Cohén, Levin and Mowery (1985, 1987) make a more concrete approximation to 
the significance of technological opportunities establishing three factors that 
characterise and determine these: the degree of proximity to science, the importance of 
the extemal sources to technical knowledge and the industry maturity. Based on a 
known survey among executives of the main USA firms carried out by Levin et al. 
(1987), the authors build on some variables that approximate the three factors 
mentioned above.
17 It is very ¡nteresting, for instance, the description that this author makes about the diffículty that 
supposed the substitution of wood by coal in some industrial activities.
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The proximity to Science is measured by the importance of the different basic 
and applied Sciences (among 11 branches) in the technology of each industry. In 
reference to the influence exercised by the different sources of technical knowledge that 
operates with the firm, the variables that determine it can be defíned in four different 
ways: the equipment and raw material suppliers, the users of the industry products, the 
govemmental agencies and research laboratories. The last mentioned factor is 
approximated by a variable that captures the relative maturity of the technology of an 
industry through the industrial property and the equipment installed in a recent period of 
time. Following the distinct estimations done, the aforementioned variables are 
significant in the explanation of the R&D intensity.
The analysis that, from our point of view, presents a higher degree of accuracy is 
that of Jaffe (1986, 1988 and 1989) in its different studies. The main premise of this 
author in relation to this innovation dimensión is in accordance with that exposed before 
because, for him, technological opportunities reflect the exogenous variation in the cost 
and diffículty of innovation18 in what he calis, and this is where he is original, the 
different “technological areas”19.
The author postulates the distinction that should be made between industries and 
technologies, concepts which in previous works have lead to confusión. Within an 
industry firms can adapt different technological strategies. The example of Jaffe clarifies
18 However, the author recognises that the technological position of a firm can have a certain degree of 
endogeneity, although only in relative long periods of time. Then, he fínds evidence of the adjustment 
o f the technological position of firms in response to technological opportunities.
19 Jaffe argües that the factors affecting innovation in the supply side cover two aspects both enshrined in 
the concept of technological opportunities: the variation in the intrinsic diffículty of the innovation in 
the different technological areas and the State of scientific knowledge in each area.
41
The traditional determinants o f the innovative activity
this. A firm in the vehicle sector can, for instance, carry out research in three different 
areas: engines, aerodynamics and the structural properties of some materials. For this 
reason, the use of dummy variables for each industry with the objective to incorpórate 
technological opportunities in the empirical model (e.g. Scherer, 1982) does not seem 
adequate and, even more, when we pretend to distinguish between the effect of 
technology and that of market size.
The procedure of Jaffe is the foliowing. First, the author classifies the patents 
achieved by a firm in a given period of time according to the corresponding 
technological epigraph working out, for each one, the proportion that those carried out 
in each technological field represents as part of its total number of patents. 
Consequently a vector of the participation that each firm has in each technological space 
is obtained. The relative technological proximity of each firm with respect to the rest of 
the firms is determined as a fimction of this vector. Thus, for each pair o f firms, it is 
possible to obtain this data working out the angular separation of its vectors. Once Jaffe 
has these valúes, he identify clusters with a similar technological position, that is to say, 
combinations of technologies with a high scientific relationship.
Following this procedure, the author finds a very relevant effect of the dummy 
variables build on the technological groups mentioned above in four economic 
indicators: patents, revenues, profits and the market valué of the firm. In any case, it is 
necessary to say that the distinction between industries and technological areas, 
although convenient, does not seem to imply important classification differences. When 
dummy variables for industries and technological areas are introduced into the
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regressions we observe that both factors are significant. When we consider each one 
independently the effects of the industry dummies are non-signifícant in the equation in 
which the dependent variable is patents.
Geroski (1990) also highlight the relevance that technological opportunities have 
over innovations. His estimations establish that variations in technological opportunities 
explain approximately 60% of variations in innovations. In this case, the dependent 
variable is the number of innovations and technological opportunities are encapsulated 
in the individual effects because this author considers that they cannot be measured by 
observables but have the property that, although differing by industries, are relatively 
constant in the short and médium run for each one.
More recently, we find the work of Thompson (1996). The author estimates for 
13 industries the elasticity of the production ñmction of R&D, which is interpreted as a 
measure of technological opportunities20. Some results of this research have to be 
outlined. There is a certain evidence of decreasing retums in R&D, that is, the number 
of additional innovations achieved decreases with the effort devoted to R&D. Moreover, 
the variations in technological opportunities over time are not correlated among 
industries, reinforcing the fact that they encapsulate very specific factors of each one. 
Therefore, the behaviour that technological opportunities of each industry present does 
not depend on what matters in other industries. However, the expected rate of growth of 
technological change in the different industries are clearly correlated with the expected 
growth at the aggregate level.
20 What the author is really estimating is the marginal productivity of R&D for a given level of spending 
on R&D.
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All in all, technological opportunities refer to the productivity that the firm 
located in a given industry (or, altematively, technological area) obtains from its 
expenses on R&D, that is to say, reflects the importance of the innovation that can be 
reached given the R&D expense. This parameter is specific to each industry (or 
technological area) and its evolution seems independent of the evolution experimented 
in other industries and, without exception, it is very significant in the explanation of the 
allocation of resources to R&D.
H.6.- Uncertainty and appropriability
Perhaps, these are the two most characteristic aspects of the spending the firm 
directs to R&D of new products and process. At the same time, they are the least known 
and studied because of the difficulty of their analysis, although for the extemalities case 
there have been in recent years a significant advance with the emergence of an increase 
in the literature.
The uncertainty aspect has been treated explicitly in theoretical models and, for 
this reason, it will be analysed in more detail in Chapter III of this thesis. In any case, it 
would be convenient to provide, at least, its concept. It seems quite evident that, when a 
firm devotes resources in order to maintain a given infrastructure on R&D (employees, 
plant and equipment) it does not know, a priori, what is going to be the result of this 
spending and when it will occur. That is to say, the firm faces a high degree of 
uncertainty about the productivity of the employed resources and in which period of 
time the results will be achieved. The theoretical modelling takes into account this fact
The traditional determinants o f the innovative activity
through the so-called “hazard fimctions”. It is established that the probability that a firm 
obtains an innovation in a given moment of time, conditioned on not having obtained it 
until this moment, depends directly on the amount of resources directed to R&D. That is 
to say, it is assumed that the greater the amount of resources directed to research the 
higher the probability to obtain an innovation in a shorter period. Although this type of 
modelling is interesting and, as we will see, outlines some relevant points, it has no 
empirical implementation and this is the reason why it losses a part of its interest.
The topic of extemalities, usually reflected in the literature as the study of the 
impact that appropriability conditions of an industry have on the incentives a firm has to 
invest in innovation, has been treated in a relevant number of studies with the 
achievement of contradictory results. Although, the extemalities of R&D are generally 
considered as the problem the appropriability of the profits an innovation leads to, it 
also presents another different aspect.
In this respect, Cohén and Levinthal (1989) highlight the role that the expenses 
on R&D can play as a way to acquiring the knowledge generated outside the firm and 
that can be profitable for it. These authors argüe that the fact that the knowledge is in the 
public domain does not imply that it has to be considered as a public good because costs 
of assimilation of the technological knowledge exist. In other words, the firm has to 
acquire enough training (through expenses on R&D) for interpreting in its own benefit 
the knowledge that is at its disposal. From this point of view, the expenses on R&D not 
only serve to generate innovations but also to improve the ability of the firm in order to
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assimilate and extract the existing information from different sources. Thus, the 
spending on R&D has an aspect called “absorptive capacity”.
Following these premises, Cohén and Levinthal (1989) develop a theoretical 
model reflecting the generation of the technological knowledge of a firm through three 
sources: the spending on R&D by the firm, the extemalities generated by the R&D of 
the rival firms and the knowledge generated outside the industry. The last two factors 
influence the firm’s knowledge to a greater or lesser extent depending on its ability to 
assimilate them. This ability will depend on its own expenses on R&D which are 
conditioned by the extemal knowledge features (for instance, the complexity that the 
knowledge to acquire incorporates or the degree to which this knowledge may cover the 
firm’s needs reflecting the greater or lower diffículty of its leaming). In fact, in their 
theoretical analysis, the authors demónstrate how at the same time that assimilation (or 
leaming) depends on a higher extend on own R&D expenses, more important 
technological opportunities or extemalities have a stronger impact in its R&D effort. 
Therefore, the inclusión into the model of the existence of an endogenous “absorptive 
capacity” may modify the qualitative impact of the determinants of the innovative 
activity mentioned above.
The empirical analysis tries to include both the negative aspect of the 
extemalities (appropriability) and the positive one (absorptive capacity) over the R&D 
effort of firms. Although the latter cannot be done directly, it is feasible to see how the 
different level of diffículty of the knowledge assimilation that each industry presents21
21 It is measured by the máximum score revealed in the aforementioned survey of Levin et al. (1987) that 
six different mechanisms have in the effíciency of protecting the profíts generated from new process
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influences the distinct impact that appropriability has in the variables of interest. The 
estimations reveáis a negative net impact of extemalities but they confirm that the 
“absorptive capacity” effect is significant. Moreover, the positive effect grows in 
relation to the negative one the greater the intrinsic ease of leaming of each industry, the 
higher the price-elasticity of demand and the higher the number of firms in the 
industry22 (these last two related with a more competitive environment).
We find in a similar line of reasoning the work of Jaffe (1986). From the 
author’s point of view, there exists a positive aspect of the extemalities that is not 
sufficiently taken into account in the literature. Following Jaffe, the scientific 
knowledge is by its nature a public good23. So, the existence in the firm environment of 
technologically related research efforts can allow the achievement of similar results 
devoting less amount of resources to R&D than would be necessary in a situation where 
this did not occur. Therefore, from a strictly technological point of view a positive 
extemality exists, that is, the productivity of R&D is increased with the R&D of 
technological neighbours. However, the author also recognises that this type of 
extemality cannot be identified in practise and distinguishes it from the negative effect 
that from an economic perspective is produced because of competitors' rivalry.
and producís: patents that protect duplication, patents that secure revenues through royalty rights, 
secrecy, being the first to obtain the innovation, faster movement through the leaming curve and 
complementary efforts in Services and sells.
22 In a versión of the theoretical model in which the authors introduce the process innovation aspect, they 
demónstrate that in more competitive environments is more likely that the equilibrium level of R&D 
grows with extemalities. This is because greater competition implies that the prívate loss associated 
with the public aspect of the extemalities of R&D decreases in relation to the prívate profits that 
represents “absorptive capacity”.
23 In this sense, Jaffe does not take into account the cost that supposes the knowledge acquisition outlined 
by Cohén and Levinthal (1989).
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In order to study the impact of the extemalities on the different indicators of the 
output of the innovative activity (patents, profíts and market valué of the firm) Jaffe 
build on a variable that serves as an indicator of the extemalities that are potentially at 
the disposal of a firm coming from the firms located in its technological area. This index 
is composed of a weighted sum of the R&D of the firms located in the corresponding 
technological area, where the weight is defined by the “technological proximity” 
between two firms as explained in the previous epigraph. In any case, the author 
assumes that appropriability conditions are the same in all technological areas.
The corresponding estimations reflect a positive impact of the extemalities on 
patents both directly and indirectly through the elasticity of R&D. However, this impact 
is negative if we consider the direct effect on profíts and the market valué of the firm. 
The indirect effect through the increment in the productivity of the own R&D is relevant 
in firms with a high effort on R&D, but for those below the average it can even be 
negative. The negative effect because of rivalry seems to play a greater role in those 
firms with lower effort on R&D. In posterior works (Jaffe, 1988 and 1989) the author 
confírms these results.
In the work of Cohén, Levin and Mowery (1985, 1987) already reviewed, there 
is also an approximation to the problem presented by extemalities. Similarly to previous 
studies, these authors recognise a double aspect derived from them. On the one hand, 
they highlight the necessity of the existence of effective measures that favour the 
appropriability of the profíts of the innovation in order to encourage the incentives of a 
firm to invest in R&D. Altematively, the existence of extemalities acts to increase the
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productivity of R&D reinforcing the basis of the scientific knowledge of the industry. 
Following the survey of Levin et al. (1987) they build on two types of variables. One 
reflects the appropriability aspect (whose impact will be likely positive in the effort on 
R&D). The other captures the time necessary to imitate a patent that incorporates a 
relevant product innovation (the greater the time of imitation, the greater the firm 
incentive to invests on R&D but, because of the reduction of the extemalities, the lower 
the productivity of R&D). The estimations confirm the foreseeable effects of the 
different variables.
Levin and Reiss (1988) develop a theoretical model that incorporates product 
and process innovation and in which both are the result of the expenses on R&D carried 
out by the firm and of the amount of industry knowledge at its disposal. The latter is 
composed of its own expenses on R&D as well as those of rival firms which are 
included in the mentioned amount as imperfect substitutes (the degree of substitution is 
determined by the level of the existing extemalities). This implies that greater 
competition in R&D by rival firms decreases the marginal productivity of own R&D. 
Moreover, the effect that R&D of the rival firms has on the reduction of the unitary cost 
of production of a given firm or over the improvement of the quality of its products will 
be a function of the extensión of these extemalities as well as of its productivity (i.e. the 
utility of the acquired R&D).
In this model, it is allowed that technological opportunities and the degree of 
appropriability could differ between the R&D devoted to product innovation and that 
devoted to process innovation. Thus, it is possible to examine the impact of the
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extemalities both in the amount and composition of R&D. The estimations of this 
model reveal a relevant inter-industrial variability in the amount and productivity of 
extemalities. In any case, and it is important to note it, both in the product and process 
innovation cases it is not possible to reject that the extensión of the extemalities be 
different from zero.
Finally, we will mention two aspects of the extemalities not often studied in the 
literature: its intemational transmission and its impact on the geographic concentration 
of the innovative activity.
In the first case, Coe and Helpman (1995) try to study how the total factor 
productivity of a country depends, apart from its own R&D stock, on the R&D stock of 
its trade partners. Own R&D allows the firm to profit in better conditions from foreign 
technical advanees which increases its productivity. Foreign R&D have direct and 
indirect effects. The direct effects imply the leaming of new technologies, production 
processes, etc. The indirect effects are encapsulated in the goods and Services imported. 
The estimations of these authors indicate that the beneficial effects of foreign R&D on a 
country’s productivity are greater the more open its economy is.
Audrestsch and Fieldman (1996) highlight the importance of the extemalities for 
the geographic location of the innovative activity. Their premise is the following. If the 
capacity to receive the extemalities of knowledge is a function of the distance to the 
source of this knowledge, a certain geographic concentration should be observed and be 
stronger in those industries in which extemalities of knowledge have, presumably,
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greater importance. Their estimations for the USA economy show that, even taking into 
account the geographic concentration of production, greater concentration of the 
innovative activity is identified in those industries in which extemalities are more 
relevant (that is, where the industry R&D, the University research and the qualified 
labour are more important).
All in all, we have to realise that the extemalities of innovation not only have to 
be seen in their aspect of a negative incentive for the expenses on R&D through 
imitation or rivalry but also as a positive incentive through the existent knowledge in the 
firm environment that may increases the productivity of its R&D.
II.7.- Conclusions
So far we have analysed separately what are thought to be the main determinants 
of the resource allocation to R&D of new process and producís by firms or, in general 
terms, of their innovative activity.
It seems that firm size and industry concentration (following the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis) have no clear influence on innovation specially once we have taken into 
account other variables with more solid economic justification. In any case, is probably 
more convenient to establish the inverse causation order, that is, from innovation to 
concentration and firm size. As Culbertson (1985) outlines, these last two variables are 
connected through market dimensión.
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More importantly is the impact of demand conditions, degree of appropriability 
and technological opportunities presented by the different industries. The fírst two are 
more directly related to the profitability of the innovation and the latter to the 
productivity that can be achieved from the R&D expenses (diffículty of the innovation) 
that can also be affected by certain positive extemalities. The diverse empirical studies 
analysed in this chapter confirm the significance of these variables although they differ, 
to a greater or lesser extent, in their relative importance. Apart from the mentioned 
variables, there exist other factors with lower relevance that have also been taken into 
account by the literature such as cash-flow, output diversification, management 
capacity, etc.
As we have observed, in the different sections we have made repeated mentions 
to different studies. This is due to the effort made to isolate each determinant of the 
innovative activity in order to make an individualised study with the aim to ease its 
understanding. It is quite clear that these factors act jointly in the explanation of the 
innovation process and that some interactions also exists among them. They have been 
outlined in the chapter as and when necessary.
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III. 1.-THE THEORETICAL MODELS ON INNOVATION
III. 1.1.- Introduction
The theoretical literature accepts that a firm has mainly two reasons for investing 
in R&D. First, the achievement of a new (or better) product or a more effícient 
productive process in the development of its activity. Second, the acquisition of the 
knowledge and ability necessary to adapt itself to the dynamic evolution of the industry 
in which it enhances its activity and, at the same time, benefit from the valuable 
available information.
Usually, economic models have only paid attention to the first of these factors1 
establishing that a firm has two motivations for doing R&D: the pursuit o f greater 
profits (profit incentive) and the maintenance of a given competitive position which is in 
danger because of the action of its rivals (competitive threat). The “profit incentive” will 
exists even if the firm would be alone in the market and encapsulates the desire o f a firm 
to increases its profits. The “competitive threat” appears because a firm does not want to 
loss its current market position and it is looking for a strategic advantage.
The attempt by the economists of explaining the R&D phenomenon has driven 
to the emergence of a high number of models. These models arrive at different
1 One exception is the aforementioned model of Cohén and Levinthal (1989).
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conclusions as a result of the different assumptions made. Therefore, it is necessary to 
define accurately the assumptions about the behaviour of economic agents and the 
parameters and functional forms employed in each model in order to have a good 
understanding of the implications of the resulting outcomes. By doing this, it will be 
possible to better evalúate the virtues and shortcomings of the model developed in the 
next section which will serve us as a basis for the empirical analysis.
There are two types of models: decision-theoretic approach (developed in the 
sixties) and game theoretic literature (since 1980). As it seems clear, with the course of 
the years models have become more sophisticated and realistic. Therefore, we will pay 
attention to the game theoretic approach as more adequate focus for our purpose: the 
explanation of how firms allocate resources to innovative activity and the market 
structure that is obtained as a result of this process.
The game-theoretic literature has four paradigms. Two of them assume a 
deterministic relationship between the amount of money spent in R&D and the 
innovative output that results: auction models and non-toumament models2. In the rest, 
there is a stochastic relationship between the amount of R&D and the expected date of 
innovation: toumament models and the probabilistic contest model.
However, the important distinction that appears in the literature is that which 
exists between toumament and non-toumament models. As we have said above, in 
toumament models it is assumed that firms, by investing resources in R&D, are able to
2 The most known of these models is that of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980).
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influence the date of the innovation3. This fact has the implication that firms are 
involving in something similar to a race to be first to make the discovery. As a 
consequence, these types of models are characterised by the existence of one successful 
innovator only. In contrast to toumament models, non-toumament models assume that 
the amount of R&D affects only the size of the innovation and, as a consequence, it is 
allowed the possibility that many firms obtain it. This is possible because of the 
existence of many different research path with equal result or, altematively, the 
intrinsically unpatentable nature of the innovation.
As in toumament models, in auction models there can only be one successful 
bidder and this is the reason why in this kind of models the “strategic” incentive 
outlined above (competitive threat) has the central role. For his part, in the Probabilistic 
Contest Model it is assumed that the probability for a firm for being the successful 
innovator depends on the amount of resources invested by this specific firm as a ratio to 
the total amount spent in the industry in which the firm is located.
Apart from these considerations, there are also two important distinctions in the 
elaboration of models that have very important implications. The first one is between 
process and product innovation, each one with differentiated effects in firm’s profits as 
already mentioned in other sections. In some situations, the consideration of one type of 
model or another could reverse the conclusions. The second distinction is between a 
single innovation and a sequence of innovations. In a single innovation model it is
3 We are placed in a context of uncertainty ¡f we assume in our model that the investment in R&D has 
only a limited probability of success at any time that depends directly on the amount o f resources 
employed. Altematively, we are in a model of certainty if the relationship between the resources 
devoted and the date of success is deterministic.
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assumed that there is only one stage in the R&D competition game. Then, the prize 
obtained from become the innovator last forever. However, it is more realistic to 
consider that the game has more than one stage. Thus, if we consider that the R&D 
competition is repeated in various stages we are in a model of sequence of innovations. 
In this case, in each stage the winner can be the same as in the precedent stage or 
another and this fact can dramatically change the outcomes obtained when a single 
innovation is considered.
In the next epigraph, we will revise briefly the more relevant features o f some 
toumament models with uncertainty and auction models. We will do this for two 
reasons. First, because these models are those with more academic influence, although 
they do not have empirical implementation. Second, because in the context of the 
former the uncertainty aspect of R&D is encapsulated and in the context of the latter the 
differences existing in the evolution of the market structure when we consider 
altematively process innovation or product innovation are evidenced.
By doing this, we would have established the framework for a better 
understanding of the theoretical model developed in next section.
III. 1.2.- The importance of the assumptions
The model of Loury (1979) is considered one of the pioneer in the context of 
toumament models with uncertainty. Loury develops his model with the objective to
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study the impact of market structure on R&D performance at firm and industry level and 
the corresponding welfare implications.
This model assumes the existence of un n identical firms in the market which 
compete for the achievement of a “perpetual” flow of rewards “V ” (single innovation), 
considering that one firm only introduces the innovation. Each firm invest in R&D 
under both technological and market uncertainty.
Technological uncertainty is present because there exists a stochastic 
relationship between a firm’s R&D investment and the time at which it obtains the 
innovation. Then, Loury considers that a firm “ i ” by making a contractual 
commitment4 to R&D, that implies a present valué of cost of, say, ux,n purchases a 
random variable r(x,.) which is the representation of the uncertain date at which the 
successful innovation takes place. Or, in other words, the assumption is that the random 
variable t (x ¡ ) is purchased by paying “ x¡ ” at / = 0 . The technological relationship 
considered is that r{x¡) is exponentially distributed, that is:
pr\r{x¡) < /] = 1 -  e~h{Xl)t
where: 
t: time
4 The literature makes an important distinction between contractual and non-contractual cost in R&D. We 
are in a model with contractual cost when R&D expenditures take the form of a lump-sum incurred at 
the outset. Non-contractual cost implies that each firm incurs in a flow cost until someone successfully 
innovates. O f course, in the real world the most likely situation is a mixture of both.
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h(x¡) : is a constant fiinction of x¡ called “hazard rate” and represents the probability 
that a firm innovates in a small interval of time conditional on no one else has 
succeeded up till then. Loury assumes that this fimction has initially increasing retums 
to scale in order to ensure a finite number of firms in the industry.
The expected time at which the R&D project will be successfully completed is:
Et(x)  = h(x)~l
Market uncertainty results from assuming that firms are uncertain about the date
A
at which any of its rivals’ R&D effort will be successful. Let r¡ the random variable 
that represents this unknown date. Assuming rational expectations the relationship
A
between r, and the behaviour of other firms is given by:
r> =min[T(xi)]
\Zj*i<.rt
Assuming no extemalities in the R&D process the random variable can be taken 
as independent. Then:
pr(r¡ <t) = 1 -  exp
<*j
= \ - e
where:
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a¡ = ^  h(Xj) , is taken as given by the i -th firm.
i * j
Knowing that there is a reward flow of “ V ” and given the market structure, 
equilibrium occurs when each firm investment decisión maximises its expected 
discounted profíts, taken as given the R&D investment strategies of other firms 
(Coumot assumption).
Due to the existence of symmetry in the model (which implies the same 
investment strategy for all firms) Loury arrives to the following result:
x ' = x \ n , r , V )
where
x *: equilibrium level of firm’s R&D given the market structure. 
n : number of firms in the industry. 
r : interest rate.
Loury was interested in studying the impact of greater rivalry (an increasing 
number of identical competing firms in the industry) on a firm’s innovative activity, that
dx'
is, the sign of ——. The author finds that this expression is negative which implies that 
on
the increment on rivalry decreases the expenses on R&D done by each firm. It is 
important to note that this result does not implies that a more competitive market 
structure means a latter expected introduction date for the innovation. In fact, the
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contrary occurs because the increment in the number of firms compensates the reduction 
in the amount of R&D spent by each one.
Another important result of Loury is that in the long-run industry equilibrium 
(zero expected profíts condition), when there is an initial range of increasing retums in 
the R&D technology, all firms invest below the efficient scale, that is, above the 
minimum average cost level (excess capacity proposition).
Conceming the welfare analysis, Loury refers to three factors that act against 
socially optimal resource allocation:
1.- A generic factor that results in the known failure in the market for inventions 
(appropriability).
2.- A short-run factor, that is, when we consider as given the number of firms in 
the industry. In this case, the symmetric Nash equilibrium implies that each firm has the 
same probability (1 / n) of being the innovator. Thus, in the short-run equilibrium, firms 
have the tendency to invest in R&D more than is socially optimal because they do not 
take into account the parallel nature of their activities. The social loss is the result of the 
duplication of effort.
3.- A long-run factor, that appears when it is considered both socially optimal 
(maximisation of social profits) and industry equilibrium (zero expected industry profits 
condition) number of firms. Loury demonstrates that if  there are initially increasing 
returhs to scale in R&D, the industry equilibrium induces too many firms joint the 
innovation race if we compare it to what is socially optimal. This is clear because, with
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initial economies of scale in R&D, the social optimum implies a finite number of firms 
producing at effícient scale and eaming positive expected profíts but due to positive 
expected profíts tend to incentive entry this is not the case in the market equilibrium.
Lee and Wilde (1980) note that some of the conclusions of Loury are sensitive to 
the specification of the cost of R&D. In particular, the result that an increase in rivalry 
implies a reduction in the equilibrium level of firm’s investment and the existence of 
excess capacity.
These authors consider a model formally identical to that o f Loury except in one 
aspect, that is, the assumption that the random variable specified above ( z(x i) ) is now 
purchased by paying a fixed cost (F) and incurring in a flow cost “ x ” which is paid 
until someone in the market produces a new technology.
This modification implies that the expression of the fimction of the expected 
discounted profíts is not the same in both models. In particular:
Loury's model
a + r + h
where
x : expected total cost (fixed cost).
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Lee and Wilde model:
a + r + h
where
x------------: expected variable cost.
a + h + r
F: fixed cost
With this new formulation Lee and Wilde obtain, contrary to Loury5s model, that 
as the number of firms increases, the equilibrium investment rate in R&D per firm 
increases as well and that in the symmetric Nash equilibrium with free entry all firms 
invest at greater than efficient scale.
The differences between the two models can be intuitively explained. In the 
Loury5s case an increase in the number of firms, by reducing the probability of success, 
reduces firm5s expected profíts. In the case of Lee and Wilde expected cost are also 
reduced. As we have seen the change in a, in principie, not very important assumption 
could reverse some results.
The models considered above were concemed both the existence of a number of 
identical firms and a single innovation. Reinganum (1985), assuming non-contractual 
cost change these two hypotheses and suppose, firstly, that in spite of identical agents 
there is one firm that is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are the
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challengers, and secondly, that the context is that of sequence of innovations. This last 
assumption means that the privilege position that success provides is only maintained 
until the next innovation is reached. In general, the essential distinction between a single 
innovation model and a sequence of innovations model rests in the different calculations 
of the relative gains for winning the lead in a particular time. In the first case the gains 
last forever but in the second exists the possibility of loosing this lead.
Apart from last comments, Reinganum suppose that innovations are drastic in 
the sense that the advantages of the new technique permit the winner to eam monopoly 
profíts until the next innovation is introduced. The author builds a game in which she 
assumes the existence of t-stages and by using the concept of subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium play arises to the following conclusions:
1.- The outcome is that of Schumpeterian concept of Creative destruction5 (or 
action-reaction) in which the monopoly that a firm has is rapidly overthrown by the 
winner challenger.
2.- Nash equilibrium is symmetric among the challengers, while the incumbent 
always invests less than the challenger because the former has a greater incentive to 
delay innovation and continué eaming current monopoly profíts.
3.- The valué of being the incumbent is lower the greater the number of 
remaining situations and the valué of being a challenger increases with the stock of 
remaining situations. Therefore, incumbent and challengers alike invest less in the
s In a model with sequence of innovations the outcome can be of two forms: Creative destruction or 
persistent dominance. Persistent dominance implies that the incumbent maintain or extent their position 
of supremacy. Obviously, in this fiamework in some stages can be action-reaction and in other
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current innovation when a higher number of fiiture innovations are anticipated. In all 
cases, there is less investment than in the model of Lee and Wilde.
As Beath, katsoulacos and Ulph (1987) point out, the sequential structure of the 
Reinganum model does not affect her main conclusions. Because of the drasticness 
assumption the present valué of all future profíts conditional on winning or loosing are 
independent of the point in the sequence where the firms are placed. Vickers (1986) 
analyses, in the context of an auction model, the implication of considering a sequence 
of innovations when drasticness does not exist. In this case, the profíts from winning or 
loosing a particular patent race are dependent on previous history, that is, the sequence 
in the evolution of firms is relevant.
Vickers' results are.
1.- When market competition in the single period is of the form of Coumot competition, 
we will get action-reaction if technical progress is sufficiently slow.
2.- If market competition is á la Bertrand, the outcome will be always persistent 
dominance.
3.- Under drasticness assumption we have an indeterminacy.
The auction model of Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1987) is formally similar to 
that of Vickers but there is a very important difference: in this case product innovation 
is considered. It is clear that profit maximisation implies that under process innovation
persistent dominance. As it seems clear, the evolution of the industry structure is endogenous to the 
process of dynamic competition.
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at each stage in the sequence each firm will only ever employ the single best technology 
it has access (through a patent) but this is not necessary true under product innovation 
following the conclusions reached by Shaked and Sutton (1982).
The assumptions of the model are:
1.- Two firms.
2.- Bertrand competition in the product market.
3.- At the start of a period “ t ” the best quality product for which each firm has a 
patent is different. Therefore, one of the firms will have a better quality product than the 
other.
4.- Market structure is exogenous (result of assume exogenous pace of progress 
in technological knowledge and that each firm produces only one product due to 
diseconomies of scale).
5.- Drawing on the work of Shaked and Sutton (1982) all the assumption that 
characterises a Bertrand equilibrium in a vertically differentiated market.
With this ffamework, the authors reach to the conclusión that industry profíts are 
a strictly concave fimction in the quality gap between the two firms. Thus, in a context 
o f Bertrand competition we have action-reaction if technical change is rapid enough (in 
fact, it needs to be so rapid that neither firm can ever make the best response to the 
newly introduced product) and the outcome will be persistent dominance if the rate of 
product improvement is sufficiently slow (it needs to be so slow that the best response
Product dijferentiation and process R&D
to the last improvement is outside the range of the first, although not the second, firm at 
the outset of the sequence).
As we can observe, these results are very different to that of Vickers for process 
innovation.. It is possible to demónstrate that in the later case industry profíts are a 
convex function of the cost gap between firms and this is the explanation why the 
conclusions are reversed.
Among toumament models with uncertainty the most general and complete one 
is that o f Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1989a), in which it is modelled a single stage 
strategic R&D race between two firms to be first to introduce some new technology. In 
this model, the amount invested by each firm in R&D depend on the magnitude of the 
two incentives that we have outlined above:
1.- The profit incentive collects the desire to increase profíts through the 
investment in R&D. Numerically it is the difference between the profíts the firm would 
obtain if  it wins the race minus the current profíts. This incentive would appear even if 
the firm were not in a race among rivals.
2.- The competitive threat is the difference between the profíts that the firm 
would have if it wins the race minus the profíts obtained in the case in which the firm 
loss the race.
The relative magnitude of these two elements will determine the fiims’ R&D 
strategy and henee the outcome of the race. In this model, the possibility of the
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existence of asymmetry between firms is incorporated in the sense that one of the firms 
may have higher current profíts than its rivals (possibly as the outcome of some 
previous race). In the same way, the model allows that the profíts that each firm makes 
conditional on wining or loosing could be different.
Assuming no leaming by doing and the exponential relationship between R&D 
expenditure and the probability of discovery outlined above, the model establishes that 
if one firm chooses a constant hazard rate the best response of the other firm is to 
choose a constant hazard rate.
Formally, the expected present valué of profits of each firm can be written as:
Firm 1: V(x ,y ) = Ax + By + s -  y(x)  
x + y  + r
Firm 2: W(x,y)  = Dx + Ey + 1 -  y  (y) 
x + y  + r
where:
firm 1 is assumed to be the incumbent and firm 2 the follower. 
x : is the “hazard rate” of firm 1. 
y : is the “hazard rate” of firm 2.
A{D) : is the present valué of future profits for firm 1 (2) if firm 1 innovates.
B(E ) : is the present valué of future profits for firm 1 (2) if  firm 2 innovates
s(t) : current profits of firm 1 (2).
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y(x)[y \ : is the fimction that represents the instantaneous resource cost of 
achieving a “hazard rate” of x ( y ) . It is assumed that this fimction exhibits decreasing 
retums in order to have a unique equilibrium.
It is assumed that A ) B ; A r)s ; D)E y Dr)t .
dV dW
From the first order conditions ( —  = 0 and ---- = 0) we obtain the reaction
dx dy
functions and henee the Nash equilibrium in hazard rates.
If we concéntrate on firm 1, the reaction fimction must satisfy that:
(A -  B)y + (Ar - s )  + y(x) = (x + y  + r ) y ( x )
There are two points in the reaction fimction in which we are interesting in:
- Let x0 the optimal response of firm 1 when firm 2 does not spend in R&D 
(>> = 0). Then, we have that ( A r - s )  + y (x0) = (xo + r ) y ( x 0).  The only forcé that 
incentives firm 1 for doing R&D is the desire to increase the flow rate of profits 
(Ar - s )  taking into account the additional cost of this increase. This is the reason why 
x0 is usually associated with the profit incentive.
- Let x  the optimal response of firm 1 when y  —» oo. In this case A -  B = y ( x )  
is satisfied. Now, the important incentive is the difference between the profits the firm 1
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would obtain if it wins the race and those it would obtain if it loss (again, taking into 
account marginal cost). Therefore, x  is interpreted as the competitive threat.
The valué of these points determine the position and form of the reaction 
fimction. The major determinant of these relative magnitudes is the ease of imitation. 
We can consider two cases:
1.- Imitation is not possible (the product or process innovation is perfectly 
protected by a patent). In this case, it is reasonable to consider that Ar)s)Br . That is, if  
firm 2 wins it will be true that firm 1 's profíts will be lower than its current profits. In
this case, x0 (x and the reaction fimction is upward sloping. The best response of firm 1 
in view of an increase in R&D of firm 2 (that increases its hazard rate) is to increase 
also the investment in R&D.
2.- Imitation is very easy. This implies Ar = Br)s, and considering that the rate
of interest is not too low x 0) x is accomplished. Contrary to the previous case the 
reaction fimction is downward sloping and the best response of an increase in firm 2's 
hazard rate (derived from more spending on R&D) is a decrease of firm 1 's hazard rate 
(less spending on R&D). In this case a free rider phenomenon appears because each firm 
is waiting for the other to be that innovator (waiting game).
The distinct combinations for both firms give four possible cases. If we let x* 
and y* the equilibrium hazard rates that are reached we have that:
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If ( A - B ) > ( D - E )  and (Ar -  s) > (Dr - 1) => x '  > /
where:
( A -  B):  is the competitive threat of firm 1.
( D -  E):  is the competitive threat of firm 2.
(Ar -  s ) : is the profit incentive of firm 1.
(Dr - 1): is the profit incentive of firm 2.
We can relate the models we have seen up till now with this general model.
In Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) models it is implicitly assumed that 
A = D)0; B = E = 0 ; and s  = / = 0. The “profit incentive” and the “competitive threat” 
are the same for both firms and the outcome is indeterminate.
Reinganum (1985) assume that A = D)0; B - E -  0 ; s)0 and t = 0. In this case 
the “competitive threat” are identical but the incumbent has a smaller profit incentive. 
When this occurs, we have that x*(y* (action-reaction).
Harris and Vickers (1987) develop a sequential model6 formally very similar to 
this but with the assumption that r -  s = t = 0 , that is, they do not include current 
profits in the calculation of the expected payoff. Thus, in this model there is no profit 
incentive and what matters is the competitive threat.
6 A sequential model means that firms are competing for the achievement of a single innovation but in a 
context of multistage (two or more) races.
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In sequential models it is important to distinguish if they are of a “catch-up” or a 
“leapfrog” form. “Catch-up” implies that the follower and the leader are competing for 
different innovations in the sense that at each time the follower is not able to compete 
for obtaining the same position of the leader. If the follower wins the race all that it can 
obtain is the current position of the leader. Then, the point of departure is different. The 
contrary occurs in the “leapfrog” models where leader and follower are competing for 
the same innovation. Then, the follower can overeóme the leader if  it wins. The implicit 
assumption in these models is that once an innovation is patented, the knowledge that it 
incorporates becomes a public good.
The model of Harris and Vickers is of a “catch-up” form and the newness it 
incorporates in relation to precedent models is the consideration of strategic interaction 
between competitors as the race unfolds. The main aim of Harris and Vickers is to 
analyse how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry 
between them. They develop two models (one dimensional and two dimensional race) in 
a multistage game framework which conclusions are (in the case of a two dimensional 
race they need additional assumptions to reach to the same results) that the leader in the 
race makes greater effort than the follower and that this effort increases as the gap 
between competitors decreases. Moreover, the effort of the follower falls if this déficit 
increases. In general the player with higher incentive (in this case the leader) works 
harder.
Due to the impossibility to express in models with uncertainty the link between 
equilibrium levels of R&D expenditures and the parameters of the model in a single
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closed form, analytical results do not exist when considering sequences of innovations. 
Therefore, it is necessary to resort to Computer simulations.
Based on a model with an homogeneous product, constant elasticity demand 
curve, the consideration of a T cost-reducing innovations and a quadratic cost fimction, 
Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1989b) reach to the following results:
1 If we consider Bertrand competition in the product market and a model of 
“catch-up” form the outcome always will be persistent dominance. By contrast, if  we 
have Coumot competition and “leapfrog” we will obtain action-reaction.
2.- In a model with Bertrand competition and “leapfrogging” in the early races 
the outcome is action-reaction but in the last races it is persistent dominance.
3.- With Coumot competition and “leapfrogging” the outcome is very 
changeable and depends on the rate of technical change and the interest rate.
4.- In general, Bertrand competition produces more dominance that does 
Coumot.
As we have seen in this section, the assumptions made in the different models of 
R&D have very important implications and can change the outcomes and conclusions in 
a very drastic manner. For this reason, we have to take into account all the 
considerations established to interpret the affirmations carried out in the model 
developed in the next section which we will serve us for the empirical testing.
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III.2.- PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PROCESS R&D: THE MODEL
III.2.1.-Introduction
A firm faces two possibilities when investing in R&D: to devote resources with 
the intention of cost reduction (process innovation) or in order to shift its demand curve 
rightward (product innovation). These altematives are not necessarily substitutes and, in 
fact, a firm directs its efforts towards both options. Moreover, the introduction of a 
better product into the market generally needs some improvements in the production 
process1.
As far as we know, the literature on innovation does not take into account 
explicitly the obvious interrelation that in the profit fimction exists between product and 
process innovation2. This is because it is common to establish highly restrictive 
assumptions in order to simplify the tractability of the problem analysed. Some of them 
are to consider a homogeneous product or only one aspect of innovation (product versus 
process). However, the natural environment of firms that invest in R&D is normally an 
imperfect competitive market where product differentiation is a condition for surviving. 
In this sense, the optimum cost of production for the firm would depend on its level of 
differentiation because, as we will see, this will be one of the important factors which 
determine the retums achieved ffom process R&D.
1 Levin and Reiss (1988) recognise that this is normally the case.
2 There have been recently some interesting research that try to explain the factors that influence both 
types of innovations. See, for instance, Levin and Reiss (1988), Bertschek (1995), Cohén and Klepper 
(1996a), Klepper (1996), Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Yin and Zuscovitch (1998).
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All these considerations show that the relationship among the different variables 
affecting the decisión of a firm to devote resources to innovation is more complex than 
previous literature suggest. We should find at least two different types of interactions at 
the intra-industry level. On the one hand, there exists a strategic interdependence among 
firms determined by their relative qualities and prices and which is responsible for 
market structure. On the other hand, and as a consequence of the first interaction, the 
firm must choose the “sharing rule” between product and process R&D. At the inter- 
industry level, things are even more complex because we also have to consider the 
impact (and interactions) of other important variables, such as technological 
opportunities or market dimensión.
In order to demónstrate that all these points matter it seems interesting to 
analyse, as a first step, what the effect is of vertical product differentiation on the 
decisión of a firm to allocate resources to R&D in process innovation. This is the most 
important aspect of this chapter. Until now, the essential contribution that competition 
among firms in a market induces in technological competition has not been explicitly 
considered in the sense we have established here. In this regard, the consideration of the 
effect on innovation of variables as could be “firm size” losses part of its significance. 
The reason is that the relative position of the price-quality relationship of a firm in the 
market determines its sales and, therefore, variables reflecting the strategic behaviour of 
firms substitute the aforementioned determinants. The idea is that competition among 
goods (firms)is a clear determinant of technological competition.
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To do this, we start by considering the demand structure that comes from the 
model of Ulph (1991) in which differentiation arises due to the two innovating firms 
included have a quality gap in the specific product characteristic in which they are 
leaders. However, the key point of our model is that these firms need to invest in 
process innovation in order to introduce a better product into the market. That is, the 
improvement in the production process is the condition we impose to obtain a better 
product. At any moment, the quality of the product is taken as given. The argument is 
that process R&D is essential in order to introduce a higher quality product into the 
market and the amount devoted to this spending will depend on the degree of vertical 
differentiation in a specific way.
The problem we face is similar to that of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) but with 
two important differences. On the one hand, there is Bertrand competition in the product 
market. On the other hand, firms are not necessarily identical because they can face 
distinct valúes for the parameters in the demand equation due to differentiation. In this 
sense, each firm conffonts its own price-demand elasticity which, among others, is an 
important determinant for the effectiveness of the spending on process innovation.
The indirect effect that the reaction of the rival firm induces and the specific 
form of our cost fimction has impeded us to obtain a cióse analytical solution. 
Altematively, we have performed numerically computed simulations in order to 
determine the effect of the different parameters involved. Previously, the direct impact 
of each factor in the variable of interest has been established (as far as possible).
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III.2.2.-The model
In order to develop our model we have followed some interesting aspects of the 
product innovation model of Ulph (1991)3. However, in our case each type of good 
(firm) may have a different unit cost of production as a result of the assumption that the 
innovative firms must invest in process R&D to introduce their higher quality product 
into the market. The amount invested in this type of innovation will be determined by 
intra-industry (competition among firms) and inter-industry (market dimensión and 
technological opportunity) variables.
It is necessary to remark that we are only interested in the effect of 
differentiation on the level of R&D spending in process innovation and on process R&D 
intensity. Then, we have started from a specification of the demand equation that 
includes quality gaps in its arguments, allowing us to reach our objective. However, it 
should be quite clear that a quality gap is mainly the result of product innovation, a 
decisión that is not taken into account here because it exceeds the scope of this research 
although it has no consequence for what we want to demónstrate4.
3 This model was originally developed in order to study the relationship between the industrial structure 
and the rate of growth in an economy. A generalisation of this model to study the influence o f both 
R&D technology and economies of scope between product dimensions in the effort made by firms in 
R&D is found in Ulph and Owen (1994).
4 This assumption is not strange in the literature. For instance, Yin and Zuscovith (1998) take the product
innovation decisión as given to study what matters with process innovation and the reverse. Our 
objective is to stress the relevance of the interactions between product and process R&D. Interactions 
that have been obviated in previous literature (Levin and Reiss, 1988, Cohén and Klepper, 1996a, etc) 
that tried to explain the factors affecting both types of innovations. We want to demónstrate that this 
“omission” is not trivial.
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We are succinctly going to describe the main features of the demand structure 
and firms’ behaviour considered in the model of Ulph (1991). The assumptions of this 
model are:
1.- It is assumed that the good produced by each firm has two fundamental 
characteristics (let “a” and “b”).
2.- In the market there are two innovative firms and many non-innovative ones. 
Each innovative firm is leader in one of the two fundamental characteristics.
3.- At each moment there exists one quality gap for the innovative firms in 
relation to the non-innovative ones. Thus, we will ñame “basic good” (let good 0) the 
one which embodies the second highest level of quality in both characteristics and that 
will be produced by the non-innovative firms.
4.- a  and p denote the characteristic gaps that each innovative firm has in 
dimensión “a” and “b” respectively. Then, the vector of characteristics gaps is 
v 1 = ( a ' , p 1) where a 1 = a l - a °  and p1 = b ’ - b ° .  Considering the simplest case in 
which each innovative firm is leader in one of the two characteristics, we have three 
types of goods: good 0 (basic good), good 1 (firm 1) with a vector of characteristic gaps 
v 1 = (a ,0 ) , and good 2 (firm 2) with a vector of characteristic gaps v2 = (0 ,P ).
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5.- Each firm has a constant unit cost of production (c)0). In Bertrand 
competition the price of the basic good is equal to the unit cost of production, that is 
normalised (p° = c = 1). Firms that produce the basic good obtain zero profíts.
6 -  On the demand side, consumers have a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the
form:
u = í o g w + io g (X y  x') (i)
0
wherejc' is the quantity of good “i”, q' is the quality of good “i” as perceived by the 
consumer and “R” is the income spent on other goods.
There are two dimensional distribution of consumers represented by the vector 
of weights they attach to each of the two characteristics (v,w) > 0 . It is assumed that 
for these consumers the expression of perceived quality has the form:
q1 (v, w) = exp(va' + wb‘) ;  (i = 0, 1, 2) (2)
It is assumed that the variables v and w are independent and identically 
distributed with density ñinctions e~v and e~w respectively.
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The consumer optimisation and the fact that these goods are perfect substitutes
p '
implies that each consumer will buy the good for which the ratio ------  is minimised,q (v,w)
being p ‘ the price of the i-th good , that is assumed strictly positive. The expression of
M
the demand of good “i” is x' = i(v w) ; where M is income, assumed identical for all
2 p
consumers.5
With the assumptions made, it should be quite clear that the important point are 
the relative qualities of the three goods as perceived by the consumer. In terms of good 
zero, expression [2] becomes:
q ‘ (v, w) = exp(ya* + w/?') ; (i = 1, 2) (3)
The next step is to obtain the expression of consumer’s share, demand and 
profíts for each firm. It should be noted that each type of firm has at each moment a 
positive consumer’s share because of the differences in the consumer’s valuation of the 
characteristics of each good (distinct valúes of “ v ” and “ w ”). The achievement of the 
consumer’s share fimction is derived from the conditions of the “indifferent consumer”
(in which p*)c and p2)c):
Between good 0 and 1:
5 This differs from the work of Shaked and Sutton (1982) where vertical differentiation is the result o f a 
different distribution of income among consumers and not of differences in tastes. However, «hcoretica! 
implications are equivalent.
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—  = P—; these are the points for which v = V ~ — log(— ). 
q° q a  c
Between good 0 and 2:
P° p 2 1 P2—  =  — ; these are the points for which w = W -  — log(— ). 
q q P c
And between good 1 and 2:
Pl P2 a  1 , , p 2 .—r  =  —r : these are the points for which w = — v + — log(—r ) .
q q P P P
These equalities define the area that corresponds to each type of good in the 
space (v,w) (see figure 1). Integrating the densities over the corresponding area, we 
obtain the consumer’s share for each firm. Then, following Ulph (1991), we know that 
for firm 1, consumer’s share and demand will be:
<rt =  Pi a 
M
d ' = Y p¡
1 - P
a  + p
-0+T)
P l fi
P
a  + p P i P
(4)
where r¡{á) = (1H— ) is the price-elasticity of demand. 
a
The market share and demand of good 1 depend on its own price and the pricc 
the rival firm as well as their respective quality gaps ( a  and p). Because Bert
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A  A
equilibrium implies p x =  c ( l  +  a ) and p 2 = c ( \  +  j 3 ) (where c = 1), it is possible to
i
express the profits o f both firms in terms o f  a  and B and show that ——L>0 and —
d a  d p
(similarly for firm 2). Then, the profits o f a firm are increasing in its own quality gap 
and decreasing in the quality gap o f the rival firm.
In the model we have briefly described, the assumption that the unit cost o f  
production is constant and equal for all the firms allows the author to represent the 
relevant expressions in terms o f quality gaps. But, if  we allow the innovative firms to 
affect their production cost through process R&D, we will be able to analyse the 
incentives that underlie this spending. This is a more realistic assumption because we 
have established that the innovative firms are producing a higher quality product and 
they will normally need some improvements in the production process in order to obtain 
this.
v
V
FIGURE 1
The important point we need to mention here is that, as we have seen before, the 
equilibrium price (Bertrand competition) o f  each type o f firm is:
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Po=C
p x =c(\ + a)  (5)
P2 = C(\ + P)
For firms producing the basic good the unitary cost does not change. But this is 
not true for the innovating firms that need process R&D to produce their higher quality 
product. Thus, we will suppose that for firm 1 and 2 the unit cost depends on the 
amount of R&D devoted by each firm to process innovation. Thus, prices can be 
expressed as:
P, =c(z,)(l + a )
W
P 2 = c(z2)( 1+/3)
where z¡ (i = 1, 2) is the amount spent by each firm on process R&D.
For simplicity’s sake we assume the same functional form as in Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) for the relationship between R&D in process innovation and the unit cost 
of production:
c(z,) = z - ‘ (7)
where e is the technological opportunity of the industry (i.e. the elasticity of unit cost 
with respect to process R&D).
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We assume technical knowledge only to be composed by the current spending 
on R&D by the firm6. We also forcé the two innovating firms to invest in process 
innovation to stay in the market ( c(0) = 00). Moreover, to be in accordance with the 
demand structure we will restrict our analysis to the case in which the unitary cost of 
production (and, necessarily, the price) is higher for the goods produced by the 
innovative firms than the ones produced by the non-innovative ones. That is, producing 
higher quality products will always be more costly than producing basic goods7.
Knowing that the equilibrium prices of the two innovating firms are given by 
[6], and considering the case of a single innovation and linear cost in R&D, the 
expression of profits for firm 1 (remembering that quality is taken as given, is):
M
n í = — a(l + a) - 0 + - )  -  a z. 1 - f i  ia  + p
- Z , (8)
The First Order Conditions — -  = 0 and — — = 0 (Nash equilibrium) imply
¿z, cz2
that the marginal gain of each firm from process R&D is equal to its marginal cost (in 
appendix 1 we have derived the properties of the corresponding reaction functions and 
the restrictions that must be imposed into the model). These conditions together
6 Joshi and Vonortas (1996) study the effect that the consideration of altemative specifications for the 
cost function and the production fimction for technological knowledge has in the equilibrium level o f 
R&D investment.
7 This restriction is necessary in order to ensure that the price of the innovative firms is higher than that of
the non-innovative ones. Although there is a discontinuity in the cost fimction with respect to non- 
innovative firms no problem exists with the analysis we are going to perform because non-innovative 
firms act just as a reference point being its price-quality relationship equal to 1.
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determine the optimum amount the firm must devote to this type of innovation given the 
parameters of the model.
Focusing exclusively on firm 1 (an identical analysis for firm 2) , the F.O.C. can 
be stated on the following form:
áfl, dD, ¿f>cmx
— L = — o (9)azx azx azx
where:
pcmx = p x~ c x = azx£ is the price-cost margin of firm 1.
The marginal gain can be divided into two components: the effect of process 
R&D on the demand of the firm times its price-cost margin and the effect of this type of 
innovation on this last variable times the demand of the firm. An analysis of these two 
effects is necessary in order to know the impact of the distinct parameters involved.
It is easy to see that:
c D x 1 , (£ - d—— pcm] = ¿-(l + —)khpzx a (10)
ozx (X
where:
85
Product Differentiation and process R&D
M
Y
- ( 1+ - )
ju = a ( l  + a )  a
Similarly:
¿focm, , ,  (--i)
D x=-ekhfjZ\a (11)
dzx
In our model the effect of process R&D is always positive on the demand of the 
firm but negative on its price-cost margin. These results contradict the existing literature 
(e.g. Cohén and Klepper, 1996a) that considers that the price-cost margin is enhanced 
with the reduction of the cost of the firm and that process R&D has no (or negligible) 
effect on its demand8. However, this literature imposes the highly restrictive assumption 
that firms are price-takers. In our case, Bertrand competition in the product market 
implies prices to depend directly on cost (mark-up) and this is the reason why price-cost 
margin diminishes9. The assumption that consumers will buy the good for which the 
price adjusted for quality is minimised is more realistic and in concordance with non- 
competitive markets.
8 The authors assume the diffículty of licensing and limited expected growth due to innovation in order to
sustain their results (see also Cohén and Klepper, 1996b).
9 It is not possible the Coumot assumption because as it seems quite obvious in the model quantity is not
a decisión variable for the firm.
86
Product Differentiation and process R&D 
The net effect, which is the marginal gain, can be expressed as10:
M G  =  ~ ^ k h / j z \ a  ” (12)
We can see that the positive effect outweighs the negative one.
£
Moreover, the second order condition for a máximum implies that — -1 (0  (see
a
appendix 1) or, equally, the assumption o f decreasing retums in marginal gain o f R&D. 
This condition ensures a finite solution and positive profits for the two innovating firms. 
Now we have enough elements to graphically determine the equilibrium amount o f  
process R&D o f fírm 1, taken as given the valué of process R&D of the rival firm 
(Figure 2).
MG
MC
MC
MG
FIGURE 2
The expression (12) can be written in another way as:
10 For convenience it has not been suppressed the parameter a , that appears in the numerator and the 
denominator, in order to highlight the distinct components that affect the marginal gain of process 
R&D.
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MG =
Between brackets we have the distinct components we can find. First, the 
relationship existing between technological opportunity and quality gap that reflects, as 
a direct impact, the effectiveness of process R&D in increasing gains. Second, the 
expression of profits as in Ulph (1991) but with an additional component: the process 
R&D of the rival firm. We will cali this expression “ex-ante profits”. Finally, the 
expression that reflects the valué of the decreasing retums on marginal gain.
In order to investígate the direct effect of the different parameters it is better to 
express the equilibrium condition on the following form:
£ £ £ £ M
log z, = (1 -  —)_1 (log — + log n ;) = (1 -  —) _1 (log— + log—  + log hfi) (14) a  a  a  a  2
First of all, in order for z, to be lower than 1 (a condition that ensures that, in 
any case, the unitary cost of the products from the innovative firms is higher than from 
the non-innovative ones and which will be relaxed later) it is only necessary that the
Mparameter representing market dimensión ( — ) is small enough (see appendix 1 for
fiirther explanation).
Basing ourselves on equation (14) we study the foreseeable impact of the 
different parameters on cost-reducing spending, although we must resort to computed
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numerically simulations because we are not confident about the reaction of the rival 
firm and some other interactions. To do all this, we have worked out the expression of 
the elasticity of process R&D in relation to the different parameters in which we are 
interested.
III.2.3.-Comparative static
In this section, we develop the implications that our model has in relation to the 
inter-industry and intra-industry parameters considered, as well as two important 
extensions that can improve its realism.
III.2.3.1-Intra-industry analysis
Quality gap o f  firm 1
Operating in [14] we obtain that:
(15)
where
a
~ da  n;
The expression in square brackets determines the sign of this elasticity. We can 
fínd three terms that represent the distinct effects. The first one is the effect of quality 
gap on process R&D because decreasing retums on marginal gain are enhanced. In
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principie, we expect this to be a negative effect because an increment in a  clearly
£
reduces the term (---- 1). However, we have an ambiguity. Recall that, for convenience,
a
we have forced the innovative firms to have, in any case, a higher unitary cost than the 
non-innovative ones. This implies that the term in brackets can be negative (mainly 
because market dimensión is restricted) and, contrary to what is expected, the whole 
sign positive. The intuition is the following. The higher a ,  the higher the negative 
impact (trough price-cost margin) of an increment of process R&D on marginal gain. 
Then, the firm knowing that its cost will always exceed a specific valué, the lower the 
decreasing retums on marginal gain it faces the lower the incentive to invest in process 
R&D and the other way round (this case). This effect is more clearly weakened with 
market dimensión, although simulations must confirm this11.
The second term is unambiguously positive. In the model of Ulph (1991), the 
profits of the innovative firms were always increasing with a .  This is also the case 
here. The only condition that must be met for this to be true is that the price of the rival 
firm is greater than one and, as we have said, this is ensured12. Thus, this elasticity is 
always positive. The higher the positive impact of a  on “ex-ante” price cost margin and 
demand (“ex-ante” profits), the higher the incentive to invest in process R&D when a  
increases. Obviously, the higher a , the lower will be this effect. The third term does not
M The cost fiinction that is employed in the next section does no restrict the valué of market dimensión. 
Then, for a high enough valué of this parameter this term is negative.
I2The only difference that exists between the expression I I |  and the profits of firm 1 of Ulph (IT j) is
on the price of firm 2. In the first case p 2 = z2£( 1 + /?) and in the second p 2 = 1 + f i . The 
important thing is that this price is greater than 1 (the price of the non-innovative firms) because this
<31, dil\
will drive to ensure that sign—— = sign——)0.
da da
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present any controversy because it is just a constant. This term reflects the negative 
impact of “ot“ on the effectiveness of process R&D in increasing gains. The net impact 
of these three effects will be reinforced by technological opportunities and weakened by 
the degree of differentiation.
Quality gap o f  firm 2
Analogously:
Following the discussion above the quality gap of the rival firm has an
(16)
unambiguously negative effect due to sign
\\\.23.2.-Inter-industry Analysis
Market Dimensión
If we proceed in the same way as before we obtain that:
(17)
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Technological Opportunity
Making operations in [14] we see that:
e1,' = ( i —— 1—  (log—+ io g n ; ) + f ‘ + 1
a  a - £ a (18)
where s h£
úh s  
ds h *
This case is, in some sense, similar to that of the own quality gap. There are also 
three effects. The first and third one are just the reverse of the one explained in equation 
[15]. The second one is ambiguous due to the effect of rivalry.
Thus, as far as possible, the foreseeable impact of the distinct parameters in the 
equilibrium valué of process R&D has been established. As we have seen there exist a 
high number of interactions among the different parameters that raise some doubts 
about the relative importance of the different effects, although it is expected that indirect 
effects due to rivalry are minor in relation to direct ones.
Remains to consider the expression of R&D intensity (proportion of R&D in 
relation to sales) on process innovation which, in fact, shows the real effort of the firm 
for this type of spending.
From F.O.C. it seems straightforward that:
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(19)
then:
£
R.I.=
p xDx 1 + a (20)
Consequently, for each firm the R&D intensity in process innovation is directly 
related to technological opportunity and inversely related to its own quality gap. In this 
respect, what matters in the effort that leads the innovative firms to cost reduction is the 
difficulty with which the innovation is obtained and the relative degree of vertical 
product differentiation.
The greater the quality gap, the more important is the negative response of the 
R&D intensity in process innovation to a one-percent-increment in the quality gap.
lll.2.3.3.-Exíensions
Cost depending on quality gap
We have considered the case in which the unitary cost of production depends 
exclusively on process R&D. However, it is more realistic to assume that it is increasing
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with quality gap. In this regard, the production process will be more or less complex 
depending on the quality of the product the firm sells13.
We consider the simplest case in which the quality gap affects linearly the cost 
of production:
c(a,z¡) = az¡£ (22)
A greater quality gap implies a higher cost of production and, consequently, a 
negative effect on the demand of the firm. Moreover, it should be noted that:
(23)
that is, the effectiveness of process R&D in lowering cost is increasing with the valué of 
the quality gap.
Operating as before we obtain that:
logz, = ( 1 - —)-'
a
s  , 1 , log—+ logn , - —loga 
a  a
(24)
We find a new term that encompasses the net impact of the two effects outlined 
abo ve, that is:
13 In essence, and considering the variables in which we are interested, we have a similar structure o f 
profits as in Bertscheck (1995) in the sense that some measure o f product quality enters the demand 
equation and affects cost, and that an increment in this variable is interpreted as a product innovation.
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1.— r|(a) loga which reflects the negative effect of a higher cost in demand.
2.- loga,  which reflects the greater effectiveness of process R&D in lowering 
cost when the quality gap increases.
In order to establish the parallelism with the previous case we can work out 
again the corresponding elasticity. It is easy to see that:
e'. = 0 - —)■'a a - e
(log— + logET) + ¿r¡f -1  + (loga - —) 
a  a
(25)
The effect is ambiguous but it is clear that the new term is increasing with a . We 
must resort again to computed numerically simulations in order to know the real effect. 
The impact of the other parameters is unchanged.
A new form o f the cost function
The reader may be worried about the fact that the valué of market dimensión 
must be bounded in order to maintain the coherence with the demand structure. We can 
relax this assumption establishing a new form for the cost function that explicitly 
determines a production cost which is higher for the innovative firms than for the non- 
innovative ones.
Thus, considering that the cost function has the form:
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1 c(z¡) = 1 + z¡ s ; when cost does not depend on quality gap and 
2 -  c(zj ) = 1 + az~£; when cost depends on quality gap.
From F.O.C., we obtain, respectively:
log(l + z¡ £) + a (1 t -^ logZf. = logÍ£/z(l + a y (a)z 
1 + a  Tj(a) 1 J
(26)
and
log(l + ctz,*) + + logZj = —j— \og[eah(l + a ) ' { z
1 + a  ij(a) 1 J
(26')
As before, the same second order conditions can be applied here, although it 
might be possible to relax them in some way (see appendix 2).
The problem we face is that a more complex expression is obtained for cost- 
reducing R&D that does not allow us to analyse, as before, the different incentives we 
can fínd. However, there is no reason to think that there exist essential changes in 
relation to previous analyses except for the indirect effect that comes through z¡ because 
now the elasticity of the cost function with respect to process R&D is:
ecy  = (27)
when cost does not depend on quality and:
s  :(7,) =
OtZ;
1 + az.
when cost depends on quality.
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(28)
In contrast, we can now study the effect of market dimensión more deeply, 
because we are not any longer restricted in this way.
If we consider R&D intensity, F.O.C. conditions show quite straightforwardly
that:
—  (29)
*' 1 + a
Then, when cost does not depends on quality gap, we see that:
R I  (30)1 + Ct 1 + Z;
In this case, market dimensión and rivalry have effects on process R&D intensity 
through z¡. As previous discussions suggest, the first parameter will have a negative 
effect and the opposite will occur with rivalry. As before, the direct effect of 
technological opportunity is positive and that of differentiation negative. However, in 
this case there exist indirect effects that may compénsate to some extend.
If quality gap affects cost, it is easy to see that:
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a  z, E
R.I  = e-  1  _g- (31)1 + a  l + az.
We can see how (vertical) differentiation can induce a positive effect on R&D 
intensity. This is logical, to have a more differentiated product implies a higher cost; 
then, in order to obtain the relationship between price and quality that maximises profits 
it is most likely that the firm has the incentive to increase the effort on process R&D.
III.2.3.4.- Simulation results
As above mentioned, it has been necessary to perform simulations in order to 
know the effect of the different parameters of the model. We have focused on the most 
interesting case in which the cost function for the innovative firms implies a unitary cost 
that is always higher than those for the non-innovative ones.14
We have taken 0.05, 0.1 and 0.15 for low, médium and high technological 
opportunity industries. For market dimensión, we have considered veiy low (10 and 20) 
and very high (1,000) valúes in order to see the importance of this variable when it 
interacts with other parameters of the model. For quality gaps we have taken valúes 
equal or higher than 0.2 to ensure that second order conditions are always satisfied.
In tables 1 and 2 the equilibrium valúes of process R&D for symmetric (a  = p =
0.2 and a  = p = 0.25) and asymmetric (a  = 0.25 and p = 0.2) equilibriums are reflected,
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when costs do not depend on quality gap and when they depend on quality gap 
respectively.
At the outset, process R&D increases with quality gap reflecting that positive 
effects 15outweigh the negative one. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse if there exist a 
point beyond which the opposite occurs. This is reflected in table 3. The simulations 
have been performed taking consecutive higher valúes of the quality gap with a 
difference of 0.05 points. Thus, if we fínd in a cell the valúes 1.5-1.55, this means that 
for a valué of the quality gap of 1.55 the equilibrium valué of process R&D starts to be 
lower than for the preceding valué of the quality gap. It is important to remark that 
beyond this “tuming point” the equilibrium valué of process R&D always decreases 
with the quality gap. The intuition is that when the differentiation level is high enough, 
the price of the goods (directly related to its cost of production) has less strategic 
relevance.
Taking the comparative static analyses and considerations of previous sections 
as a reference, the main results we can extract from tables 1, 2 and 3 are:
1.- When cost does not depend on quality gap, there exists the possibility that, in small 
markets, if technological opportunities increase process R&D decreases (“negative” 
effect of lower decreasing retums on marginal gain). It seems that this does not occur 
when cost depends on quality gap.
14 The author has also performed simulations for the case when c(z¡ ) =  z~¡E and c(z¡ ) =  z j e (1 +  a)  
(only when market dimensión takes valúes equal to 10 and 20) obtaining a similar behaviour that is 
explained in next paragraphs.
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2 - The point in which an increment in quality gap decreases the equilibrium valué of 
process R&D (“tuming point”) is always greater for the case in which cost depend on 
quality gap. We know that there are two new effects: an “effectiveness” effect and a 
“demand” effect. Because a larger quality gap decreases the price-demand elasticity and 
increases the effectiveness of process R&D in lowering cost, the larger the quality gap 
the more likely it is that the positive effect will outweigh the negative one.
3.- In the asymmetric equilibriums the “tuming points” are always located at a larger 
valué of quality gap than in the symmetric equilibriums. The explanation is that in the 
asymmetric equilibrium for each valué of the quality gap, the firm with the highest 
quality gap has more “ex-ante” profits than in the symmetric equilibrium case. Thus, at 
the intra-industry level, the ratio between quality gaps matters in considering the net 
effect o f differentiability on process R&D.
4.- When cost does not depend on quality gap, an increment in market dimensión 
decreases the “tuming point”. This does not occur in the case in which cost depends on 
quality.
5.- When market dimensión is small, an increment in technological opportunities 
increases the “tuming point”, but the opposite occurs if market is big. In the last case the 
interaction between technological opportunity and market dimensión16 exercises a
15 Recall that for low valúes of market dimensión it is likely that the negative effect of lower decreasing 
retums on marginal gain becomes a positive one.
16 The greater the market dimensión the greater the impact of the negative effect of quality gap on 
decreasing retums on marginal gain.
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powerful negative effect. This does not occur apparently when cost depend on quality 
gap, because (again) the effect of market dimensión is less powerful in this case.
6.- From the comments above, we can see that the “tuming point” is larger when cost 
depend on quality, reflecting the greater effectiveness of process R&D in lowering cost 
(net of negative demand effect) when quality gap increases and the fact that 
technological opportunity and market dimensión (and its interactions) have less impact 
on the equilibrium amount of process R&D.
We have established the impact of the different parameters of the model on the 
level of process R&D, but it remains to consider how this affects the effort the firm 
devotes to process R&D, that is, the R&D intensity on process innovation for each firm. 
In tables 4 and 5 we have the valúes of this index for the cases considered in table 1 and
2. In the last section, we have clearly established the effect of market dimensión and the 
quality gap of the rival firm. It is quite clear that the direct effect of technological 
opportunity is greater than the indirect one and, then, we can be confident about the 
positive effect of this variable on R&D intensity both when cost depends on quality gap 
and when it does not. Consequently, it would be interesting to study the effect of own 
quality gap more deeply.
We have seen (equation 30) that when cost does not depend on quality gap the 
direct effect of own product differentiation is always negative. Moreover, the indirect 
effect comes through its impact on the equilibrium valué of process R&D. We know
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that till the “turning point” the direct effect is reinforced by the indirect one17, and 
process R&D intensity is, for sure, continuously decreasing with differentiation. Beyond 
the “tuming point” the indirect and the direct effect go in opposite directions. It would 
be interesting to investígate whether there is a point in which the former outweighs the 
latter. Making simulations with a=10 we can see that this is not the case.
In contrast, when the unitary cost depends on quality gap we have obtained 
(equation 31) that the direct effect is positive. Till the “tuming point” the indirect effect 
is defínitely negative. Making simulations we can see that at this point the R.I. is greater 
than at the starting point (a=p=0.2), revealing that the direct effect is always greater 
than the indirect one.
Therefore, an interesting result of this model is that R&D intensity in process 
innovation is decreasing with quality gap when the unitary cost does not depend on 
quality gap and the opposite occurs when they depend on quality gap. That is, the effort 
devoted to cost reduction is only inversely related with the quality gap embodied in the 
product if the complexity of the production process is not affected by the quality of the 
goods, an assumption that seems quite strong but that has been widely used in the 
literature.
zr*
17 Due to “ Z¡ ” is increasing with “a “, and that  ------— is always increasing with Z¡ .
1 + z.
102
Product Differentiation and process R&D
T A B LE1
Equilibrium Valúes of Process R&D 
Costs are independent on quality gap
M.D. T.O. a  p Process R&D
10/20/1000 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.001228/0.002707/0.22307
0.25 0.25 0.003134/0.006715/0.478245
0.25 0.2 0.0031493-0.0012205 / 0.006753225-0.002689226 / 0.4821025-0.221067
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.000894/0.0023871 /0.439435
0.25 0.25 0.003612/0.008707/ 1.012787
0.25 0.2 0.00362453-0.0008900001 / 0.008745069-0.002374344 / 1.022835-0.43^283
0.15 0.2 0.2 0.0001852/0.000829079/0.69985
0.25 0.25 0.00241 / 0.007242265 / 1.697673
0.25 0.2 0.00241483-0.000184526/0.00726652865-0.00082518/ 1.719763-0.68942
M.D.
10/20/1000
TABLE 2
Equilibrium valúes of process R&D 
Costs are dependent on quality gap
T.O. a P Process R&D
0.05 0.2 0.2 0.010244/0.0205714/ 1.030881
0.25 0.25 0.012243 / 0.0245715 / 1.228608
0.25 0.2 0.01238946-0.01011611 /0.0248734-0.02031 / 1.245711-1.01611
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.01977 / 0.0402943 / 2.0464786
0.25 0.25 0.02377889 / 0.0483418 / 2.43556
0.25 0.2 0.024054306-0.01952979 / 0.04892685-0.03978543 / 2.4724588-2.0148741
0.15 0.2 0.2 0.02806 / 0.0586794 / 3.021995
0.25 0.25 0.0341239 / 0.0708828 / 3.586247
0.25 0.2 0.03451595-0.0277183/ 0.0717512-0.0579216 / 3..645166-2.970648
TABLE 3
Critical valúes of a  (asymmetric equilibrium 13=0.2) and oc=(3 (symmetric equilibrium) beyond which
process R&D decreases with quality.
M. D. T.O. Cost independent on quality Cost dependent on quality
Symmet. Equil. Asymmet. Equil. Symmet. Equil.. Asymmet. Equil.
10 0.05 1.50-1.55 1.80-1.85 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
0.1 1.55-1.60 1.90-1.95 2.10-2.15 2.60-2.65
0.15 1.60-1.65 1.95-2.00 2.10-2.15 2.60-2.65
20 0.05 1.45-1.50 1.80-1.85 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
0.1 1.50-1.55 1.85-1.90 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
0.15 1.55-1.60 1.85-1.90 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
1000 0.05 1.35-1.40 1.75-1.80 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
0.1 1.25-1.30 1.55-1.60 2.05-2.10 2.60-2.65
0.15 1.20-1.25 1.45-1.50 2.10-2.15 2.65-2.70
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M.D.
10/20/1000
M.D.
10/20/1000
TABLE 4
Process R&D Intensity (%) 
Costs are independent on quality gap
T.O. a P Process R&D intensity (%)
0.05 0.2 0.2 2.429184/ 2.389023/ 2.161436
0.25 0.25 2.286292/ 2.248874/ 2.036877
0.25 0.2 2.286054-2.429495/ 2.248595-2.389359/ 2.036476-2.161905
0.1 0.2 0.2 5.571889/5.387648/4.337876
0.25 0.25 5.095968/ 4.931327/ 3.997459
0.25 0.2 5.095327-5.572717/5.173122-5.575958/3.995484-4.340328
0.15 0.2 0.2 9.799959/9.293843/6.417252
0.25 0.25 8.54179/8.12178/5.761959
0.25 0.2 8.54105-9.801116/ 8.120463-9.295529/ 5.75615-6.424285
TABLE 5
Process R&D Intensity (%) 
Costs are dependent on quality gap
T.O. a P Process R&D Intensity (%)
0.05 0.2 0.2 0.83728/0.8142/0.693565
0.25 0.25 0.950203/ 0.925199/ 0.793432
0.25 0.2 0.957133-0.830937/0.924765-0.814619/0.792993-0.693982
0.1 0.2 0.2 1.903758/ 1.801196/ 1.307971
0.25 0.25 2.132086/2.022983/ 1.489092
0.25 0.2 2.130285-1.905554/ 2.021165-1.802991 / 1.487271 -1.309688
0.15 0.2 0.2 3.1844/2.928975/ 1.811016
0.25 0.25 3.519052/ 3.252639/ 2.053185
0.25 0.2 3.5148-3.188764/ 3.24831 -2.93335/ 2.049028-1.815001
104
Product Differentiation and process R&D
III. 2.3.5. -A ppendix
Appendix 1
a) We will concéntrate on firm 1 but an identical analysis is valid for firm 2.
¿TL
The condition —— = 0 determines the expression of the Reaction Function of 
ck,
firm 1 , that is:
z, = <
M  - ( i + - )  
e — (\ + a )  “ P_a +  P O)
Let:
k = —
2
<J)(x) — (1 + x) X;x = a ,p
P
h i = a  + p
5, = -
a  
a  -  s
where:
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k) O 
( í« > 0  
*,>0 
o<«y,<i 
£ . > i
Then:
z, =
(1 + a) (2)
and:
_ (1 + a )
lfi-1
(1 + a) ( 3 )
where it is accomplished that:
Qz
— L(0 if (1 — h1<()(P)z2l ))0 , that is, if z,)0 . Cost-reducing R&D of both firms are
dz2
strategic substitutes.
— -  = 0 if z. = 0, that is, when the firm is not in the market.
dz2 i
Moreover:
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d2z ,
dz.
e k _¿Coc)_( i  _  hi(|,( p ) z a .)
(1 + a )
í | - 2
(Ek # ^ 7 h14.(P)5,z*'-1)2
(1 + a)
5 , ( 6 , - l ) 6 k ^ - h , ( | . ( P ) z * '- 2 
(1 + a )
E k - J ^ - d  -  h,<}*(P)z|' ) 
. (1 + a )
s.-> ( 4 )
where:
d  z, d  z,
2 )0 (convex function) if z, )0 and 2 = 0 if z, = 0.
¿Z2 ¿Z2
Similar expressions hold for firm 2.
In the reaction function of firm 1 the sections with the axis are:
z °l - [sk *(<X) 1
a-e
when z, = 0 and z, = a  + P
(l + a)J |_P<KP)J
when z, = 0
Similarly, for firm 2 we have:
z° = [sk 1
H
p -e
when z. = 0 and z, = a  + pz (1+p). 1 1 a<|)(a)
when z. = 0
For a symmetric equilibrium ( a  = p) we can face two cases:
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0 0  + <2)a) z )z  (Figure 3 íllustrates) and this is accomplished when k)- . In£(¡){o)
this case we have three possible equilibriums: A, B, and C. The interior solution is not 
stable. We therefore eliminate this possibility by restricting the valué of the market 
dimensión.
b) z° (z  (if the last inequality is reversed). Then, in this case a stable unique equilibrium 
exists with an interior solution (Figure 4). Thus, if the market is small enough the two 
firms will compete.
It is not trivial to remark that the higher the technological opportunities the 
higher will be the possibility that market dimensión reaches to its critical level. This is 
in accordance with previous literature which establishes that industries with higher 
technological opportunities are more concentrated.
b) The second order condition is —o-; 1- (0. In our case:
¿P n,
d  n ,  ó(a) £ (--2) -
1 =£k   I V  (1 - W ) z f )  (5)
dz. l + a  a
£
We will have a máximum when — (1 (similarly for firm 2 with respect to its
a
own quality gap).
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Appendix 2
With the new form of the cost function, we have that:
^ L  = (lozx
£■(1 + —)(1 + Z¡ £ ) 1 Z¡ S -  (1 + S) 
a (1)
This expression is negative if:
z¡£_  a {l + ¿r)
- E  \1 + z¡e s{\ + á) (2)
Because process R&D will be always greater than zero, it is ensured that this
g
condition is satisfíed if — <1. This is a suffícient but not a necessary condition
a
Appendix 3
Uniqueness and stability are ensured (see Seade -1980- and Spencer and Brander 
■1983) if:
<?n. <?2n ,  í?2n .  ¿?2n ,
i) A = ——j ------ ;—— )0 ; that is, own effects of process R&D on marginal
ozx oz2 dzxdz.2 az2azx
gain domínate cross effects.
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And: 
d 1n .
ü) B 0 0 (0 (similarly for firm 2). The increment in the rival process R&D reduces
¿Z\CZ2
own marginal gain.
It is straightforward to see that condition ii) is satisfied. Unfortunately we are not 
able to obtain a simple enough expression to explore what matters with expression i). 
Therefore, we have decided to calcúlate this expression for each of the simulation cases. 
In every case the result obtained has been satisfactory.
III.3.- Practical implications of the model
As we have established in Chapter I, the objective of this research is twofold. On 
the one hand, we attempt to verify if the variable “firm size” is relevant for 
technological activity or, by contrast, is just a reflection of it and, therefore, a 
consequence of the competitive environment in which the firm is located and that leads 
it to have a given relationship between the price and quality of its product. On the other 
hand, we are interested in testing if the variable “quality” influences the incentives the 
firm has for the reduction of the unit cost of production or, in particular, if it affects 
resources spent on this purpose and, consequently, the firm’s process innovation 
performance.
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The theoretical model developed in last sections suggests a quadratic 
relationship between process R&D and quality gap. This implies the existence of a point 
beyond which we find a trade-off between quality and process R&D within the firm18. 
This point is called “tuming point”. As we have demonstrated, the exact valué of this 
point depends on the degree of differentiation of the rival firm, on market dimensión 
and on technological opportunities in different ways as well as on the interactions 
existing among these variables.
We have made some simplifications in the model that have to be taken into 
account in the empirical implementation because of the possible implications that may 
exist when working with data. We can mention mainly two. The first one is to consider 
that the unit cost of production (productivity) depends on the expenses on process R&D 
by the firm. Although many researchers exist that highlight the importance of this type 
of investment on productivity evolution it is quite evident that there are other factors 
that influence it. For this reason, the reader must be conscious that we are working with 
this relevant simplification. In any case, we demónstrate in Chapter V the relevance of 
the variable under consideration in the empirical implementation.
Perhaps, the most important simplification has been to take the variable 
“quality” as given, without considering that this variable is the result of a decisión that 
implies an optimisation process by the firm. Given the structure of the model, the 
inclusión of this decisión (assuming that the quality gap is a function of the expenses on 
product R&D of the firm) make it completely intractable and does not seems to give us
18 The author is conscious that to measure productivity with products of different qualities is not 
technically correct and the radical distinction that we make between productivity and quality is
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relevant information for our specifíc purpose19. In any case, for an adequate 
specifícation of the empirical model it is necessary to correct the existence of this 
endogeneity because not taking this fact into account would lead to undesirable bias. 
Following this premise, the econometric framework assumes that the independent 
variables are weakly exogenous.
All in all, in the empirical section we will test the implications of the proposed 
theoretical model trying to solve the problems appearing with some additional 
assumptions.
III.4.- Conclusions
We have made a fírst attempt to investígate the effect of a firm’s vertical 
differentiation in the incentives it has for cost reduction. Assuming that the spending on 
process innovation is necessary in order to introduce a higher quality product into the 
market, we have found three distinct types of effects when there is an increment in the 
quality gap of the firm: “ex-ante profits” effect, “decreasing retums in marginal gain” 
effect and “price-demand elasticity” effect.
When the differentiation level is low, process R&D increases with own quality 
gap but it reaches a point where this relationship is reversed. This critical point, which 
we will cali “tuming point”, depends on the quality gap of the rival firm, market
restrictive. However, in chapter V we clarify, at least to some extend, this aspect.
19 Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) study product and process innovation decisions separately, assuming in 
each case that the other strategy is taken as given. When they allow firms to choose both strategies 
simultaneously, conclusions do not change.
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dimensión and technological opportunities in different ways. If we allow the unitary 
cost to be affected by the quality gap, it seems that a larger quality gap is needed for this 
negative relationship to appear. Moreover, process R&D intensity always decreases with 
the quality gap when the unitary cost of production does not depends on quality, but this 
result is reversed when cost is affected by the quality gap. Technological opportunities 
have a clear positive effect on the effort devoted by fírms to process R&D.
The main result of this research relies in the existence of a point beyond which 
we detect a trade-off between own quality gap and process R&D within the firm. In this 
respect, due to process R&D directly affects production cost and, from here, it is very 
likely a negative impact on productivity evolution, we are able to affirm that a relation 
of substitution can exist between quality and productivity into the firm. It should be 
noted that this relationship of substitution comes from the own market competition 
mechanism.
We want to point out two important features of our model. The first one is about 
the existence of interdependence among firms. It is quite obvious that, in a specific 
market, products are normally differentiated and what matters is the perception of their 
relative prices and qualities by consumers. Then, strategic interdependence among fírms 
must be considered, because in some circumstances it can be more determinant than the 
variables normally established in the literature. The second one refers to the existence of 
an important interrelation between product innovation (implicitly encapsulated in 
quality gaps) and process innovation, even when we assume that the quality of the
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product does not enter the production cost function. It is important to remark that 
theoretical models did not use to take these two considerations into account.
As far as we know, the interactions and effects aforementioned have only been 
partially considered in the literature to date. Our aim has been to shed light on the 
connection that exists among aspects related with market competition and technological 
competition in order to bring attention to some important variables.
By introducing two factors that have not been taken into account previously, 
such as the strategic interdependence among fírms in a market and the corresponding 
interrelation between product and process innovation, we have given an altemative to 
some aspects that, even nowadays, confuse the literature as, for instance, the 
relationship between firm size and innovation.
115
CHAPTER IV: TESTING THE MODEL WITH 
SPANISH FIRM DATA

Testing the model with Spanish firm data
CHAPTER IV: TESTING THE MODEL W ITH SPANISH FIRM DATA
IV .l.- Introduction
ín the theoreticai and empirical literature on innovation it has been quite 
common to consider the expenses on R&D in a generic manner or just in one of iís two 
possible aspects: product and process R&D. This has implied taking into account, 
altematively, the incentives that a firm has for the improvement of the quality of its 
products or for the reduction of its unit cost of production. However, a firm obtains 
innovations in both directions and to focus only in one aspect gives an excessively 
restrictive explanation of the reality. For this reason, in Chapter III, a first attempt is 
made to fill this gap developing a model in which, in order to introduce a better product 
into the market, the two existing innovative fírms are forced to invest in process R&D.
The objective we pursue in this chapter is to test if there exist a point beyond 
which there is a trade-off between quality and productivity within the firm. This main 
proposition is based on the predictions of the aforementioned theoreticai model that 
establishes strategic interdependence among fírms and a direct connection between 
process and product innovation. This theoreticai model specifies that the productivity 
growth of a firm (measured by the evolution of its unit cost of production) is a direct 
consequence of the expenses the firm directs to process innovation (an input) whose 
reflection would be in the number of process innovations the firm obtains (an output). 
We have an approximation of the latter data for a sample of Spanish manufacturing 
firms. The measure of vertical product differentiation is a difficult task but, as we will
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show in the following sections we have at our disposal variables that, according to some 
authors, are reasonable approximations. These variables are the number of product 
innovations per “line of business” or advertising expenses as a ffaction of total sales, 
both easily obtainable from the survey.
The above premises are vias through which we have tried to relate the theoreticai 
model to the empirical one in order to extract conclusions, a task that necessarily 
implies resorting to additional assumptions that allow us to reach our objective. As 
usually occurs, the empirical implementation of any theoreticai model is not absent of 
difficulties. In our case, problems are even greater given the known peculiarities of this 
topic as well as the obstacle of measuring the variables established in our model. 
Nevertheless, we are going to use a vast Spanish firm data source as is the “Encuesta de 
Estrategias Empresariales” (Survey of Firm Strategies) that provides information which 
facilitates the solution of this types of handicaps, at least to some extend.
Below, we will detail the steps we have followed to adapt the theoreticai model 
to the empirical one taking into account that we have a panel data sample with a discrete 
dependent variable (number of process innovations) that requires an adequate 
econometric treatment in order to extract the máximum benefit.
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IV.2.- The Survey of Firm Strategies (SFS)
The SFS is a panel data conducted by the “Fundación Empresa Pública”. It 
incorporates a sample of more than 2,000 Spanish fírms1 analysed since 1990. The 
authors wanted that this invaluable data source was as representative as possible to 
ensure that the population inferences extracted from it were considered as valid2.
The main aim of the survey is the knowledge, through a wide range of variables, 
of the strategic behaviour of fírms in their respective markets. This necessarily involves 
an investigation into the decisions that fírms take as a response to the competitive 
environment in which they are located. To do this, this survey is composed of 8 sections 
in which categorical variables (the firm answers among a number of altematives) as 
well as numerical ones are included. The sections of the survey as a result of the types 
of questions formulated are:
1.- Activity, producís and production process. This encompasses the main 
characteristics of the firm such as the society organisation, geographic location of the 
industrial and non-industrial establishments, foreign capital participation, main activity, 
types of products, etc.
2.- Clients and suppliers. There is information about the type of commercial 
agreements of fírms, advertising activities, etc.
1 In particular, 2,188 fírms in 1990,2,359 in 1991,2,438 in 1992, 2,539 in 1993 and 2,595 in 1994.
2 For a detailed explanation of the characteristics of this survey see Fariñas and Jamandreu (1994).
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3.- Prices and costs. This incorporates information about the procedures of 
estimation of the production cost of the firm, its price policy and the respective 
competitors influence, etc.
4.- Markets. Questions are related to the type of markets in which the firm 
operates, their evolution and the relative performance of the firm.
5.- Technological activities. Analyses everything that is around the innovative 
aspect of the firm. Therefore, there are data about variables that are considered to be 
inputs of the technological process such as R&D expenses, Services acquired or 
technological payments, as well as data on innovative output as patents, number of 
process and product innovations, etc.
6.- Foreign trade. This examines the export and import activities of the firm and 
the corresponding destination and origin markets.
7.- Employment. Gives information about the number of employees of the firm, 
types of labour contracts, classifications according the kind of activities the employees 
do, qualifications, etc.
8.- Accounting data. In this last section, we have data about investments, assets 
and liabilities of the company etc.
The sample period is 1990-94. In the sample selection of firms we have followed 
two main criteria. On the one hand, we have chosen the firms that contain information 
about all the variables we are interested in during the five years of the study. On the 
other hand, among these firms it was necessary to ensure that their main activity was not 
in any way different during the sample period, that is, the NACE code (at three digit 
level) of their most important line of business was the same in the five years of the
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study. Not taking this fact into account could have led to serious mistakes. By doing 
this, we have a sample of 1062 firms that are distributed among sectors as table A (in 
the appendix) shows.
Apart from performing the regressions with all types of firms, we have also 
manipulated the data in two different ways in order to extract additional conclusions. 
The first one is to rule out those firms we have considered as outliers. We have 
established that firms with more than 10 product innovations (per line of business) in a 
year are exaggerating their technological performance3. The second one is to restrict our 
sample to those firms that have obtained product innovations in the given period. That 
is, only for firms we consider to have some degree of differentiation of their products. 
We will cali these firms “differentiated firms”.
As we can see, the information contained in the SFS is the most appropriate in 
order to test the theoreticai model, in which the important thing is the strategic 
competition among firms.
IV.3.- The econometric model
The econometric model has two essential features. On the one hand, we have a 
panel data, that is, we have data about the characteristics that a given number of “n” 
individuáis observed during a period of time “T” present, in our case, over a period of
1 Some firms report for hundreds of product innovations per “line of business”.
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five years. These types of models allow to control for the individual effects4 (random or 
fixed) of the units analysed. This is especially interesting in studies on innovation where 
the unobserved heterogeneity among the units of analysis that comes, for instance, from 
different degrees of appropriability conditions, is quite evident. On the other hand, the 
dependent variable (number of process innovations) is a discrete one which implies that 
we are working with non-linear models.
The analysis of panel data models in which the endogenous variable is discrete is 
a recent field of study in econometrics5. We have the additional feature that the 
dependent variable presents the zero valué in a high number of cases. In this respect, we 
have to resort to a probability distribution with a functional form taking into account 
this aspect, as is the case of the Poisson model. Therefore, the econometric specification 
which is more in accordance with our aim will follow the Poisson regression model6.
Let y it the observed event (i.e. number of process innovations) where “i” are 
individuáis and “t” time, the probability density function conditioned to the observable 
characteristics of firms is7:
4 As it is well known, the random effects model assumes that the individual effects are randomly 
distributed along the cross-section observations. The fixed effects model assumes that the differences 
among the distinct individuáis are in parametric changes (constant term) in the regression, implying the 
existence of correlation among the individual effects and the rest of the regressors.
5 The problem that arises with panel data is to find a way to elimínate the individual effect in order to 
obtain consistent estimators. There have been some authors that have proposed various Solutions as, for 
instance, to condition the máximum likelihood function to a sufficient statistic, through the simulation 
of an estimator or by two steps methods, all of them with a high degree of complexity. See 
Chamberlain (1980,1984) and Bdrsch-Supan and Hajivassilou (1993)
6 For a discussion o f these kind of models see, for instance, Cameron and Trivedi (1986).
7 It is assumed that the occurrence o f the events is random and time independent.
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(i)
where Xh = E{Y¡,) = V(Yh ) is the called Poisson parameter.
The usual assumption is that this parameter depends on the independent 
variables of the model foliowing the functional form log Xt t= X up .  Then,
the variables established by the theoreticai model, individual effects ( tj¡ )  and time
where u¡, is the "residual”8.
In the simplest versión, the Poisson model, apart from the restrictive assumption 
that the mean of the process is equal to its variance, does not take into account the 
individual effects. Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), in an article that serves as a 
reference in this topic and in which the relationship that exist between the achieved 
number of patents and the spending on R&D is studied, propose estimators that relax
8 In fact, the randomness in the model comes from the Poisson specification for the Y¡, because a 
deterministic relationship exists between the Poisson parameter and the independent variables.
E(Y¡t) = V(Y¡() = e x,,p, where the vector of characteristics may encapsulate, apart from
effects (v,). Thus, Xz,p = /)a +/9,X,„+ +PkX u, + r¡, + v ,.
Therefore the model we have to estimate is:
(2)
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the assumptions aforementioned. On the one hand, they assume that the variance differs 
form the mean following a given functional form obtaining as a result the called 
“Negative Binomial Models”. On the other hand, in order to eliminate the fixed effects9, 
they propose a conditional máximum likelihood approach in which the probability of 
occurrence of the events is conditioned on the sum along time of the dependent variable. 
In any case, the Solutions given by Hausman et al (1984) are valid only when the 
regressors are strictly exogenous or, similarly, when they are not correlated with the 
error temí neither contemporaneously ñor with its lags.
If, by contrast, the regressors are correlated with the lags of the error term we 
have regressors that are weakly exogenous or predetermined10. Chamberlain (1993) 
propose an estimator that allows for weak exogeneity of the regressors and that also 
eliminates the fixed effects11. In this case, the author obtains an orthogonality condition 
that must be satisfied by the model through a transformation of the original specification 
which implies a quasi-differentiation of it.
The original model can be written as foliows:
Y„ = ex:{  +u„ (3)
9 In innovation models does not seems justifíed the assumption of random effects. If, for instance, the 
firms with greater ability in the achievement of patents (due to non observable reasons) invest more in 
R&D because this activity is more profitable for them, the model has to be fixed effects. In any case, in 
order to confirm this point, the authors suggest a statistical test based on the serial correlation o f the 
residuals.
10 In innovation models it is quite restrictive to assume strict exogeneity of the regressors.
11 In a similar manner, Blundell et al. (1995) propose an estimator that encompasses these characteristics 
but, in this case, measuring the unobserved heterogeneity directly through the use o f the information 
contained in the past history of the dependent variable. However, as the authors recognise, this method 
is not valid when, as in our case, the panel dimensión is small.
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If the regressors are weakly exogenous, it is the case that:
E { u J  X n ,  X ll,rj,) = 0
Moreover, it is true that:
y  _  p xu+\Ppn,
il+\ ~  { e+ uí7+1 ( 4 )
Obtaining the fixed effects from (4):
  /^/+1 /^7+l
, X il+lP
( 5 )
and substituting (5) into (3) it is easy to check that:
_ (0XHfi-Xu+\P XhP-X^xPK77+1 ^ /7 (6)
That can be written as follows:
y  — Y P(xu-x u^ p  ,
// — /7+1 T  v ii ( 7 )
The restriction the model must accomplish is that:
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E(yu ! X u) = E{Yl, - Y „ y x‘-x'-'"‘ I X „  * „ )  = <) for 1 = 1,........ , T - 1 (8)
The problem we have with this orthogonality condition is that it is non linear in 
the parameters of interest p . Therefore, a non linear adaptation of the standard 
estimation is required. This is done by Montalvo (1993), who proposes the use of the 
Generalised Method of Moments (the sample moments are equalised to the population 
ones) in order to obtain the estimators. The estimator proposed by Montalvo (1993) is 
less dependent on the restrictive distributional assumptions needed for estimation in 
precedent models and allows us to calcúlate robust standard deviations for the estimated 
parameters.
Equation (8) gives us the basis of this method because this is the condition that a 
given sample moment must satisfy. Using the GMM we can face two distinct situations. 
The first one is when we have the same number of parameters as equations reflecting 
the corresponding restriction. In this case, the model is exactly identified. The second, 
more common one, is when the researcher has more equations reflecting the restriction 
than parameters, facing a problem of overidentification of the model. In this case, we 
should fínd a way that, at the same time that uses all the available information in order 
to improve effíciency, makes the diverse estimations existing in an overidentified 
system compatible.
Suppose a model in which the number of restrictions “J” is higher than the
number of parameters to estímate “K”, /? = ( $ , ...... ,/?*). The orthogonality conditions
are of the type:
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rrij = o ; 7 = 1 J  (9)
The sample counterpart is:
mj (y , X ,P ) = ~ Y j "ij (y ¡ ,xn j3) (10)n ¡
Therefore:
= “ Z 7WyO'/»*/>J0) = ° ;  y = l ,  J  (11)n ¡
will not have a unique solution because the model is overidentified.
The way to solve this problem is to minimise a criterion function, as, for 
instance, the square sum similarly to the standard procedure of the Ordinary Least
2
Squares. That is, Min.q = M in .{ m j  = m(fi)m(/3). Due to the fact that the sample
j
moments that lead to the restrictions are composed by the addition of the corresponding 
observations we have, in fact, random variables whose variance is possible to estímate. 
Following the logic of the Generalised Least Squares, when there are more restrictions 
than parameters it is possible to resort to a weighed procedure in which the weights are 
inversely proportional to the variance of the moments.
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We define W a diagonal matrix whose elements are w,¡ =asymptotic
variance(m ¡ ) . Therefore, the estimators are defined by choosing the valué of p that
minimises q = m(/3) W Hansen (1982) demonstrates that W is the optimal
weighed matrix. Moreover, if W is a positive definite matrix and plimm = 0, the 
estimator of p is consistent.
Under these conditions it is possible to demónstrate that /?-> JV(/?,£), where
E = [ G W 'g ] , being GJ = — .
The Montalvo (1993) model follows the above analysis. Then, the GMM 
estimator of p in the quasi-differenced model (7) is obtained by
mmimising 2 > ;z ,
7=1
A  - «
w „ h z ¡vlLf=l
where:
A 1 ^  . A A' 
w " =~¿1l z ¡v' v¡Z í
n  m
V; =
y n -e< *«-™ 'ya
z ,  =
z„ - 0 - 0 - 0 ---------0
0 — z¡2 -  0 -  0 ---------0
0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0  -  z;T_,
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being Z¡ a matrix of instruments whose elements z¡, =
The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is given by:
/  z — - 
t í  ' dp
A  " I
w N
/=1 dP
-I
It is possible to test the adequacy of the overidentifying restrictions. In the exact
identifíed cases q-rr íW ~ xm would be exactly zero because we can find a set of 
estimates for which “m” is zero. If the parameters are overidentified these equations will 
imply substantive restrictions. In this case, if the hypothesis of the model that lead to the 
moment equations in the first place are incorrect, at least some of the sample moment 
restrictions will be systematically violated. This is the basis for a test of overidentifying 
restrictions whose nuil hypothesis is that the restrictions are satisfied and in which
IV A - The empirical model
Foliowing the essence of the theoreticai model, if we are able to find a measure 
of product differentiation directly related to quality and a measure of process innovation 
reflecting the reduction in the unit cost of production, there should exists a quadratic 
relationship between these two variables within the firm. This result is a direct 
consequence of assuming strategic interdependence among fírms in a market as well as 
a direct interrelation between product and process innovation.
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Apart from this result, other consequences can be extracted from the model. 
Process innovation is positively affected by market dimensión (or, in more general 
terms, an approximation of the “pulí of demand”) and inversely related with a measure 
of the degree of product differentiation of the rest of the fírms in the market (rivalry). 
Technological opportunities have ambiguous effects on the level of process innovations.
Therefore, we should find the most adequate way of testing these results. This 
implies the use of the correct source of data, to construct the variables that best reflect 
the essence of the model and to apply them to the chosen econometric framework. The 
SFS provides us with valuable information that is enough to reach to our objective. The 
variable we are going to explain (dependent variable) has to reflect that type of spending 
on innovation directed to the improvement of the production process. From our point of 
view, the number of process innovations achieved by the firm in a year is a good 
approximation of this variable because the theoreticai model assumes that there exists a 
direct relationship between the technological input (process R&D) and technological 
output (reduction in cost). However, at this first stage we find a problem. We have the 
exact number of process innovations achieved by a firm only for 1990. For the rest of 
the years, we only know if the innovation is a new machine, a new method of 
production or both. The solution adopted to this problem is to consider a dependent 
variable with only three possible valúes:
Ylf = 0 if the firm has not obtained a process innovation.
Y¡, = 1 if the firm has obtained a new machine or a new method.
Yu = 2 if the firm has obtained both, a new machine and a new method.
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For 1990, the fírms that declared two or more process innovations (not many 
cases) have a valué of 2.
The independent variables we are going to use should reflect vertical product 
differentiation, the “pulí of demand” and rivalry. With respect to technological 
opportunities, the normal thing is to use dummies by industrial sectors with a 
disaggregation established by the researcher. Given that we are speaking about a 
categorical variable, for the panel data analysis its impact is encapsulated in the 
individual effects. This is the usual procedure used, for instance, by Geroski (1990).
The pioneering article about how to measure “product differentiation” is that of 
Caves and Willianson (1985). The point is that firms (brands) in a market face 
downward sloping demand curves satisfying the structural condition of imperfect 
substitution among competing brands. There are two main type of models, not 
necessarily substitutes of each other, that are able to explain this aforementioned feature 
of product differentiation: “product attribute” and “information” models. In the first 
case, the degree of imperfect substitution among brands will be greater the higher the 
number of primary attributes of the good and the variety of consumers’ taste. In the 
second case, heterogeneous preferences among brands at any given set of prices is the 
consequence of differing information sets. In both cases, the increment in the price of 
one brand does not imply the loss of all buyers, but a fraction of them. The data analysis 
drives these authors to conclude that both types of explanations are valid.
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The empirical implementation of this theoreticai ffamework to the Spanish case 
is carried out by Suarez (1995) that uses the same set of data as ours for 199012. The 
author mainly uses categorical variables that are not valid for our case because we 
estímate with a fixed effects panel data. However, we can find two variables, each one 
representing a different theoreticai perspective, that are in order: the number of product 
innovations obtained by a firm in a year and advertising expenses as a fraction of total 
sales.
The essence of our theoreticai model establish product differentiation as a result 
of the differences in quality between the differentiated (innovative) and the non- 
differentiated (non-innovative) firms. Therefore, it seems that it is more in accordance 
with the “complex attribute” perspective than with the “informational” one. Thus, we 
have considered the first possibility (the number of product innovations) as the variable 
that best reflects the “quality gap” of a firm13. The difference between the quality of a 
differentiated firm (number of product innovations) and the quality of a non- 
differentiated one (zero product innovations) is the quality gap of the first one. 
However, our measure of quality have to be defined for a line of business or single 
product and we do not have this information because data are defined at the firm level. 
In this case, it is necessary to find a solution. We have decided to divide the number of 
product innovations reported by each firm by the number of products it declares to have, 
to a máximum of 10 products14. The resulting valué is the one which we use in order to
12 This study shows how the sample can be divided in three types of fírms: fírms in which differentiation 
is achieved by “good” attributes, fírms that differentiate through the informational channel and fírms 
that do not differentiate their products.
13 The advertising variable has not been significant in any of our estimations.
14 In the survey, the number of product lines is restricted to 10. The number o f firms with 10 (or more) 
product lines is very small.
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measure the quality gap of each firm15. The prediction is that there exist a quadratic 
relationship between the dependent variable and this one. Therefore, the square of the 
defined variable is also included in the regression.
Continuing with the definition of the variables at the intra-industry level it is 
necessary to build on a variable representing “rivalry”, following the essence of the 
theoreticai model. In our model “rivalry” is defined as the quality gap of the rival firm. 
In this sample, each three digit industry (the most disaggregate classification that we 
have at our disposal) is constituted by a given number of innovative firms and not only 
two as in our theoreticai model. Therefore, the best way of measuring this variable for 
each firm is to work out the average number of product innovations of the rest of the 
differentiated firms in the industry. This new variable is not void of problems. Apart 
from a generic one about the importance of the product innovation (that can be also 
applied to process innovations and, in general, to the whole research in this field), we 
observe that this variable, on the one hand, does not reflect in a correct way the relative 
position of each firm in relation to the degree of rivalry by industries and, on the other 
hand, it would not be well calculated if we do not have information about all the firms 
in the industry. Due to having filter the data (see section IV.2) it is advisable to 
homogenise these valúes in some way. In this sense, for each firm we have divided the 
corresponding valué by the average of the industry to which it belongs avoiding any 
kind of industry bias. This transforms our variable into an índex in which the non- 
differentiated firms will have a valué of one (in industries with at least one differentiated
15 However, this correction has not been done for process innovations. There are two reasons. The first 
one is that we do not know the exact number of process innovations. The second one is that it is quite 
sensible to think that the production process is the same or quite similar for all the product lines.
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firm) and where the position of the differentiated fírms will be in relation to this valué, 
both at the cross-section level and at the time level.
Summarising, the “rival” variable is defined as follows:
Differentiated fírms.
2>,
n, - 1  j,¡ n,
rivaL, =
X a , X a , n' - 1
V; V/
Non-differentiated firms.
rival it = 0  (if there is not any differentiated firm in the industry) or 1 (if there exist 
differentiated fírms in the industry).
where:
pjt = number of product innovations per line of business of firm j in period t.
n t = number of differentiated fírms in the industry in period t, where differentiated
implies to have a positive valué of product innovations.
At the inter-industry level, we had two determinants of process innovation: 
technological opportunities and market dimensión. As we have said before, the former 
is usually controlled by dummies and, therefore, is nullified at the time level because is 
a characteristic of the industry that presumably remains constant during the five years of
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the sample16. The second variable tries to reflect the known hypothesis of Schmookler 
about the importance of the “pulí of demand” as opposed to the Rosenberg emphasis in 
relation to the “push of technology” (encapsulated in technological opportunities). It is 
not easy to find a non-categorical variable that reflects the importance of demand on 
innovation. We have decided to use “capacity utilisation” to measure the pressure that 
demand exercises on production and, then, on innovation. Although this is a variable at 
the firm level and not at the industry level, if we think in Keynesian terms it reflects 
quite accurately what we want to measure.
Finally, we are going to include in our model a measure of firm size. As is usual, 
this will be the number of employees the firm has at the end of the year. In our 
theoreticai model, this variable is not included explicitly. The reason is that we assume 
that it is endogenously determined by “strategic competition” among firms in a market 
(the respective price-quality relationships), and can be substituted by variables reflecting 
product differentiation, rivalry etc. Including this variable we are able to test the validity 
of our proposition.
Summarising, the empirical model consists in applying the Montalvo (1993) 
econometric framework to the data obtained from the SFS with the variables defined in 
this section.
Therefore:
16 However, it is fair to emphasise that Jaffe (1989) fínds a certain degree of endogeneity in this variable 
in the médium and long-run.
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_  ¿>(P\DIFit + P i DIFu + P2rival¡t + P 4ocuit + f i5employment¡t ) ,
n y r it ~ e ^  u it
where:
nprit = number of process innovations (0,1,2) of firm i in period t.
DIF„ = number of product innovations per line of business (vertical product
differentiation) of firm i in period t.
rivalu =relative measure of rivalry of firm i in period t.
ocuu = output capacity utilisation (“pulí of demand”) of firm / in period t.
employmentj' = number of employees (measure of firm size) of firm i in period t.
We expect that:
f i ) o ,  £<o, £<o> £>o, & = o
The descriptive statistics for the variables and samples used in the estimations 
(mean and standard deviation) are reported in table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Sample 1 (1062) Sample 2 (1109) Sample 3 (465) Sample 4 (423)
npr 0.46 (0.73) 0.40 (0.69) 0.61 (0.79) 0.63 (0.81)
DIF 2.56(25.61) 0.46 (1.34) 1.08 (1.90) 1.09 (1.90)
rival 0.86 (0.37) 0.80 (0.41) - 0.82 (0.41)
ocu 79.1 (15.75) - - 78.7 (14.97)
employment 243.7 (590.46) 220.9 (569.10) 339.8 (779.50) 363.7 (814.60)
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Additionally, considering the simplest versión of our theoretical model, process 
R&D intensity is directly related to technological opportunity and inversely related to 
vertical product differentiation (quality gap) following the expression:
where:
R¡ : process R&D intensity of firm “i”. 
s  : technological opportunities of the industry. 
a¡ : quality gap of firm “i”.
This is the case of the cost function not affected by the quality of the product17. 
More complex versions include the indirect effect of the quality gap of the rival firm 
(rivalry) and market dimensión. Thé foreseeable impact of the first one on process R&D 
intensity is positive and that of the second negative.
To test the validity of the predictions about process R&D intensity is not an easy 
task. We do not have at our disposal for all the years of the sample a sensible measure of 
process R&D intensity because, as already explained, we do not know exactly the exact 
number of process innovations achieved by each firm. This information is only available 
for 1990 and, as a consequence, we have been forced to focus in this year, which 
implies a cross-section analysis.
17 Numerical simulations reveal that process R&D intensity is increasing with quality gap when the 
unitary cost of production is affected by this variable.
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In order to calcúlate a proxy of our dependent variable we have followed the 
essence of the procedure used in other research (Levin and Reiss, 1988). The firm 
expenses on R&D are directed both to process and product innovations. Then, the 
assumption is that the proportion spent in each kind of R&D is directly connected with 
the proportion of innovations achieved of each type in relation to the total number of 
innovations. It seems quite clear that acting in this manner may have some bias but an 
altemative does not exist.
So, our dependent variable will be the following:
np¡ 
np, + npd,
where:
np¡ : number of process innovations of firm “i”. 
npd¡ : number of product innovations of firm “i”. 
RD¡ : total R&D of firm “i”. 
s,: sales of firm “i”.
At this stage we find yet another problem. It is not necessarily true that the firms 
reporting a positive valué of process innovations also declare a positive valué of R&D. 
There are at least two reasons. The first one is that firms are normally very optimistic 
about what is a process innovation considering as such whatever little improvement that
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occurs in the production process. The second one is that the innovation process can be 
performed in an informal manner without specific resources directed to this task.
Because of this fact, for our regression we have to take the firms with both a 
positive number of process innovations and a positive valué of R&D. The first condition 
is satisfied by 195 firms of the 1134 firms with valúes for all the variables we are 
interested in. Among them, 134 firms report positive expenses on R&D. Therefore, this 
will be our “small” sample size.
For the purpose of the regression, note that taking logarithms in (12) we have:
r¡ = log R¡ = \o g s -  log(l + a  ¡) (13)
As a consequence, we will take the logarithm of R¡ as a dependent variable. For 
the independent variables we have to comment some important aspects. Throughout the 
literature, the proxy for technological opportunities has been the use of dummies by 
industrial sectors (see, for instance, Scherer, 1982). Although to proceed in this manner 
is not absent of critiques it has been an easy and effective way to capture this variable. 
Thus, we have decided to use dummies by sectors as table 2 shows18. It seems clear that 
we cannot take logarithms on these variables and the interpretation of the corresponding 
parameters estimated is valid only to establish the ranking of technological 
opportunities by sectors.
18 It is possible to act in another way grouping the different sectors in three groups o f high, médium and 
low technological intensity. For the Spanish case see, for instance, Paricio (1993).
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For the regressor corresponding to vertical product differentiation we will take 
that derived from the theoretical model, d if = log(l + DIF) . Based on equation (13), 
the prediction is that the parameter affecting this expression should be equal to -1.
As already mentioned, some extensions of the model (in particular, those 
affecting the assumptions about the cost ñmction) include, at least indirectly, the 
differentiation level of the rival firms and the impact of market dimensión.
TABLE 2
NACE SECTOR N° FIRMS VARIABLE
22 Production and preliminary processing of metal 8 SI
24 Non-metallic mineral producís 9 S2
25 Chemical industry 13 S3
31 Manufacture of metal articles 13 S4
32-33-39 Agricultural and industrial machinery, office 
machinery.
11 S5
34-35 Electrical machinery 17 S6
36-37-38 Automobiles and engines, other means of 
transport
18 S7
41-42 Food, drink and tobáceo industry 20 S8
43-45 Textile industry, leather and leathergoods 
industry and footwear and clothing industry
4 S9
46-47 Wooden industry, paper printing and publishing 10 S10
48 Industry of rubber and plastics 9 S il
49 Other manufacturing industries 2 S12
In the first case and in order to establish the parallelism with own quality gap we 
use the variable riv = log(l + rival) , in which the variable “rival” is calculated as 
explained above but now within the new aforementioned sample of 1134 firms. In the 
second case, the variable that proxy market dimensión will be md = log(ocw), where 
“ocu” has already been explained. Finally, we use emp = log{employment) , as a proxy 
for firm size, a variable not considered in our theoretical background but normally taken 
into account in the literature.
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T h e  m o d e l to  e s t ím a te  is  th erefore:
13
r, = Y ,P iS¡ dif> + P u riv, + P i6m d, + P n emPi +  u¡ (14)
/ = !
We expect that:
P\a =  —  1 P\i ~ ^ •
IV.5.- Results
The results of the estimation are reported in table 3 for the panel data analysis 
about a firm’s process innovation performance and in table 4 for the cross-section one 
about process R&D intensity. The first three columns of table 3 correspond to the cases 
that present the estimates of the parameters belonging to the five variables chosen for 
the entire period. The rest of the columns present the estimations for those firms with a 
number of product innovations “per line of business” inferior or equal to 10, both when 
we take all the firms in the sample and when we only take “differentiated firms” as 
defined previously. The differences observed in sample sizes are due to the availability 
o f data for the number of variables chosen.
The most important result is the confirmation of the existence of a quadratic 
relationship between the number of process innovations the firm obtains and our 
measure of vertical product differentiation (DIF). In all the cases the coefficients have 
the correct signs and are highly significant. When we take a more restrictive measure of
141
Testing the model with Spanish firm data
product differentiation ( DIF < 1 0 )  this relationship becomes much more narrow. This 
result is directly in accordance with the main proposition of the theoretical model.
If we consider the effect on process innovation of the rest of the variables some 
relevant comments are in order. First of all, the evidence shows that there must exist an 
interdependence (some kind of covariation) between our measure of “rivalry” and 
employment. The estimations (most of them not reported) showed dramatically changes 
in the parameters estimated of the “rival” variable when we eliminate “employment” 
from our regression. In fact, the regressions showed a correct (and significant) sign of 
this parameter when employment is not present in the regression. When employment 
enters the equation, the sign is reversed and, in some cases, with significant valúes (see 
columns 1, 3, 4 and 5). From our point of view the interpretation of this result is quite 
straightforward. Our theoretical fiamework States that the demand the firm faces is 
dependent, among other things, on the product quality of the rival firm. In this sense, if 
we are able to assume (and we are) that the demand of the firm is directly related to its 
size, whose employment is usually its measure, it should not be surprising that rivalry 
and employment have some kind of interrelation (jointly with the other considered 
variables), making it incompatible for both of them to be in a regression at the same 
time because of collinearity problems. We believe this to be yet further confirmation of 
the model we are testing.
In general, and with the results obtained, it seems that “rival” better explains the 
behaviour of firms in relation to process innovations when we consider the entire 
sample (all types of firms). That is, the parameter that correspond to this variable is
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highly significant (much more than employment, that also shows the sign expected in 
other studies) and, even more important, the valué of the chi-square test for 
overidentifying restrictions is clearly reduced when this variable enters the equation and 
employment is excluded. By contrast, when we consider only differentiated firms, 
things are quite different because now employment seems to be an important 
determinant of the cost-reducing innovations for the same reasons explained above. In 
this case “rival” is non-significant although shows the correct sign.
A similar argument as that explained in relation to rivalry can be applied to 
“output capacity utilisation”. When we take the entire sample this variable has the 
expected sign and is significant (at least at 10% level). In the case when the sample is 
only composed by the differentiated firms this variable becomes insignificant, however 
showing the correct sign. Additionally, when we have only taken the cases for which 
d if  <10 this variable is far from significant19 (not showed). This fact leads us to think 
that for those firms which are highly differentiated, “the pulí of demand” may act as 
important incentive for process innovation, reducing the negative impact of vertical 
differentiation.
Therefore, a different behaviour is observed depending on the type of firms 
under study. When we take all types of firms the important thing in order to obtain 
process innovations is not essentially the size of the firm but the intensity of competition 
that other firms exercise in the market. This is the case that the theoretical model 
describes. By contrast, once the firm have reached some degree of differentiation the
19 Therefore, this variable has been excluded from the regression and now the sample size is 1109.
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relevance of competition of other firms decreases and becomes essential the argument of 
“cost-spreading” of Cohén and Klepper (1996a), that is, the cost of innovation per unity 
produced is the key variable (apart from the effect of own quality).
The explanation of this phenomenon may be the following. If you are not 
vertically differentiated, that is, if your product does not have any kind of “brand 
loyalty” your decisions about reduction in cost (price) that imply the attraction of new 
consumers would depend on the “brand loyalty” of your competitors. The higher the 
vertical differentiation of other firms the lower the possibility of obtaining additional 
demand for your products when price is reduced. However, if you have some degree of 
differentiation that implies a certain “brand image”, additional reduction in prices are 
more able to shift consumers from other firms to yours and, in this case, the relevant 
point in your decisión is size20.
The chi-square test for overidentifying restrictions shows that only for case (6) 
and (8), and if we are more willing to accept the nuil hypothesis than is normally the 
case, we are confident that the specification of the model is correct. These cases 
coincide with that of the sample composed only by differentiated firms. Logically, when 
we also have non-differentiated firms (those with zero valué of the DIF variable for the 
entire period) there are no changes in the valué of an independent variable making the 
choice of its lagged valúes as instruments an inappropriate way to proceed21. In any 
case, it should be noted that the reduction in the valué of the chi-square statistic when
20 At this point, it is convenient to remember that Jaffe (1986) finds that the negative effect of 
extemalities because of rivalry seems to play a greater role in those firms with lower effort on R&D.
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taking the correct set of variables is quite relevant. Following this criteria, our preferred 
specifications for each kind of sample are equations (3), (4) and (6).
With these estimates we are able to perform a practical exercise that provides us 
with an approach of the relevance of the results obtained. Taking, for instance, the 
estimations presented in equation (4) we can substitute the “rivalry” variable for its 
average valué in the sample (see table 1). Figure 1 shows the estimated relationship 
between “process innovation” and “product differentiation” for the typical firm. The 
“tuming” point, that is, the point beyond which we detect a trade-off between quality 
and productivity into the firm is located at 5.5 product innovations per line of business. 
In our sample of 1109 firms the 6.58% of them are at the right hand side of this point at 
least in one year of the sample. If we take just differentiated firms (as would seem more 
logical) this percentage rises to 15.7%.
The results of the estimation about R&D intensity and the descriptive statistics 
for the cross-section analysis are reported in table 4. We have performed OLS estimates 
robust for heteroskedasticity. The first surprising thing is that when the variable “ocu” 
enters the equation without any other manipulation the dummy variables are non- 
significant. As our observation of the descriptive statistics of the data and of the 
different regressions reveal, the explanation of this fact is that this variable is almost a 
constant temí (see its standard deviation) and, therefore, the existence of a
21 Although the Montalvo method is more appropriate where a long history of the dependent variable is 
not available, it presents some problems when the explanatory variables move slowly over time. This 
shortcoming is reduced when focusing only on differentiated firms.
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multicollinearity problem is quite likely22. The solution adopted has been to elimínate 
the dummy variable corresponding to the “Food, drink and tobáceo” industry , which 
will serve as a reference point for the ranking o f technological opportunities among 
sectors because this is clearly the sector with lower cost-reducing technological 
performance. Once these comments have been taken into account, among the different 
specifications presented our preferred one is equation (4).
TA BLE 3
Poisson fixed effeets estimates with predetermined independent variables 
Sample period: 1990/94 
Dependent variable: Number of process innovations.
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D if 0.027*
(0.0085)
0.035*
(0.0088)
0.026*
(0.0084)
0.41*
(0.057)
0.46*
(0.058)
0.39*
(0.05)
0.378*
(0.052)
0.392*
(0.053)
D i f 2 -0.00016*(3.67e-05)
-0.0002*
(3.81e-05)
-0.00016*
(3.7e-05)
-0.038*
(0.007)
-0.033*
(0.0068)
-0.033*
(0.0066)
-0.034*
(0.006)
-0.035*
(0.006)
rival 0.16
(0.1)
-0.26*
(0.095)
-0.34*
(0.09)
0.21*
(0.1)
-0.094
(0.1)
ocu 0.0077*
(0.0031)
0.0156*
(0.0031)
0.0052**
(0.0031)
0.0051
(0.0045)
0.0055
(0.0043)
employ. 0.00032**
(0.00018)
0.00035**
(0.00019)
0.0002
(0.00026)
0.0005*
(0.00023)
0.00047*
(0.00023)
Firms 1062 1062 1062 1109 1109 465 423 423
y 2A, m 65 60 43.29 40.12 65 24.4+ 31.98 28.25+
m 19 16 16 13 16 13 16 16
D I F <  10 NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
* significant at 5% level.
** significant at 10%. level 
+ non significant at 2.5% level.
22 We have also observed that when we also include a constant term in the regression (eliminating one of 
the dummy variables) if “ocu” enters as a regressor the intercept is far from significant, contrary to that 
occurred when “ocu” is eliminated.
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As we can see, the percentage o f the variance o f the dependent variable 
explained by the regression is about 32%, which can be considered as a reasonable good 
valué. The results are in agreement with the theoretical framework although the “rival” 
variable presents the incorrect sign23 (but it is non-significant at 5% level) and the 
correct and significant valué for the parameter o f “ocu” cannot be taken seriously for 
the reasons explained above.
FIGURE 1
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num ber of product innovations
In fact, if  we carefully observe the results obtained, they are in line with the 
specification presented in equation (12). The coeffícient affecting “d if5 is negative and 
cióse to 1 (in particular, it is not possible to reject the nuil hypothesis that this parameter 
is equal to -1) and the parameter affecting the variable measuring the “size” o f  the firm 
is non-significant. In any case, it seems that exercises a negative (but not significant) 
effect on process R&D intensity, probably because it is associated with a high level o f  
vertical product differentiation. With respect to technological opportunities the results
23 In this case, it is not detected the covariation problem with firm employment explained above. It should 
be noted that the variables have suffered some transformations.
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obtained are quite sensible. On the one hand, firms in “machinery”, “chemical”, 
“manufacture of metal articles” and “automobile” industries24, seem to have some 
advantages or greater incentives for the investment on process innovation. On the other 
hand, the “production and preliminary processing of metal” and the “textile” and 
“footwear and clothing” industries apparently do not behave differently from the sector 
taken as a reference.
From our theoretical point of view, the most interesting conclusión we can 
extract from these results is that due to the variable dif has a negative parameter 
estimated, this would imply that, from the sample used, the quality of the product does 
not enter in a significant manner the production cost function. This, in principie, non- 
realistic consequence of the estimation performed can be explained in some way. The 
most likely explanation is that the greater part of the product innovations the firm 
declares to have obtained are of an incremental nature in the sense that they do not 
imply a really relevant change in the characteristics of the good. In this case, they do not 
substantially alter the unitary cost of production of the respective good as opposed to 
that which would occur in the case of drastic innovations.
Although we have obtained “good” results from this analysis (in the case of the 
variable d if  a surprisingly accurate estimated parameter valué) we are conscious of 
important shortcomings related to sample size, variables construction, etc.
24 The sector “other manufacturing industries” has the higher parameter valué. This is difficult to interpret 
because the diversity of firms included in this sector, although in our case only 2 firms are in the 
sample.
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TABLE 4
OLS-Heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
Dependent variable: log of process R&D intensity. Sample: 134 firms
F-stat
Prob. F-stat
Jarque-Bera
test
Note: t-ratio between brackets.
Variable mean st. dev.
-2.19 (-6.34)Intercept
-0.74 (-5.27) -0.71 (-5.23) -0.72 (-5.3) -0.75 (-5.32)
-0.13 (-1.3)
-0.19 (-0.15)
0.31 (0.23)
0.45 (0.35)
0.39 (0.32))
0.45 (0.36)
0.27 (0.21)
0.38(0.31)
-0.36 (-0.28)
0.26 (0.2)
0.1 (0.08)
0.29 (0.23)
-0.13 (-1.26)
-1.95 (-5.12)
-1.51 (-4.54)
-1.34 (-3.68)
-1.36 (-4.23)
-1.35 (-3.67)
-1.53 (-5.00)
-1.37 (-4.45)
-2.19 (-6.34)
-1.51 (-3.4)
-1.71 (-5.59)
-1.53 (-4.96)
-0.13 (-1.26)
0.23 (1.31)
0.68 (2.89)
0.85 (4.15)
0.83 (4.55)
0.83 (4.02)
0.65 (4.32)
0.81 (5.05)
0.68 (1.53)
0.48 (3.04)
0.66 (4.63)
-0.14 (-1.45)
0.15(0.85)
0.67 (2.78)
0.81 (3.95)
0.74 (4.3)
0.81 (4.06)
0.62(4.14)
0.73 (4.66)
0.61 (1.43)
0.46 (2.98)
0.65 (4.56)
1.02 (8.58)
4.65
(0 .10)
-2.34 0.61
ocu -0.94 (-1.48)
IV.6.- Conclusions
Some American authors have recently been worried about the poor evolution o f  
productivity in the USA economy in the last decades. The reason for this can be found 
in different factors but it seems that those associated with innovation are o f  some
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relevance. However, following this line of research, almost nobody has paid attention to 
market behaviour. In an industry, firms compete with the aim to obtain profits, as much 
as they can, and the two ways to arrive to this objective are prices and quality. Process 
innovation acts in the fírst direction by reducing the unit cost of production of the firm 
and, therefore, increasing its productivity. Product innovation, influences in the second 
direction by improving the characteristics of the product the firm sells.
Intuitively, process and product innovations are related because both enter the 
price-quality relationship of the products of a firm which is a key variable in the 
evolution of profits due to the existence of strategic interdependence among firms in a 
market. Our theoretical model analyses this interrelation finding a quadratic relationship 
between process innovation and vertical product differentiation. Data on manufacturing 
Spanish firms confirms this theoretical proposition and States a point (that we have 
called “tuming point”) beyond which the firm has less incentive to pursue process 
innovations and, therefore, its productivity evolution will suffer.
Thus, we can find in the own market mechanism a possible explanation of the 
slowdown in productivity. However there is no reason to be worried about this because 
the other part of the story is the improvement in quality and, in tum, on welfare.
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IV.7.- Appendix
TABLE A
THREE DIGIT LEVEL NACE (MANUFACTURING SECTORS)*
221(11) Iron and Steel industry.
222 (4) Manufacture o f  Steel tubes.
223 (3) Drawing, coid rolling and coid folding o f  Steel.
224 (5) Production and preliminary processing o f  non-ferrous metáis.
241 (14), 247(13) Manufacture o f  clay products for constructional purposes.
242 (8) Manufacture o f  cement, lime and plaster.
243 (18), 244 (12), 245 (1), 
249 (3)
Other minerals and non-m etallic derivatives.
246(11) Manufacture o f  glass and glassware.
251 (10), 252 (4), 253 (17), 
254 (38), 255 (13)
Chemical products
311 (7), 312 (4), 313(7), 
314 (22), 315 (9), 316 (53), 
319(13)
Manufacture o f  metal articles.
321 (4), 322 (2), 323 (3), 324 
(8), 325 (15), 326 (5), 329(13)
Manufacture o f  agricultural and industrial machinery.
330 (4), 391 (3), 392(1), 
393 (5)
Manufacture o f  office machinery.
342(18), 343 (5), 345 (8), 346 
(11), 347 (17), 351 (6), 352(1), 
353 (3), 354 (6), 355 (5)
Manufacture o f  electrical machinery.
362 (6), 363 (35) Manufacture o f  autom obiles and engines.
371 (10), 372 (8), 381 (2), 382 
(3), 383 (5)
Manufacture o f  other means o f  transport.
413(39) Processing and preserving o f  fruit and vegetables.
414(8) Manufacture o f  dairy products.
411 (2), 412 (3), 415 (17), 416 
(7), 417 (11), 418 (2), 419 (62), 
420 (3), 421 (7), 422 (2),
423 (11)
Manufacture o f  other foods.
424 (4) D istilling o f  ethyl alcohol from fermented materials; spirit d istilling and 
compounding.
425 (9) Manufacture o f  w ine o f  fresh grapes.
426 (2) Other beverages obtained from fermentation o f  fruit juices.
427 (6) Brewing and malting.
428(14) Manufacture o f  soft drinks, including the bottling o f  natural waters.
429 (5) Manufacture o f  tobáceo products.
431 (7), 432(5), 433 (7), 435 
(12), 436(5), 439 (6), 453 (56), 
455 (9), 456(1)
Manufacture o f  textile products; clothing.
441 (5), 442 (7), 451 (19), 
452(1)
Manufacture o f  products from leather and leather substitutes and 
manufacture o f  footwear.
461 (2), 462 (5), 463(15), 
464 (5), 465 (3), 466(1), 
468 (41)
Manufacture o f  w ooden fumiture.
471 (2), 472 (6) Manufacture o f  pulp, paper and board.
473 (18), 474 (49), 475 (12) Paper products, printing.
481 (9), 482 (43) Manufacture o f  rubber products.
491 (7), 492(1), 493 (3), 
494 (5), 495 (3)
Other manufacturing industries (jewellery, m usical instruments, 
photographic, toys...).
Note: Between brackets there is the number o f firms in the sample to a total amount o f 1062firms.
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CHAPTER V: THE IMPACT OF PROCESS INNOVATIONS ON FIRM’S
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
V.I.- Introduction
The study of the impact that technology could have on productivity growth 
experimented a relevant development when it was observed at the end of the seventies a 
clear slowdown in this ratio in occidental economies. This worry emerged due to the 
possible adverse consequences that this fact could have on the behaviour of inflation 
and competitiveness and, in general, on the standard of living of the industrialised 
societies. The interest of the authors has been essentially focused in trying to discover 
what the role is of the amount directed to the research and development of new products 
and processes on productivity evolution. The research conducted is from distinct stages, 
mainly at the country and sectorial levels and, to a lesser extend, at the firm level.
To do this, the diverse works have included, in addition to physical capital and 
labour, a measure of knowledge capital (normally a weighted sum of past R&D) as an 
input of the productive process and have tested the sign and significance of this variable 
in the corresponding regression. The results obtained of doing this exercise are not 
conclusive and differ in an important manner depending, for instance, on the country 
under study, the characteristics of the sample used (i.e. type of firms) or the period of 
analysis, as well as other circumstances such as to consider or not the assumption of 
constant retums to scale, the existence of extemalities, etc.
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Our perspective, however, is slightly different. In Chapters III and IV we have 
outlined the convenience of distinguishing the distinct impact that process and product 
innovations have on the profit function of a firm. This is logical if we realise that the 
effect of a process innovation is to reduce the unit cost of production of the good, 
implying a productivity improvement, and that of a product innovation is to shift the 
corresponding demand curve rightward (vertical product differentiation) allowing the 
firms to charge a higher price-cost margin. Acting in this manner, we have reached the 
theoretical and empirical conclusión of the existence, for a wide sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms, of a quadratic relationship between an approximated measure of 
the number of process innovations a firm declares to have obtained in a given year and 
its vertical product differentiation (number of product innovations). That is, we have 
detected a point, corresponding to a specific degree of vertical product differentiation, 
beyond which the firm has less incentive for a reduction in its unit cost of production 
and, therefore, its process innovation performance decreases.
From this point of view we can extract one tentative (at least, partial) 
explanation for the aforementioned fall in the rate of growth of productivity in modem 
economies. In this sense, the own evolution in the development of the market 
mechanism that leads to a great variety and the characteristics of the good the firm sells 
(the possibility of vertically differentiate it) influences its cost-reduction incentives. The 
crucial point in order to sustain this conclusión relies in the consideration that the 
variable we have taken in previous chapters as a dependent one reflecting the process 
innovation performance of a firm determines, to a greater or lesser extent, its
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productivity evolution. If this is revealed to be true, we would have been able to give an 
alternative way to expound the problem.
This is the main contribution of this chapter. Based on the same data source used 
in the previous chapter and including our approximated measure of the number of 
process innovations obtained by a firm in a given year in its production function, we test 
the relevance of this variable both at the cross-section level and at the time dimensional 
one. Previously, a traditional approach with R&D intensity is conducted in order to 
make some comparisons.
Although the problems with the measurement of the variables are non-negligible 
throughout this study (in particular, the identification of implausibly high decreasing 
retums to scale at the time dimensión) the results obtained are satisfactory and robust 
enough to affirm that the postulated existing trade-off between quality and productivity 
within the firm is a reasonable argument.
V.2.-TheoreticaI background
The point of departure of this type of analysis is normally the traditional Cobb- 
Douglas production function extended with a measure of knowledge (or research) 
capital as an input of the productive process in order to account for the improvement of 
technology at the firm level (see, for instance, Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). That is:
Q, = Ae* K ; i W e *  (1)
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where Q¡, is the output of firm “i” in period “t”, A is a constant, X measures the rate of 
disembodied technical change, Ku and Ru are respectively physical and knowledge 
capital of firm “i” in period “t”, Lit is labour employed, a , p and 8 are the corresponding 
elasticities of the three defined inputs and e¡, is the error term.
When the data available exists for a sufficient period of time, the measure of the 
knowledge capital is usually achieved by a weighted sum of past (deflated) R&D. If this 
is the case, the empirical analysis is carried out by a cross-section or panel data 
regression of equation (1) in its logarithmic versión. Unfortunately, the time dimensión 
of our data source is just five years (see next section) and, consequently, it is not 
possible to construct a reliable variable reflecting research capital.
There is, however, an altemative way of dealing with this problem and it is to 
consider equation (1) in its growth rate form. Therefore, if we take logarithms in 
equation (1) and we differentiate with respect to time, we obtain:
q.„ = X + ak„ + piu + 5r„ + w„ (2)
where lower case variables indicate rate of growth.
Being 8 the elasticity of knowledge capital with respect to output, we have that 
S  = ^ we assume the equality of marginal products across firms i { ~ )  allowing
8 to vary among them, this would lead the rate of growth of productivity to depend on 
RD
R&D intensity ("g")* ls:
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8R Q  R 8R Q Q Q 
where it is assumed there is no depreciation in R&D (AR = RD -r¡R \r\=  0).
Following this procedure, equation (2) is reformulated as follows:
RDq„ = X + ak„ + /?/„+ p —  + w„ (3)
where the variable of interest in equation (3) is not a measure of knowledge capital but a 
measure of R&D intensity.
A second issue to take into account is about the assumption of constant retums to 
scale in the Cobb-Douglas production function1 (a  + p = 1). Introducing this possibility 
into the regression, the equation to estímate is now in terms of labour productivity and 
takes the form:
RD
(?» -  4 )  = /l + a(k„ -  + p —  + w„ (4)
or simplifying the notation:
ql„ =Á + aklu + y,, + prdu + w„ (4')
where y = a  + p -1 , setting it equal to zero when assuming constant retums to scale and 
leaving it free if this is not the case. Equation (4') will be the basis of a fírst stage in the
1 There is a controversy in the defínition o f constant retums to scale about the inclusión in the production 
function of the parameter affecting the research capital. Following Griliches and Lichtemberg (1984), 
we have decided not to include it in order to avoid double counting with labour and physical capital 
inputs,
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analysis performed in section 4. See, for instance, Wakelin (1998), that uses this 
procedure in a recent study for UK manufacturing firms.
As previously noted, the contribution of this chapter relies in considering the 
analysis made above from a different point of view. In our case, two additional features 
are in order. The first one is in direct connection with the assumption of Blundell et al. 
(1993) that, in spite of constructing knowledge capital using firm research efforts 
(R&D), they pay direct attention to effective innovations. The reasoning behind this 
substitution is that the process of leaming is by doing successfully rather than just the 
resources directed to R&D. Following this criteria, the increment in knowledge stock is 
given by:
AR = I  -  tjR  => AR = I  if we continué assuming r| = 0 (5)
where “I” is the number of innovations achieved by a firm in a given year.
The second novelty is the distinction we make between product and process 
R&D. As Griliches and Mairesse (1984) recognise, the knowledge capital has to be 
constructed with the R&D investment on productivity, clearly referring to process R&D. 
However, the authors do not take into account this aspect along their study probably due 
to data availability2. In our case, it is possible, at least in some way, to correct this 
shortcoming and to construct a variable that approximately measured the process 
innovation performance of a firm. Therefore, in the construction of knowledge capital
2 This fact is justified arguing that the price correction of the output variable cannot account for intra- 
sectorial differences in price movements that, from the authors’ opinión, mostly reflect quality 
changes. In this sense, the study encompasses not only process but also product innovations. We will 
turn to this aspect in next pages.
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we will also consider, in principie, process innovations only. Thus, AR = p c i , where 
“pci” is the number of process innovations that a fírm obtains in a given year.
Acting in this manner and starting again from equation (2), we have that:
Sr = (— —)AR = Opci 
SR Q (6)
assuming now that what is constant across firms is the rate of retum of innovations in 
percentage points.
Substituting, the final expression is of the form:
Equation (7) gives the basis for a test of our theory. We expect the parameter 0 
to be positive and significant, not establishing “a priori” any assumption about its 
relative importance compared with the impact of physical capital. We have also include 
in some regressions the number of product innovations the firm declares to obtain in a 
given year (pdí) in order to validate the assumption we have made about its limited 
relevance in this types of studies.
V.3.- Data and the measurement of variables
qlu = A + akl¡, +ylu + Opci + w¡, ( 7 )
As in Chapter IV the data source is the called “Encuesta de Estrategias 
Empresariales" (Survey of Firm Strategies) conducted by the “Fundación Empresa
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Pública As previously mentioned, the sample period for which we have data is five 
years (1990-94) and the number of fírms surveyed exceeds 2,000 although for reasons 
of missing observations and outliers this number is considerably reduced for our 
estimations.
The measure of the different variables we are interested in is as follows:
- The variable reflecting output ( Qu) is normally measured by the firm amount of sales 
in the given year. However, we have made a correction in this valué because it may not 
accurately reflect the real production of a firm if the sales stock variation is high and 
there are important changes from year to year. Accordingly, we have accounted for this 
fact and our output variable includes not only the sales of the firm but also its stock 
variation. The inflation correction has been done using the output deflator constructed 
from the data contained in the National Accounts of Spain (Contabilidad Nacional de 
España, CNAE) with the sectorial level disaggregation described in the left hand side of 
table 1.
- The physical capital stock ( K¡,) of a firm is represented by its total fixed gross assets. 
It has been deflated correcting its current rate of growth by the national investment 
inflation rate collected in the publication “Boletín Económico del Banco de España ” 
(Bank of Spain).
- The labour input ( L¡,) is compound by the total number of employees of a firm at the 
end of the year.
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Unfortunately, our data availability does not permit us to correct these last two 
variables for the workers and capital used for research activity, incurring in double 
counting when we include R&D intensity in the regression probably underestimating its 
parameter valué.
In our estimations we use two different variables measuring the technological 
input. As discussed above, the first one is R&D intensity (R&D expenses over total 
sales). For the construction of this variable we have taken the total amount spent by each 
firm on R&D, that is, we have considered not only intemal expenses but also extemal 
ones. The second one is the number of process innovations a firm obtains in a year. 
Although we do not have the exact data for our sample period we have constructed a 
variable already used in the previous chapter that reasonably approximates the process 
innovation performance of a firm. The information we have is if the firm has obtained or 
not a process innovation in a given year and, if this is the case, we know if it consist in a 
new machine, a new method of production or both. Following the main criteria used in 
Chapter IV, our “process innovation” variable (pci) will take the valué “0” if  the firm 
has not obtained a process innovation, the valué “1” when the firm has obtained a new 
machine or a new method and a valué of “2” when it has obtained both, a new machine 
and a new method.
Finally, in some regressions the total number of product innovations achieved by 
a firm in a year (pdi) has also been included as a control variable for our theory. There 
also exists in relation to this regressor some relevant comments that we will outline in 
the next section.
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T able 1
Sector classification
Sector Price-deflator classification Sector Regression classification
(CNAE) (CNAE)
1 (221,222,223) Iron and Steel industry. 1(22) Extraction of metallic minerals.
2 (224)
3 (242) 
4(246)
Production and preliminary 
Processing of non-ferrous metáis. 
Manufacture of cement, lime and 
plaster.
Manufacture of glass and glassware.
2(24) Non-metallic mineral producís.
5(241,247)
6 (243,244,245, 
249)
Manufacture of clay producís for 
constructional purposes.
Other minerals and non-metallic 
derivatives.
7(251/255) Chemical producís. 3(25) Chemical producís.
8(31) Manufacture of metal articles. 4(31) Manufacture of metal articles.
9(32)
10 (33,39)
Manufacture of agricultural and 
industrial machinery. 
Manufacture of office machinery.
5(32)
6 (33,39)
Manufacture of agricultural and 
industrial machinery.
Manufacture of office machinery.
11 (34,35) Manufacture of electrical machinery. 7 (34,35) Manufacture of electrical 
machinery.
12(361,362,363) 
13 (37,38) 
14(413)
15(414)
Manufacture of automobiles and 
engines
Manufacture of other means of 
transport.
Processing and preserving of fruits 
and vegetables.
Manufacture of dairy producís.
8(36)
9 (37,38) 
10(41,42)
Manufacture of automobiles and 
engines
Manufacture of other means of 
transport.
Food, drink and tobáceo industry.
16(411,412, Manufacture of other food.
415/23)
17 (424/428) Beverages.
18(429) Tobacco.
19(43,453/56)
20(441,442,451,
452)
Manufacture of textile producís, 
clothing.
Manufacture of leather producís and 
footwear.
11 (43,453/56) 
12(44,451,452)
Manufacture of textile producís, 
clothing.
Manufacture of leather producís 
and footwear.
21(46)
22 (471,472)
23 (473,474,475)
Manufacture of wooden fumiture.
Manufacture of pulp, paper and 
board.
Paper producís, printing.
13 (46,47) Manufacture of wooden fumiture 
and paper industry.
24 (481,482) Manufacture of rubber producís. 14 (48) Manufacture of rubber producís.
25 (49) Other manufacturing industries. 15(49) Other manufacturing industries.
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The sample size used in each regression depends on the availability of data of the 
corresponding variables for each firm and for the entire period. Nevertheless, we have 
decided to omit those firms that have experienced a rate of growth of labour 
productivity or of the capital to labour ratio greater than 100% in a given year. This is 
because we have considered that these observations could have some kind of problems 
such as errors of measurement, the existence of mergers, or some other circumstances 
that could affect in an important manner our estimates3.
V.4.- Results
As alreády mentioned, we have firm data of the variables we are interested in 
during a period of five years: 1990-1994. However, because we are working with rates 
of growth the sample is reduced to four observations for each firm. This is the typical 
example of a panel data model. When working with panel data we mainly have three 
different types of estimators: between-units estimator, within-units estimator and a 
weighted sum of both. The first one accounts for the cross-section variation in the 
sample and is constructed using the firm means. The within-units estimator, also called 
fixed effects model, pays attention to the time dimensión and assumes that each firm has 
a specific (individual) effect that does not vary over time and that is correlated with the 
corresponding regressors. In order to account for this problem the fixed effects model 
uses the deviations of the observations from their specific firm means. Altematively, if 
the assumption is that the individual effects are randomly distributed across the cross-
3 Griliches and Mairesse (1984) demónstrate that mergers of firms have a relevant impact in this type of 
study.
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sectional units we are in a context of a random effects model (GLS estimator) that 
considers with different weights the two aspects outlined above4.
We have analysed both the time dimensión of the data and the cross-sectional 
one. The great advantage that the first type of estimator has over the second one is that it 
take into account the unobserved heterogeneity existing among the different units of 
analysis, which is a good thing in these types of studies. The descriptive statistics for the 
distinct samples used figure in table 2. The difference that exists in sample size between 
the cross-section and panel data models is due to a distinct criteria in the application of 
the decisión to eliminate those firms with a variation in labour productivity or in the 
capital-labour ratio greater than 100%: in the case of the cross-section regression this 
restriction is relaxed because it is taken in relation to the average of these rates of 
growth throughout the entire period5.
Logically, the mean valué of the different variables is almost identical for the 
two types of samples studied. However, the standard deviations for the panel data case 
approximately doubles that of the cross-sectional one except for the technological 
variables for which it is only slightly higher. This result implies that R&D intensity and 
the innovation performance of a firm (product or process) are much more stable over 
time than other indicators such as those considered here, probably reflecting that labour 
is an input with a higher variability than is normally considered to have.
4 The classical OLS regression can also be performed but in this case assuming the inexistence of 
individual effects and just an overall constant. In this case, much more weight is directed to the 
between-units variation.
5 This does not qualitatively affect the conclusions but the fít of the regression ( R2 ) is reduced 
considerably in the panel data estimates.
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For the period analysed, the mean of the annual rate of growth of labour 
productivity is about 5% and that of the capital-labour ratio and labour 8% and -2% 
respectively. These are very high valúes if we compare them, for instance, with the 
calculations of Wakelin (1998) for a sample (much more small than ours) of UK 
manufacturing firms corresponding to the period 1988-92 (1.7%, 5% and -1%, 
respectively). By contrast, the ratio measuring R&D intensity is considerablv higher for 
the UK sample (0.79% versus 1.6%). This probably reveáis that in Spain the 
technological innovation process is conducted in an informal way to a greater extend 
than in other countries of our economic environment as well as that the Spanish firm 
directs less effort to innovative activity .
The sectorial evolution that is obscured for this general valúes is shown in table 
3 with the sectorial classification given in the right hand side of table 1. This 
decomposition has been done for the first sample used in our regressions (813 firms) 
and also includes the mean sectorial valúes of R&D intensity and our variable 
measuring the “number of process innovations”. As it can be observed, the sectorial 
variability is quite important. The sector with a higher average annual rate of growth of 
labour productivity is that of the “automobile industry” followed by “extraction of 
metallic minerals”, “electrical machinery” and “chemical producís”. On the other 
extreme, we find “metal articles” and “other means of transport”. However, the data 
considered to be of greater interest in this table are derived from four correlations (not 
showed) that have been calculated from some of the variables listed (each one with 15 
observations). The correlation that exists between (the rate of growth of) labour 
productivity and the capital-labour ratio with respect to R&D intensity by sectors are
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respectively 0.18 and 0.05, whereas with respect to the “number o f process innovations” 
the valúes reach to 0.51 and 0.546. Although this is clearly a very basic analysis it is an 
indicator o f  what we could find in our regressions.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics 
(mean and standard deviation)
Sam ple ql kl 1 rd pci pdi c o rr c o r r
(firms) (ld/1) (pci/pdi)
cross-section 813 0.048 0.082 -0.020 0.0079 0.54 - -0.44 -
( 0 . 0 9 ) ( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 1 9 ) ( 0 . 5 9 )
762 0.047 0.080 -0.022 - 0.53 3.66 -0.38 0.05
( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 5 9 ) ( 2 5 . 2 )
683 0.046 0.082 -0.023 - 0.49 0.61 -0.38 0.34
( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 5 7 ) ( 1 . 1 7 )
panel d a ta 778 0.049 0.081 -0.023 0.0079 - - -0.51 -
( o b s e r v a t i o n s ) ( 3 1 1 2 ) ( 0 . 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 2 2 )
655 0.046 0.082 -0.023 0.0072 - - -0.52 -
( 2 6 2 0 ) ( 0 . 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 2 2 )
815 0.049 0.081 -0.022 - 0.56 - -0.51 -
( 3 2 6 0 ) ( 0 . 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 7 7 )
680 0.046 0.081 -0.023 - 0.49 0.62 -0.51 0.26
( 2 7 2 0 ) ( 0 . 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 4 ) ( 0 . 1 6 ) ( 0 . 7 4 ) (1.56)
The parameters estimated o f the cross-section regression are showed in table 4. 
In order to perform this regression we have taken for each firm the average annual rate 
o f growth o f each variable except for p c i  and p d i  that is the arithmetic mean between 
1991 and 1994. We have followed the equation specifications given in expressions (4') 
and (7). The first three columns of this table do not take into account the parameter X ,
6 However, there is not a problem of collinearity in the regressions between the capital to labour ratio and 
the “number of process innovations” because the correlation between these two variables is
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which represents disembodied technical change and which reflects those characteristics 
of the sector that remain constant over time7 (for instance, technological opportunity or 
spillover conditions). For the rest of the columns, this sector specific effect is accounted 
for by the inclusión of 15 dummies in the regression (see table 1).
Column (1) includes the classical R&D intensity variable (rd) and does not 
assume constant retums to scale. The parameter estimated of the physical capital is in 
line with that obtained for other countries which are approximately located in the 
interval (0.2, 0.3). This is the case of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) for USA, Cuneo 
and Mairesse (1984) for France, Odagiri and Iwata (1988) for Japan and Wakelin (1998) 
for UK. The assumption of constant retums to scale is clearly rejected, a result also 
found in other countries but now the effect is stronger than in other cases8. The fact of 
assuming or not constant retums to scale influences some of our estimations in so an 
important manner that we have decided to present the results considering both 
altematives. The variable we are most interested (rd) has a positive and significant 
impact on productivity growth, showing a higher marginal impact than that observed in 
other countries. For instance, the parameter estimated of Wakelin (1998) for UK is 0.35, 
although it is necessary to remember that in this case the average valué of this variable
significantly reduced in our samples.
7 Firm-specific effects with respect to the level of productivity are removed by the first differencing. 
However there could remain those related with the rate o f growth of productivity. It is quite clear that 
we cannot account for them at this cross-sectional level and we have to postpone the discussion to our 
panel data estimates.
8 The diverse authors have tried to give altemative explanations to this result. Some of them are related 
with the exclusión of materials in the production function, the omission of labour and capital intensity 
of utilisation variables, the use of sales instead of valué added to measure production, etc. Griliches and 
Mairesse (1984) also include in this list the simultaneity in the determination of output and 
employment and propose an altemative estimation. Unfortunately, it is necessary a measure of 
knowledge capital to perform it.
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is twice that of Spain. Therefore, the marginal impact is greater in Spain but the total 
(average) effect is higher in the UK.
In column (2) we perform the regression with our altemative measure of the 
technological input (pci). The corresponding parameter estimated is positive and highly 
signifícant (much more than R&D intensity) and the impact of the capital to labour ratio 
is considerably reduced9. Even more important, the F-statistics reflecting the joint 
significance of the regression is twice that of the precedent case and the same occurs 
with the adjusted- R2. If we put these technological variables together -column (3)- the 
estimated coefficient of our preferred technological measure and its significance almost 
do not suffer any change and that of R&D intensity simply vanishes from the model
Column (4) only differs from column (1) in the inclusión of the sectorial 
dummies. It is clear that when considering sector-specific effects the coefficient on 
R&D intensity tums out to be small and far from signifícant10. However, although 
experimenting a decline, the coefficient on the “number of process innovations” variable 
remains highly signifícant -column (5)- denoting that even when accounting for 
differences among sectors the measure of the process innovation performance of a firm 
have a relevant impact on its own productivity growth. Moreover, the inclusión of 
dummies also reduces the parameter affecting the capital to labour ratio. If we assume 
constant retums to scale -column (6)- the coefficient affecting our technological variable 
suffers from a discrete fall but the parameter estimated of the physical capital increases
9 It is convenient to remember that there is not a problem of collinearity between these two variables. In
fact in this sample its correlation coefficient is only 0.11.
10 Other authors have also obtained this result. This effect is normally attributed to the existence of sector 
spillovers.
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a lot. For an explanation of this phenomenon it is enough to see in table (2) the existing 
correlation between the annual rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio and the rate of 
growth of labour. In any case, the assumption of constant retums to scale increases the 
relative importance of the physical capital in relation to the knowledge capital.
One of the key points of our contribution relies in the distinction made between 
product and process innovation. In this sense, the assumption is that, in principie, only 
process innovations would affect the rate of growth of firm’s productivity11. Therefore, 
there would exist an effect of product innovations on productivity only to the extend 
that they affect process innovations. As mentioned in the introduction, the detected 
relationship between these two variables is a quadratic one, that is, there exists a point, 
called “tuming point”, beyond which the process innovation performance of a company 
decreases with the number of product innovations it obtains. Following this reasoning, 
the foreseeable impact of the number of product innovations on a fírm’s productivity is 
not so clear because, in fact, we are not able to know exactly the relative weight of the 
firms located to the right of their specific tuming point, apart from the fact that this is 
really an indirect effect.
In order to test the impact of this variable in our regressions we have taken the 
average annual valué of the total number of product innovations obtained by a firm in 
the period considered (pdi). In column (7) we see that this variable has a negative 
impact on productivity growth although this is not signifícant. This result probably
11 As noted above, Griliches and Mairesse (1984) argüe that to the extend that the inflation correction 
does not account for intra-sectorial differences in price movements reflecting quality changes, their 
study encompasses both product and process R&D. For our point of view, this is not necessarily true
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reveáis that the impact of those firms beyond the “tuming point” in the sample is strong 
enough to induce this negative parameter estimated12. Curiously, the parameter 
estimated corresponding to the capital-labour ratio losses its significance at 5% level. 
However, if we assume constant retums to scale it is signifícant but with a smaller 
coefficient than the estimated without the use of this regressor. The coefficient on “pez” 
slightly declines and remains highly signifícant.
In previous work, when studying the relationship between product and process 
innovations, we tried some regressions restricting our sample by eliminating those firms 
that we considered to be exaggerating their product innovation performance. Therefore, 
we did not consider those firms with more than 10 product innovations “per line of 
business” in a given year13. By doing this, the relationship between these two variables 
became narrower. In the case at hand, we have been much more restrictive and we have 
eliminated those firms with a total number of product innovations that in a given year 
exceed the valué of 10, calling the new variable rpdi. As we can see in table (2), acting 
in this manner increases the correlation between product and “process” innovations to a 
point where we can start to think about a collinearity problem. In fact, presumably the 
probability that the number of firms beyond the “tuming point” in this sample is 
negligible is quite high.
because the effect of a process innovation could also be a reduction in price and, therefore, compénsate 
the above effect.
12 In fact, if we also include the square of the pdi variable a quadratic relationship appears although the 
coefficients are non-signifícant.
13 Note that because now we are working with firm’s productivity growth we have taken the total number 
of product innovations as a dependent variable.
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The result o f this experiment is shown in columns (9) and (10). As we can 
observe, “p d i ”  has a much greater coefficient than before and this is signifícant. In 
column (9), the coefficient on p c i  suffers a decline but remains with a marginal impact 
that doubles that o f product innovations. Things change if we assume constant retums to 
scale because in this case the coefficient on process innovations losses its significance in 
favour o f  the capital-labour ratio14. This last result is quite disappointing, although as we 
have already explained not very strange, but before trying to give any additional 
explanation we have to confirm it in our panel data estimates.
T able 3
Descriptive Statistics by sectors
S ecto r (Firms) q* kl I pci rd
1(23) 0.092 0.093 -0.051 0.65 0.005
2 (58) 0.027 0.085 -0.021 0.375 0.004
3 (6 1 ) 0.062 0.082 -0.010 0.61 0.026
4 (77) 0.017 0.059 -0.013 0.49 0.004
5 (43) 0.030 0.079 -0.038 0.61 0.017
6 (6 ) 0.050 0.048 -0.058 0.54 0.014
7 (75) 0.065 0.079 -0.014 0.68 0.015
8 (39) 0.100 0.120 -0.032 1.06 0.015
9(2 3 ) 0.019 0.100 -0.046 0.87 0.016
10(132) 0.043 0.074 -0.007 0.49 0.002
11 (88) 0.047 0.084 -0.038 0.45 0.005
12 (25) 0.029 0.041 0.006 0.33 0.003
13(103) 0.049 0.084 -0.016 0.39 0.003
14 (43) 0.056 0.090 -0.010 0.56 0.004
15(17) 0.058 0.140 -0.017 0.56 0.004
14 This does not occurs if we eliminate only the firms with more than 10 product innovations on average 
in the given period. However, we have deliberately chosen the most adverse situation.
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Table 4 
Cross-section estim ates
Ordinary Least Squares correctedfor heteroskedasticity 
(Dependent variable: average annual rate of growth of labour productivity)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
kl 0.21 ( 7 . 2 2 ) 0.14 ( 4 . 5 0 ) 0.14 ( 4 . 4 4 ) 0.09 ( 2 . 9 7 ) 0.08 ( 2 . 6 4 ) 0.19 ( 4 . 1 6 ) 0.058 ( 1 . 7 9 ) 0.12 65.45; 0.06 ( 1 . 8 2 ) 0.13 ( 3 . 4 9 )
1 -0.29 (-5.15) -0.32( - 5 . 4 9 ) -0.326-5.2S) -0.33 ( - 5 . 3 3 ) -0.346-5.50; - -0.25( - 4 . 8 8 ) - -0.25 ( - 4 . 6 8 ) -
rd 0.51 ( 1 . 9 8 ) - 0.033 ( 0 . 1 3 ) 0.032 { 0 . 1 3 ) - - - - - -
pci - 0.039 { 9 . 2 2 ) 0.038 ( 8 . 7 0 ) - 0.021 ( 4 . 3 8 ) 0.018 ( 3 . 6 2 ) 0.019 ( 4 . 1 8 ) 0.017(3.52) 0.013 ( 2 . 5 2 ) 0.009 ( 1 . 7 4 )
pdi “ ~ “ -0.82 E-04
( - 1 . 4 2 )
-0.76 E-04
( - 1 . 3 0 )
- -
rpd i - - - - - - - - 0.006 ( 2 . 0 3 ) 0.007 ( 2 . 4 0 )
firm s 813 813 813 813 813 813 762 762 683 683
dum m ies no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
F -stat 3 0 . 0 8  ( 0 . 0 0 ) 67.02 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 44.64 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 13.71 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 14.91 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 10.03 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 9.75 (0.00) 7.71 (0.00) 8.95 (0.00) 7.03 (0.00)
a d j - i ?
0.067 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.13
Note: T-ratios between brackets except for the F-stat reflecting probability valué.
Table 4 
Panel d a ta  estim ates
Period: 1990-94
(Dependent variable: annual rate o f  growth o f  labour productivity)
Fixed effects R andom  effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
kl 0.016 (0.75) 0.023 (0.99) 0.019 (0.89) 0.022 (0.94) 0.019 (0.86) 0.22 (13.67) 0.22 (12.99) 0.22 (14.9) 0.22 (12.92) 0.22 (13.69)
1 -0.51 (-17.03) -0.55 (-15.57) -0.56 (-17.36) -0.55 (-15.91) -0.55 (-16.01) - - - - -
rd -0.77 (-2.53) - - - - -0 .19 (-1.13) - - - -
rrd - -0.57 (-1.68) - - - - 0.032 (0.17) - - -
pci - - 0.02 (2.69) - 0.018 (2.08) - - 0.016 (3.53) - 0.012 (2.22)
rpdi ~ 0.0037
(0.95)
0.0024
(0.60)
* - “ 0.0051
(2.00)
0.0037
(1.46)
firm s 778 655 815 680 680 778 655 815 680 680
a d j - i ?
0.059 0.063 0.057 0.062 0.064 0.048 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.054
Note: T-ratios between brackets.
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The problem that appears with panel data estimates of equations (4') and (7) is 
that if we perform the regression by a simple OLS, implying that we assume just an 
overall constant term in the model, or altematively, if we take into account the 
individual effects (random or fixed) of each cross-sectional unit. Theoretically, the 
assumption of individual effects implies that firm-specific characteristics that are 
constant over time influence not the level of productivity but its growth rate15. If, as 
some authors argüe, the ability to innóvate persists over time and is firm-specific, this 
assumption seems quite sensible. In fact, the corresponding test statistic strongly rejects 
the assumption of considering the same intercept across units. Therefore, our model 
must be fixed or random effects. The discrimination between these two cases is usually 
derived from the Hausman test, in which it is tested the orthogonality of the individual 
effects and the regressors. An additional example of the difference that exists of 
assuming or not constant retums to scale is the fact that when we assume the existence 
of them the model has to be fixed effects whereas random effects have to be used if  this 
is not the case.
Our panel data estimates are showed in the second part of table (4). The first 
relevant thing to take into account is that, at the time level, the correlation between the 
rate of growth of the capital to labour ratio and the rate of growth of labour notably 
increases and, consequently, in the fixed effects model the coefficient affecting the 
physical capital is quite small and far from signifícant16 whereas in the random effects 
model a more sensible and signifícant parameter estimated is found. Now, R&D
15 We can assume, for instance, that the parameter of disembodied technical change is firm specific letting 
it as A ¡ .
16 Other authors have also obtained worse results in the within-units estimates. The explanation o f this 
fact has already been outlined in footnote 8.
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intensity exercises a negative effect on the rate of growth of labour productivity. This 
result is less strange than it seems at first sight because other authors, depending on the 
sample and period used, have also obtained a similar result. However, the coefficient of 
this variable, although negative, is usually non-signifícant. This clearly occurs in our 
random effects model but not in the fixed effects one in which it is highly signifícant. 
From the perspective of our theory, the explanation of this fact is derived from the effect 
exercised by those firms with a level of vertical product differentiation that is beyond 
the “tuming point”. In this case, its effect is not smoothed by the.calculation of annual 
average rates.
Consequently, we have decided for this case to eliminate again those firms with 
more than 10 product innovations in a given year. The variable representing the R&D 
intensity in this new sample is called rrd. As it can be observed, in the fixed effects 
model its coefficient, although it remains negative, is reduced and now non-significant. 
In contrast, in the random effects model it tums out to be positive but non-significant.
If we focus on our technological measure, it again appears positive and 
signifícant with a marginal effect very similar to that obtained in the cross-section 
estimates, experimenting a small decline when we assume constant retums to scale 
because of the increment in the relevance of the physical capital. If we include in the 
regression the “number of product innovations” variable (not presented in the table) its 
effect is now positive but very small and far from signifícant, detecting again a 
quadratic (but non-significant) relationship if we also include the square of this variable. 
As before, we have again decided to eliminate those firms with higher product
The impact ofprocess innovations on firm ’s productivity growth
innovation performance. Contrary to that occurred in the cross-section regression, this 
variable has completely lost its relevance in the within firms estimations. Including 
again in the regression our pci variable it just suffers from a slight fall in the 
corresponding coefficient and its significance. At this point, it is convenient to 
remember that our theoretical predictions made reference to relationships occurred 
within the firm and, to a lesser extend, across firms, because it is necessary to take into 
account specific firm and market characteristics such us degree of rivalry, technological 
opportunities, market dimensión..., that were considered as given. In this respect, the 
fixed effects model provides the best way to account for the mentioned features.
For its part, the random effects model gives a positive and signifícant parameter 
estimated of the rpdi variable if it stands in the regression alone reflecting the influence 
that the between-firms estimates exercises in this estimator. If we also include our pci 
variable the significance of rpdi vanishes, experimenting the former a non-drastic 
decline but it continuos to be highly signifícant.
From the comments above, it appears that the variable we have constructed to 
approximate the process innovation performance of a firm (pci) has a stable, consistent 
and permanent effect on the rate of growth of its labour productivity. We have just 
found an exception in which this variable has lost its significance and it has been for a 
very special case, specially considering that, by construction, this variable has probably 
a relevant constraint if we compare it with pdi, because we really do not have the exact 
number of process innovations of a firm and we do not have the possibility to compare
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this measure with the altemative. In any case, when we make a deeper study with panel 
data the aforementioned shortcoming does not appear as a problem.
Finally, we should give an approximation o f the relative importance o f  our 
technological variable. In fact, this implies to compare the impact o f the knowledge 
capital in relation to the physical capital. Given the assumptions o f section II and the 
special features o f our variable this is not an easy task. However, we can use a 
rudimentary and simple way to provide an approximation o f their respective effects. We 
can simply multiply the corresponding coefficient estimated by the average valué o f  the 
variable in the sample and we will have the estimated average impact o f  the 
corresponding regressor. If we divide this number by the average valué o f the dependent 
variable in the sample we obtain the percentage o f this last term explained by the first 
one. We will do this for equations (5) and (6) o f the cross-section estimations and for 
equation (3) o f the random effects model. We do not take into account the fixed effects 
estimation because in this case the physical capital is non-significant. The results are 
showed in table (5).
Im pact o f  physical and knowledge capital on labour productivity growth in percentage term s
T able 5
V ariab les kl pci
Cross-section
Equation (5) 13.66% 23.62%
Equation (6) 32.45% 20.25%
Panel data
Equation (3) 36.36% 18.28%
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As noted above, the conclusión essentially depends on the assumption about 
constant retums to scale but the effect of our preferred technological variable cannot be 
considered, in any case, as negligible. Above all when the measure of this variable is 
quite restrictive and its parameter estimated probably is underestimating the real effect.
V.5.- Conclusions
In the present chapter we have tried to disentangle what the impact is of the 
number of process innovations a firm declares to obtain in a given year on the rate of 
growth of its labour productivity. This focus is the consequence of two considerations. 
On the one hand, a clear differentiation between the role exercised by product and 
process innovations on a firm’s performance. As it is well known, the fírst one is 
directed to the improvement of the quality of the product whereas the second one lies in 
the reduction of the unit cost of production and, consequently, on productivity 
evolution. On the other hand, the assumption that the knowledge capital of a firm is 
mainly derived from its “successful” innovation process and not just from the amount 
spent on R&D. In this sense, we have considered to be more adequate to use the process 
innovation performance of a firm to account for the impact that knowledge capital has 
on productivity growth rather than considering, as other studies do, the R&D intensity.
The “cross-section” and “panel data” estimations demónstrate that our preferred 
technological variable has the predicted effect and is signifícant, showing that this result 
is robust under a wide range of specifications. Moreover, except for a special case in 
which we have performed some restrictions in the sample, the product innovation
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performance of a firm does not have a signifícant impact on our dependent variable. 
This implies not just that, on average, firms are telling the truth but that our predictions 
about the existence of a point beyond which the firm faces a trade-off between quality 
and productivity is reasonable and sensible.
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It is widely accepted that innovation is one of the main forces of economic 
growth and improvement of welfare in modem societies. As demonstrated by historical 
events, the emergence or decline of firms in dynamic economies is a consequence of the 
appearance of new or better products and production processes. For this reason, in the 
sixties, Economic Theory started to pay attention to the technological innovation 
phenomenon. For a long time, the studies focused on testing the hypothesis about this 
area which were established by the Schumpeter writers.
In fact, until recently, the research conducted in this fíeld has been directed to the 
study of the economic determinants of innovative activity or, more precisely, to the 
incentives that a firm has to spend resources on R&D in order to obtain an innovation. 
In the beginning, the two main candidates were firm size and market concentration, as a 
reflection of a certain degree of “monopoly power” that was considered to be one of the 
essential factors for investing in innovation. The research continued with the inclusión 
into the models of other variables reflecting the “pulí of demand”, the “push of 
technology” or extemalities, determinants more narrowly connected with the expected 
profitability of an innovation or with the degree of diffículty to obtain it. It is observed 
that, once taken into account these other factors, the first ones lost a great part of their 
relevance, probably revealing that they are a consequence and not a cause of the 
innovation process. Moreover, theoretical models also demónstrate that concentration 
and innovation are endogenously determined. In Chapter II we have made a revisión of 
this literature establishing what we consider to be its virtues and shortcomings.
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However, as we have pointed out throughout this research, in the different 
studies undertaken it has not been common to clearly distinguish the two aspects in 
which innovation can materialise: process innovation and product innovation. These two 
types of innovations have different incidence on firms performance. The first one is 
directed to the reduction of the unitary cost of production of the good whereas the 
second one improves the quality of the products the firm sells. Because both have a 
distinct impact on profits and in different ways, the standard assumption of considering 
innovation as a unitary whole may lead us to ignore some important connections of 
causality between these technological variables. Our aim is to differentiate both factors 
and to discover the link existing between them.
In Chapter III, we develop a model in which the incentives a firm has to invest in 
process innovation are determined paying special attention to the incidence that own 
vertical product differentiation exercises in the variable of interest. The point of 
departure comes from some interesting aspects of the product innovation model of Ulph 
(1991). In particular, this model establishes that the market share of a firm is determined 
by the relative position that the price-quality relationship of its product has in relation to 
that of the rival firms given consumer tastes. The resulting demand structure implies 
that each firm has a strategic interdependence with the rest of the firms in the market 
and that is the aspect of the model of Ulph in which we are more interested. Therefore, 
given the quality of the good, the firm will wish a specific price for its product that, in a 
context of Bertrand competition it will directly depend on cost. If we assume, as in 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), that the unitary cost of production is a function of the 
expenses on R&D by the firm, we can investigate the effect that (own and rival) quality
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has on this spending. In fact, the originality of our model lies in assuming the need for 
the spending on cost-reducing R&D in order to introduce a higher quality product into 
the market. Thus, we establish the existing relationship between the degree of product 
differentiation of a firm and its expenses on process R&D, as well as the effect of the 
rest of the parameters of the model: quality gap of the rival firm (rivalry), market 
dimensión and technological opportunities.
Our theoretical model shows that the incentive for cost reduction is increasing 
with vertical product differentiation until a point, that we have called “tuming point”, 
beyond which this relationship is reversed. This is because, as quality increases, the 
negative effect exercised on the price-elasticity of demand and on decreasing retums on 
marginal gain of process R&D grows in relation to the positive effect on “ex-ante” 
profits. Therefore, our main contribution lies in demonstrating that a quadratic 
relationship should exist between these two variables, with the identification of a point 
in which there starts to be a trade-off between quality and productivity within the firm. 
Moreover, the quality gap of the rival firm exercises a negative effect on cost reduction 
because “ex-ante” profits are reduced with this parameter contrary to that which occurs 
with market dimensión whereas technological opportunities have ambiguous effects. In 
this model, the strategic interdependence among firms in the market and the 
interrelation between product and process innovation gives no explicit role to firm size 
that, as we have pointed out, is assumed the result of the existent relative position of the 
price-quality relationship of each firm. In this respect, the argument of cost-sharing used 
in other studies to justify the importance of the “ex-ante” output (firm size) is 
substituted by that which we have called “ex-ante” profits.
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The results of the theoretical model are tested in Chapter IV. The estimations are 
based on a panel data analysis of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1990-94 
collected from the so-called "Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales " (Survey of Firm 
Strategies). Although the empirical specification reveáis some important shortcomings 
as, for instance, the lack of knowledge about the real relevance of innovations reported 
by firms, several important conclusions can be extracted from the econometric 
estimations.
The different estimations reported show us that we can be quite confident that 
the main result of the theoretical model is confirmed by the data. A significant quadratic 
relationship is obtained between a measure of the cost-reducing innovation performance 
of the firm (number of process innovations) and our preferred measure of its vertical 
product differentiation (number of product innovations per line of business). Thus, this 
demonstrates to be the first proof of the aforementioned trade-off between a reflection of 
the quality of the product of a firm and a variable that, by definition, determines its 
productivity growth, that is the main proposition we have tried to confirm.
The implications of this result are the following. The estimations performed 
imply that, in a given market, there are some firms for which the quality of their 
products is so high that the price (cost) is not a strategic variable. Consequently, these 
firms have less incentive to perform process innovations and its productivity evolution 
will suffer from this fact. Therefore, the firm that has created its own “niche” in the 
market will probably have a poorer productivity evolution. The point beyond which this 
occurs depends on the particular characteristics of each industry (technological
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opportunities, degree of rivalry, etc...). If we take this reasoning at an aggregate level, 
we can extract the conclusión that as the variety of the good increases and products 
become less homogeneous the rate of growth of firm productivity experience a decline.
Apart from this result, other interesting comments are necessary. Depending on 
the sample chosen (all the firms or only the “differentiated” ones) the predictions about 
the rest of the variables of the model are or are not accomplished. In particular, the 
degree of vertical product differentiation of the rival firms in the market {rivalry) will 
have a significant impact on the process innovation performance of a firm when we 
consider the whole sample but its relevance is substituted by a measure of “firm size” 
when we only consider the sample based on differentiated firms. The interpretation we 
have given to this result is that the firm takes into account the degree of rivalry in the 
market at the time of investment in order to search for a reduction in its unit cost of 
production if it does not really have a “brand loyalty” to their products. The reason is 
the stronger impact that, in this case, this variable presumably has on the foreseeable 
effect that a reduction in price has on the attraction of new consumers. By contrast, once 
obtained a certain degree of “brand loyalty” in the market, the largest firms have 
advantage for cost-reducing innovation. This provides an important nuance for those 
works that have studied the relationship existing between size and innovation.
Moreover, cross-section analysis has been performed to study the factors 
influencing process R&D intensity. The results obtained about the sectorial influence of 
this variable are quite sensible. On the one hand, “machinery”, “chemical”, “metal 
arricies” and “automobiles” are the sectors with higher performance on this type of
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spending. On the other hand, we find the “food, drink and tobáceo industry”. As the 
results also suggest, the unit cost of production is not signifícantly affected by the 
quality of the product which leads us to assume that product innovations are, in a great 
part, incremental.
As mentioned above, the main conclusión of the theoretical and empirical 
models presented is the identification of a point at which there starts to appear a 
relationship of substitution between quality and productivity within the firm. In order to 
sustain this conclusión, it is essential to investigate the validity of our intuitive premise 
which consists in assuming that the used proxy of the process innovation performance 
of a firm, a measure of the number of process innovations a firm obtains in a year, really 
determines its productivity evolution. In Chapter V we demónstrate that the selected 
variable is a clear determinant of the labour productivity growth of a firm, showing 
much better results than the standard R&D intensity.
Summarising, what we have demonstrated is that the productivity growth of a 
firm is determined in a direct manner by its process innovation performance and that, at 
the same time, this variable is strongly influenced in an specific way by its degree of 
vertical product differentiation. This has led us to establish the following proposition: 
when the degree of vertical product differentiation of a firm is high enough it faces a 
trade-off between quality and productivity. This is probably an additional explanation of 
the productivity slowdown observed since the decade of seventies in occidental 
economies.
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The research conducted here has had a clear purpose: to show that the studies 
that have tried to explain the factors influencing innovation by focusing on it in a 
generic manner or only in one of its two possible aspects (product or process) could be 
seriously misleading. This is because they have ignored the strategic interdependence 
existing among firms in a market that, in the final analysis, is responsible for the 
incentives the firm has in order to improve the quality of its product or reduce its cost of 
production.
We have tried to fill, although partially, this gap on the existing literature. A lot 
of things remain to be explained but we would be happy if we have opened a new door 
for a better understanding of our reality.
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Resumen
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PROCESS R&D: THE TRADE-OFF 
BETWEEN QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SPANISH FIRM
RESUMEN
El progreso tecnológico es un factor fundamental para el crecimiento económico 
y la mejora en el bienestar de la sociedad, por lo que resulta especialmente atractivo 
para los economistas el conocimiento de los mecanismos que lo impulsan y 
condicionan. Por este motivo, desde hace un par de décadas ha surgido un interés 
creciente en la literatura por el estudio de los determinantes que influyen en la 
asignación de recursos por parte de las empresas a la Investigación y Desarrollo (I+D) 
de nuevos productos y procesos productivos que conduzcan a una posible innovación.
A partir de los escritos de Schumpeter, una parte significativa de la literatura 
académica ha dirigido sus esfuerzos a profundizar en el estudio de los hipotéticos 
efectos positivos que una mayor “concentración del mercado” y “tamaño de la empresa” 
ejercen sobre la actividad innovadora. La “concentración del mercado” implica, por un 
lado, que las empresas disponen de un volumen de recursos propios elevado que les 
otorga una ventaja financiera mientras que, por otro lado, el mayor poder de monopolio 
confiere una mayor capacidad de cara a la apropiabilidad de los beneficios de la 
innovación. El interés por el “tamaño” se debe a la posible existencia de economías de 
escala en las actividades de I+D así como a su carácter de coste fijo para la empresa. De 
acuerdo con esta perspectiva, cuanto mayor es el número de empleados dedicados a 
actividades de mejora tecnológica mayor es su eficiencia, dado que las posibilidades 
existentes para una mejor división del trabajo se amplían de forma considerable. Del
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mismo modo, la productividad de una plantilla dedicada a la I+D es mayor en una 
empresa grande, debido a que la diversificación de actividades que se generan en su 
seno es superior. Además, cuanto mayor es el volumen de ventas de una empresa, 
menor resulta el coste (fijo) de la innovación por unidad de producto, lo que incentiva el 
destino de recursos a la misma. Este último aspecto es el que se denomina “argumento 
del reparto del coste” (“cost-spreading argument”), utilizado con frecuencia por algunos 
autores en defensa del efecto beneficioso que el tamaño de la empresa tiene sobre la 
innovación (i.e. Cohén y Klepper, 1996b).
En todo caso, la incidencia real que ejercen en la innovación las variables que se 
enmarcan en el concepto schumpeteriano de “empresa monopolística” no está resuelta y 
parece que la actividad tecnológica viene influida por otros determinantes cuya 
justificación económica es más sólida. Dos son los factores que han demostrado tener 
un mayor impacto en la decisión de destinar recursos a la innovación: las condiciones de 
demanda a las que se enfrenta la empresa o “tirón de la demanda” (“the pulí of 
demand”) y el entorno tecnológico en el que se desenvuelve la misma o “empuje de la 
tecnología” (“the push of technology”). Ambos elementos ofrecen una explicación más 
satisfactoria de los incentivos que mueven a una empresa en su evolución tecnológica 
que aquellos que se derivan de una determinada estructura de mercado.
Los fundamentos de dichos determinantes son los siguientes. El rendimiento que 
obtiene la empresa de la investigación está relacionado directamente con el número de 
unidades de producto que incorporan la nueva tecnología, por lo que, cuanto mayor sea 
el mercado potencial al que se enfrenta la empresa mayor será su incentivo a realizar
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I+D (Schmoockler, 1966). Dicho argumento descansa en el supuesto de que el 
conocimiento científico está lo suficientemente extendido y desarrollado como para que 
todas las industrias sean capaces de acceder a él a un coste similar, dirigiendo, por tanto, 
su esfuerzo innovador hacia aquellos segmentos del mercado que pueden resultar más 
provechosos. Asimismo, como ya se ha apuntado, el gasto efectuado por parte de las 
empresas en I+D puede tener la consideración de coste fijo, por lo que en este caso es 
igualmente aplicable el argumento del “reparto del coste”. Entornos tecnológicos más 
fértiles hacen, por otra parte, que la productividad de los recursos destinados a la 
innovación sea mayor y, en consecuencia, se incrementa la disposición de las empresas 
a dedicar esfuerzos a dicho gasto (Rosenberg, 1974). Por esta razón, las empresas 
situadas en aquellas industrias con mejores oportunidades tecnológicas tendrán una 
menor dificultad en transformar los inputs de la investigación en innovaciones 
presentando, por tanto, un progreso tecnológico más acentuado.
Los estudios empíricos muestran que ambos factores son relevantes en la 
explicación de la actividad innovadora de las empresas si bien divergen en cuanto a la 
medición de la importancia relativa de cada uno de ellos, tal y como se especifica en el 
Capitulo II.
Además de los determinantes de la innovación ya mencionados, existen otros 
dos aspectos del proceso de avance tecnológico que, por su propia naturaleza, han sido 
analizados con menor profundidad: la incertidumbre y los efectos externos. Cuando una 
empresa decide invertir una determinada cantidad de recursos en I+D, se enfrenta a un 
entorno de incertidumbre considerable porque, en realidad, desconoce los resultados que
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obtendrá de los mismos y el tiempo que empleará en alcanzarlos. Se trata, pues, de una 
inversión con un alto riesgo. Además, es bien conocido el carácter de bien público que, 
en un buen número de casos, presenta la innovación, lo que, si bien por un lado reduce 
los beneficios a obtener de la misma e induce a su protección a través, por ejemplo, de 
patentes, por otro, puede presentar efectos positivos si, como apunta Jaffe (1986), el 
coste de innovar se reduce por el efecto extemo que genera la investigación de las 
empresas situadas en un espacio tecnológico colindante. Surge, así, el denominado 
“problema de la apropiabilidad”.
La actividad innovadora ha sido definida de forma genérica en la mayor parte de 
los estudios aludidos (por ejemplo, gastos en I+D) de forma que no estamos seguros del 
tipo de innovación y las vías de transmisión del progreso técnico. Aunque la literatura 
no siempre lo define con claridad, cuando una empresa innova lo puede hacer por dos 
vías distintas. La primera es aquella cuya finalidad es la reducción de los costes 
unitarios de producción mediante la mejora del proceso productivo; es lo que se 
denomina innovación de proceso. La segunda va encaminada a la mejora de la calidad 
de los bienes (diferenciación vertical) o a la introducción de nuevos productos en el 
mercado; es lo que se llama innovación de producto.
Los modelos teóricos se han centrado por lo general tan sólo en alguno de los 
dos tipos de innovación o bien han tratado los gastos en I+D como un todo, 
independientemente del efecto diferenciado que cada uno de ellos tiene sobre los 
beneficios de la empresa. Siendo un hecho constatado que las empresas obtienen 
patentes en los dos tipos de innovación (o, en todo caso, destinan recursos a ambos)
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abordar sólo un aspecto puede dar una visión parcial del problema. Además, una 
innovación de producto lleva normalmente aparejada una innovación de proceso (Levin 
y Reiss, 1988), razón por la que el análisis se complica aún más. Por ello, recientemente 
han empezado a elaborarse en la literatura modelos teóricos que intentan explicar la 
relación existente en el seno de una empresa entre el gasto en I+D destinado a la 
innovación de producto y el dedicado a innovación de proceso (Bonanno y Haworth, 
1998, o Yin y Zuscovitch, 1998). En el terreno empírico se han hecho, paralelamente, 
algunas aproximaciones de los determinantes que influyen en cada tipo de innovación 
(Lunn, 1986, Levin y Reiss, 1988, Berstcheck, 1995, Cohén y Klepper, 1996a o 
Klepper, 1996).
En última instancia, el objetivo de la innovación (de proceso o producto) es la 
consecución de una mejor posición de la empresa frente a los rivales reales o potenciales 
y éste debería ser, en definitiva, el origen de la justificación económica de su actividad 
tecnológica. Es esencial considerar, por este motivo, el efecto diferencial que los 
distintos tipos de innovación tienen sobre el coste y la calidad del producto porque es 
indudable que éstos serán los factores primordiales en los que la empresa basará su 
posición competitiva.
Siguiendo este razonamiento, parece lógico pensar que las variables “tamaño de 
la empresa” y “concentración del mercado” son, esencialmente, el resultado de la 
posición relativa que las distintas empresas ocupan en su relación calidad-precio con 
respecto a sus competidores. Si consideramos que tanto el precio como la calidad del 
producto se ven influidos por los recursos que la empresa destina a la innovación, no es
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de extrañar la conexión de endogeneidad que la literatura postula entre concentración e 
I+D, así como la confusión existente acerca de la dirección en la cual la dimensión de la 
empresa incide sobre su actividad tecnológica.
Siguiendo estas premisas y basándonos en el modelo de innovación de producto 
de Ulph (1991), suponemos que la cuota de mercado de la empresa viene determinada 
por la posición que, en términos de precio y calidad, ocupa su producto en relación a los 
productos de las empresas rivales. Así, dada una distribución de los gustos de los 
consumidores, cada uno de ellos elegirá aquel bien para el cual se minimiza la relación 
precio-calidad. La función de demanda individual que se obtiene incorpora en sus 
argumentos, aparte del precio y calidad propios, el precio y la calidad de la empresa 
rival, por lo que, existe una interdependencia estratégica entre empresas en el mercado, 
aspecto del modelo de Ulph objeto de nuestro principal interés. Si tomamos como dadas 
las calidades de los bienes, la empresa deseará establecer aquel precio que maximice sus 
beneficios que, en un contexto de competencia de Bertrand, dependerá directamente del 
coste de producción. Si además suponemos, como hacen Dasgupta y Stiglitz (1980), que 
el coste unitario de producción de la empresa está determinado por su gasto en I+D en 
innovación de proceso, seremos capaces de investigar acerca de los determinantes que 
influyen en dicha variable.
El modelo teórico se desarrolla en el capítulo III. Partiendo de los supuestos 
señalados sobre el comportamiento de empresas y consumidores, introducimos la 
decisión de gasto en I+D de proceso por parte de la empresa con el fin de investigar la 
influencia de los distintos parámetros del modelo (diferenciales de calidad de la empresa
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analizada y la rival en relación a las empresas no innovadoras, tamaño del mercado y 
oportunidades tecnológicas) en el incentivo que la empresa posee para reducir su coste 
de producción. Nuestro principal objetivo se centra en conocer el efecto que la propia 
diferenciación (vertical) del producto ejerce sobre el incentivo a invertir en innovación 
de proceso. Es éste un aspecto que no ha sido tratado en la literatura sino de forma 
tangencial y, en todo caso, obviando la interrelación existente por motivos estratégicos 
entre calidad y coste1.
Debido a la interdependencia estratégica entre empresas y a que, siguiendo a 
Ulph, se considera competencia de Bertrand en el mercado de productos (el precio del 
bien depende directamente tanto del coste unitario de producción como del diferencial 
de calidad), ha sido necesario recurrir a simulaciones numéricas para contrastar la 
importancia relativa de los incentivos que el análisis teórico ha detectado acerca del 
impacto que la diferenciación propia ejerce sobre el gasto en I+D en innovación de 
proceso. Las simulaciones revelan la existencia de una relación cuadrática entre dichas 
variables, siendo ésta la aportación más novedosa de la investigación. Así, el modelo 
teórico muestra cómo el incentivo que una empresa tiene para la reducción del coste de 
producción se incrementa con la diferenciación vertical de su producto (calidad) hasta 
un punto, al que hemos denominado “tuming point” (punto de inflexión), más allá del 
cual sucede justamente lo contrario. La explicación de este hecho se debe a que, a 
medida que se incrementa el diferencial de calidad del bien, el efecto negativo ejercido 
sobre la elasticidad-precio de la demanda así como sobre los rendimientos decrecientes
1 En términos generales, la literatura no ha tomado en consideración el efecto que la diferenciación del 
producto pueda tener en la innovación tecnológica. Algunos apuntes en esta materia, sobre todo 
respecto a la influencia que la diferenciación pueda tener en la relación concentración-gasto en I+D, los 
encontramos en Comanor (1967) y Shrieves (1978).
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en el ingreso marginal del I+D en innovación de proceso crece en relación al efecto 
positivo que ejerce sobre lo que se ha denominado beneficios “ex-ante”.
Otros resultados del modelo muestran como el diferencial de calidad de la 
empresa rival incide de forma negativa sobre el incentivo que la empresa tiene a la 
reducción del coste unitario de producción debido a que los beneficios “ex-ante” caen 
con este parámetro, contrariamente a lo que sucede con el tamaño del mercado (empuje 
de la demanda) mientras que las oportunidades tecnológicas tienen un efecto ambiguo. 
Asimismo, el efecto del diferencial de calidad propio sobre la intensidad del I+D en 
innovación de proceso (I+D sobre ventas) será positivo o negativo en función de si 
suponemos que la calidad del producto entra a formar parte de la función de costes de la 
empresa o no.
Como se ha indicado anteriormente, una parte importante de la literatura ha 
dirigido su atención a las variables “tamaño de la empresa” y “concentración del 
mercado” como determinantes de la actividad tecnológica de las empresas. En nuestro 
caso, dichos factores no se consideran de forma explícita en el modelo sino que la 
variable “diferenciación vertical del producto” (en relación al precio) las sustituye. Por 
tanto, es interesante contrastar si esta sustitución es adecuada. Si así fuera, el debate 
acerca de la conveniencia de una determinada estructura de mercado como impulsora de 
la actividad innovadora tendría mucho menor sentido, cobrando mayor importancia las 
características del bien en cuestión y las posibilidades que el mismo brinda a la 
competencia estratégica entre empresas. Desde esta perspectiva, se pretende demostrar 
que los determinantes de la actividad innovadora están relacionados directamente con la
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competencia estratégica entre empresas, lo que implica interdependencia entre 
innovación de producto y proceso.
El interés central de la investigación se centra, adicionalmente, en comprobar si 
se cumplen las predicciones del modelo teórico propuesto, esto es, nuestra intención es 
averiguar el grado de influencia que la diferenciación vertical de producto tiene en las 
ganancias de productividad de las empresas y si, llegado un punto, existe o no una 
relación entre ambas variables, sacrificándose mejoras en la reducción de costes a 
cambio de incrementos en el bienestar. En definitiva, el problema a resolver es si la 
obtención de una mayor diferenciación del producto es a costa o no de un menor 
crecimiento.
La contrastación del modelo teórico se realiza en el Capítulo IV. La fuente de 
datos utilizada es la “Encuesta se Estrategias Empresariales” elaborada por la Fundación 
Empresa Pública que recoge, para el periodo 1990-94, información acerca de un amplio 
abanico de variables para una muestra representativa de empresas. En la especificación 
del modelo empírico se ha recurrido a la realización de algunas simplificaciones para 
proceder a la estimación, intentando siempre el mínimo alejamiento posible de la 
esencia del modelo teórico. Mediante la utilización de datos de panel donde la variable 
dependiente es discreta (número de innovaciones de proceso) y las independientes2 se 
suponen débilmente exógenas, se comprueba cómo, en todo caso, las estimaciones
2 La diferenciación de producto se ha medido por el número de innovaciones de producto “por línea de 
negocio” de cada empresa, para la rivalidad se ha construido un índice que refleja la diferenciación de 
las empresas rivales en relación a la media del mercado, el “tirón de la demanda” se mide por la 
“utilización de la capacidad productiva de la empresa” mientras que el número de empleados refleja el 
“tamaño” de la misma. Esta última la hemos tomado como “variable control” para contrastar la validez 
de nuestra proposiciones.
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confirman la principal proposición del modelo teórico, cual es, la existencia de una 
relación cuadrática entre innovación de proceso y diferenciación vertical. Por lo tanto, 
se identifica la existencia de un punto a partir del cual se observa una relación de 
sustitución entre calidad y productividad en el seno de la empresa.
En relación al resto de variables las predicciones se cumplen o no dependiendo 
de la muestra escogida: el conjunto de empresas o tan sólo aquellas que presentan un 
cierto grado de diferenciación de su producto. Más concretamente, la medida de la 
rivalidad tiene el impacto esperado en nuestra variable dependiente y además es 
significativo con el nivel de confianza habitual si consideramos toda la muestra, pero su 
importancia se ve relegada por el “tamaño” cuando nos centramos en la muestra 
restringida. La explicación que le hemos dado a este fenómeno es que la empresa tiene 
en cuenta el grado de rivalidad en el mercado a la hora de invertir en innovación de 
proceso si no dispone realmente de una “imagen de marca” de sus productos. La razón 
estriba en que si la empresa está escasamente diferenciada y la rivalidad es alta, en el 
sentido de que las empresas del entorno están diferenciadas de forma considerable, una 
reducción en el coste unitario de producción (y, por tanto, en el precio) tendrá 
previsiblemente efectos muy limitados sobre la atracción de nuevos consumidores. 
Debido a que la innovación es costosa, el incentivo para destinar recursos a la misma 
cae con el grado de diferenciación de las empresas rivales. Por otra parte, una vez se ha 
conseguido una cierta “imagen de marca” en el mercado el mecanismo apuntado pierde 
buena parte de su impacto y, por tanto, las empresas más grandes parece que disponen 
de ciertas ventajas para la innovación de proceso, cobrando relevancia el argumento del 
“reparto de coste” de Cohén y Klepper (1996a,b). Este resultado ofrece un matiz que se
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debe tener presente en aquellos trabajos que pretendan estudiar la relación existente 
entre tamaño de la empresa e innovación.
Cuando nos referimos a la intensidad en el gasto en I+D, la estimación, además 
de reflejar diferencias sectoriales substanciales, sugiere que la calidad del bien no entra 
a formar parte de manera significativa de la función de costes de la empresa lo que, a 
nuestro juicio, implica que las innovaciones de producto declaradas por la empresa son, 
en su mayor parte, increméntales. Este resultado, en todo caso, debe tomarse con 
cautela, dado que la muestra que se ha dispuesto para el estudio de este aspecto concreto 
es muy restringida.
La investigación no estaría del todo completa si no confirmáramos una de las 
principales premisas establecidas y que consiste en suponer que la medida que hemos 
tomado como reflejo de aquella actividad innovadora de la empresa encaminada hacia la 
reducción de su coste unitario de producción (número de innovaciones de proceso), 
tiene un impacto significativo en la evolución de su productividad.
Este estudio se realiza en el Capítulo V. A partir de una función de producción 
del tipo Cobb-Douglas ampliada con la inclusión de un factor productivo que refleja el 
capital tecnológico, se contrasta nuestra hipótesis estableciendo dos supuestos que no 
han sido normalmente tenidos en cuenta en este tipo de trabajos. Se supone, en primer 
lugar, que la innovación de proceso es la variable tecnológica responsable de los 
avances en productividad, en tanto que la innovación de producto sólo tiene la función 
de mejorar la calidad del bien. En segundo lugar, en vez de considerar el montante
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invertido por una empresa en I+D como el principal componente de su capital 
tecnológico o de conocimiento, suponemos que el proceso de aprendizaje es mediante la 
realización exitosa del proyecto y, por tanto, nos centramos en las innovaciones 
obtenidas. Las estimaciones llevadas a cabo reflejan que la variable tecnológica 
escogida tiene un efecto significativo en la evolución de la productividad de la empresa 
siendo este resultado robusto bajo diversas especificaciones econométricas. En todo 
caso, nuestra variable se comporta de mucho mejor modo que los gastos en I+D sobre 
ventas (intensidad en el I+D), que es la variable que la mayor parte de la literatura había 
escogido hasta este momento.
En resumen, hemos demostrado que el crecimiento de la productividad de una 
empresa viene directamente afectado por su innovación de proceso y que, al mismo 
tiempo, esta variable se ve influida de forma importante y en un sentido muy concreto 
por el grado en que su producto está verticalmente diferenciado. Esto nos ha llevado a 
establecer una proposición: cuando el grado de diferenciación vertical del producto de 
una empresa es suficientemente elevado, dicha empresa se enfrenta a una relación de 
sustitución entre calidad y productividad. Probablemente, esta sería una explicación 
adicional de la caída en la evolución de la productividad observada desde finales de la 
década de los setenta en las economías occidentales. En todo caso, es ésta una 
conclusión arriesgada.
La investigación llevada a cabo ha tenido un propósito claro: demostrar que los 
estudios que han intentado explicar los determinantes de la innovación y que se han 
centrado en la misma de forma genérica o únicamente en uno de sus dos posibles
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aspectos (proceso o producto) pueden adolecer de importantes deficiencias. Esto es así, 
debido a que han obviado la interdependencia estratégica existente en un mercado en el 
sentido apuntado que, en última instancia, es la responsable de los incentivos que tiene 
una empresa con el fin de mejorar la calidad de su producto o reducir su coste de 
producción.
En definitiva, el presente trabajo ha tratado de avanzar en el estudio de la 
innovación con la intención de contribuir en la medida de lo posible a la apertura, en 
este sector, de nuevos caminos, diferenciando claramente el impacto desigual que el 
incremento de la calidad del producto o la reducción de su coste de producción tienen 
sobre los beneficios empresariales, así como la interrelación existente entre ambos tipos 
de mejoras.
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